Talk:International recognition of Palestine

Proposal to streamline the section “States that do not recognise Palestine”

The current version contains numerous paragraphs that go far beyond the latest known position of each government, including historical or repeatedly stated positions. This makes the section difficult to read.

My proposal for shortening is based on uniform criteria applied to all states:

1. To be kept: – the latest known official position (preferably the most recent statement), – explicit conditions for possible recognition, – a brief note if the stance has recently shifted significantly.

2. To be shortened: – outdated long quotations without added value beyond the bare position, – historical episodes or positions no longer relevant to the current stance, – repetitions of the same position across several years.

According to these criteria, the following states require shortening:

• Austria: Details from 1978 (PLO representation) and long quotations from Spindelegger (2011) are unnecessary; it suffices to note the government’s wait-and-see approach at the time.

• Croatia: Earlier positions from 2011 and 2014, as well as the lengthy explanation regarding U.S./EU alignment, are no longer relevant; the current stance of President Milanović (2025) should remain.

• Denmark: Quotations from 2011 and the 2014 parliamentary debate are redundant; what matters are the 2025 conditions.

• Eritrea: Afewerki’s 2010 “Transjordan” remark and the 2011 UNGA speech can be omitted; the 2024/2025 statements remain.

• Germany: Merkel’s extensive quotations from 2011 are no longer relevant; the current position of Chancellor Merz (2025) should remain.

• Greece: Historical passages from the 1980s and 1990s are unnecessary; Mitsotakis’ statement from 2025 is decisive.

• Italy: Berlusconi’s 2011 remarks and the 2011/2012 UN votes are not essential; the recognition conditions stated by Meloni/Tajani (2025) should remain.

• Japan: Earlier developments from 2007–2012 can be removed; the 2024/2025 positions are relevant.

• Liechtenstein: References to 2011/2012 resolutions are not central; Monauni’s 2025 statement should remain.

• Lithuania: The 2011 statement is dispensable; the 2025 position is key.

• Singapore: Historical references to the Ramallah office are not necessary; the 2025 conditions should remain. 176.1.199.221 (talk) 10:15, 12 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]

For countries with a dedicated article such as Austria–Palestine relations we can indeed shorten and link to that article. For others such as Singapore, if the information is backed by reliable sources then there is no reason to remove it. a455bcd9 (Antoine) (talk) 10:01, 13 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Request to correct percentage in lead paragraph

The percentage given in the first sentence of the lead is incorrect. 157 ÷ 193 = 81.35%, so it should say "over 81%" rather than "over 80%." 12.133.95.205 (talk) 21:37, 14 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]

“Over 80%” is fine. 80 is the nearest “nice number”. “Over 81%” is horribly precise. 2001:8003:424F:D100:6D1D:ACF2:4D9A:2EC9 (talk) 09:05, 16 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
In the International recognition of Israel and International recognition of Kosovo articles, the lead paragraphs state "approximately 83%" and "56% respectively. Are those not also "horribly precise?" 12.133.95.204 (talk) 16:21, 17 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
User:Demoxica 12.133.95.204 (talk) 16:15, 17 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Mexico's recognition

I've just clarified and expanded the note for Mexican recognition in the table. The sources did not, and do not, justify denouncing the June 2023 date as categorically incorrect. In fact, though I've held off on changing it, I think that probably is the most correct date, since it's very unlikely that the Palestinians would have unilaterally "upgraded" to an embassy without, quiet approval from the Mexican government - much less without any kind of objection. The UN document may also have been based on nonpublic communications from the Mexican government, and the WayBack Machine shows that a government website listed a Palestinian embassy in September 2023 but not May 2023 (though this is probably WP:OR).

And that date is probably the closest thing we're going to get, since the current administration's position appears to consistently be "we've recognized Palestine for years already" - clearly they're deliberately avoiding the attention/accountability that comes with a public announcement that "recognition starts now". The source for the February 2025 date currently being used in the table is for a statement from the president that Mexico has already recognized Palestine since before her predecessor, NOT that she's declaring the beginning of recognition.

I'm not exactly sure about what to do with which date to use in the table here, and I imagine that would be much more controversial for me to change, so I'll just leave it here for potential discussion for now. GeoEvan (talk) 00:31, 20 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Further details for Kenya

Several sources state that Kenyan MPs were urging the government to recognize Palestine. ([1], [2], [3]) However, President William Ruto affirmed that Kenya has recognized Palestine as a state since 1989. Should we add this as further details? Underdwarf58 (talk) 00:22, 23 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Too much detail. Parliaments around the world contain MPs who make call for governments to do things they're already doing. This article is about the recognition of Palestine, not the ignorance of some parliamentarians in another country. Timrollpickering (talk) 10:34, 23 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Belgium

Correct me if I'm wrong, but doesn't Belgium recognize Palestine? Dynamismcool (talk) 00:22, 19 November 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Have you read what the article says about Belgium? Do you feel that it doesn't explain the current situation correctly? Myself, I find it somewhat confusing because sources as of September 23, such as [4], state that Belgium has given Palestinian conditional recognition. To me, that sounds like recognitio—with a warning but, still, recognition. But then that same source also says Although Mr De Wever confirmed that Belgium is sending out a “strong political and diplomatic signal”, he stressed that full legal recognition would only follow once all hostages are released, Hamas is removed from power and elections are held in Palestine. Diplomatic relations, the presence of embassies in each other’s capitals and international agreement between Belgium and Palestine will be dependent on Hamas disarming. So it isn't recognition. Or, at least, not "full" recognition. I don't know what's meant by partial recognition. Perhaps for purposes of this article only full recognition is being considered. Largoplazo (talk) 16:32, 19 November 2025 (UTC)[reply]