The Battle for Glina was an armed conflict between a Knindža unit supported by the JNA against the joint forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Army. Two battles were fought in Glina and both ended in serbian victories as they managed to capture of the police station, which became part of SAO Krajina.[1]

Background

In January 1991, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Srpska Krajina was founded, which sought to unite all police stations that were not under the control of the authorities in Zagreb.[2]

For this reason, a message was sent to the police stations in Knin, Obrovac, Benkovac, Gračac, Donji Lapac, Titova Korenica, Dvor, Glina, Kostajnica and Vojnić that they have joined the Interior Ministry of SAO Krajina. As these were towns with a Serb ethnic majority population, the subordination to the authorities in Knin was mostly voluntary.[3]

Course of the Battles

First battle

The first clashes in Glina took place on June 26 of 1991. During these clashes, an infantry group of the Croatian National Guard (ZNG) arrived in town while the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), held the entire region around Glina, according to the statements of Dragan Vasiljković which were also indirectly confirmed by Croatian sources.[2] In short-lived skirmishes, one Croatian policeman was killed, Tomislav Rom, and another one was wounded, Ivan Šantek.[2] The Croatian policemen were offered to leave the town and go towards Jukinac. After this retreat, the Serb forces marched towards the Glina police station and occupied it.[4]

Second battle

Exactly a month after the first battle, on July 26 of 1991, a group of 21 Kninjas under the command of Dragan Vasiljković entered the city, and with them eight more volunteers. According to the statements of Vasiljković, they came to the reconnaissance and had no idea how many members of the Croatian forces were there, otherwise they would not have attacked the city if they had known that there were between 600 and 650.[5] These volunteers managed to agree with the lieutenant of the JNA, Bojan Drobnjak, that provide them with tank support in the event of an attack on Croatian positions.[6]

Battle of Glina The Battle of Glina was a turning point in the war in Krajina and a demonstration of how a small but well-organized unit could achieve victory over a numerically superior enemy.

Preparations for the Operation The news of Glina falling into Croatian hands was a heavy blow to Krajina. Captain Dragan immediately decided to return to Knin and requested transport from Franko Simatović. Simatović quickly arranged a helicopter to transfer him from Belgrade to Knin. Upon landing, he met with Mile Martić, who had no concrete information about the situation on the ground. Martić was desperate, as Glina was a key defensive point for Banija.

Franko Simatović soon provided updates: Croatian forces had taken control of the police station and established a strong defense, while the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) had positioned a tank brigade as a buffer zone. However, the situation was chaotic—most Serbs had left Glina, and the JNA was acting passively and unreliably. Captain Dragan decided to conduct a reconnaissance mission with twenty selected special forces operatives.

Reconnaissance Mission and Plan Upon arriving in Glina, Captain Dragan attempted to establish contact with JNA Colonel Grujica Borić, but Borić refused to cooperate. The JNA was maintaining a demarcation line between Croatian and Serbian forces but had no intention of intervening. A crucial moment came when Captain Dragan met a young JNA officer, Bojan Drobnjak, who offered tank support if an attack was organized.

Based on detailed intelligence provided by Drobnjak, Captain Dragan devised a plan: a small team of special forces led by Saša Medaković was to open fire on Drobnjak’s tank from the Croatian side, triggering a response and facilitating the takeover of the police station. Simultaneously, Drobnjak would fire at Croatian machine gun nests and armored vehicles stationed in front of the police station.

The Battle of Glina The operation started according to plan, but a problem arose—Colonel Borić ordered Drobnjak’s tank to relocate. As a result, instead of supporting the attack, the JNA mistakenly opened fire on Captain Dragan’s men, thinking they were under attack from the Croatians. Despite this incident, Drobnjak successfully destroyed four Croatian machine gun nests, causing panic among Croatian forces.

However, Borić ordered all JNA tanks to withdraw to the center of Glina and refused further support. Captain Dragan was furious, realizing that the JNA was deliberately sabotaging the operation. Nevertheless, the Knindže continued their assault and managed to block access to the police station, preventing reinforcements from Jukinec and Viduševac.

The Liberation of Glina After a full day of fighting, the JNA unexpectedly requested a two-hour ceasefire to evacuate Croatian wounded. Captain Dragan agreed, but soon realized that the JNA had used this opportunity to evacuate all Croatian forces from the station. On the morning of July 28, 1991, Serbian forces entered the now-abandoned police station.

Inside, they found symbols of Ustaša units, weapons, and propaganda materials, including a bounty offer of $25,000 for Mile Martić’s head. While Croatian media later claimed they withdrew due to a JNA attack, the reality was different—a smaller but disciplined Knindže unit had won the battle.

Impact on Morale and Further Operations Captain Dragan’s statement at the press conference further demoralized the enemy. When he jokingly announced that he was heading for Kostajnica, Croatian forces took his words seriously and withdrew without a fight, leaving the city empty.

After victories in Glina and Kostajnica, Captain Dragan faced internal issues—near Dvor na Uni, a Serbian paramilitary unit had committed crimes against Croatian civilians. Captain Dragan immediately intervened, disarmed, and arrested those responsible, insisting on justice. This sent a clear message that war should not be an excuse for atrocities.

Conclusion The Battle of Glina was one of the rare instances in the war where a smaller, less-equipped Serbian unit managed to defeat a numerically superior enemy through tactics, discipline, and strong intelligence preparation. Success was achieved with minimal casualties, further boosting the morale of Serbian fighters. Although the JNA played a duplicitous role, the Knindže proved that determination and bravery could shift the course of war.

References

  1. ^ Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis. 2002. p. 93. ISBN 978-0-16-066472-4.
  2. ^ a b c "'We watched on television how the Parliament proclaimed the independence of Croatia, and the next day they attacked us'". Vecernji list (in Croatian). 2015-06-26. Retrieved 2024-05-19.
  3. ^ Publications, Europa (1999). Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, 1999. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-85743-058-5.
  4. ^ Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis. 2002. p. 234. ISBN 978-0-16-066472-4.
  5. ^ "Captain Dragan - We won the battle for Glina". ktv.rs (in Serbian). 2020-08-12. Retrieved 2024-05-19.
  6. ^ Rupić, Marko, ed. (2007). Republika Hrvatska i Domovinski rat 1990. – 1995. – Dokumenti, Knjiga 1 [The Republic of Croatia and the Croatian War of Independence 1990–1995 – Documents, volume 1] (PDF). Zagreb, Croatia: Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata. ISBN 978-953-7439-03-3. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2016-11-26. Retrieved 2014-03-07.
Allikas: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Glina_(1991)
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