Alternative (political bloc)

Alternative
Alternativa
AbbreviationBA
BeA
LeaderIon Ceban (de facto)[1][2]
Parliamentary group leaderGaik Vartanean
FounderIon Ceban
Alexandr Stoianoglo
Ion Chicu
Mark Tkachuk
Founded31 January 2025 (2025-01-31)
Ideology
Political positionCentre[8] to centre-left[1]
Member partiesMAN
PDCM
PAC–CC
Colours  Teal
Parliament
8 / 101
District presidents
3 / 32
Website
https://bloculalternativa.md/

Alternative (Romanian: Blocul politic „Alternativa” or Blocul electoral „Alternativa”, lit.'"Alternative" political bloc' or '"Alternative" electoral bloc', BA or BeA) is a political alliance in Moldova founded in 2025 by incumbent Mayor of Chișinău Ion Ceban, 2024 presidential candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo, former Prime Minister Ion Chicu, and former MP Mark Tkachuk.[9]

The alliance presents itself as pro-European and claims to consider European integration to be a major objective for Moldova.[10] Its real commitment to pro-Europeanism has been disputed,[5][6] with TVP World stating that the bloc was regarded by the European Union (EU) and the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) in Moldova as a "Trojan horse" designed to stall Moldova's accession talks to the EU "from within".[5] The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace described these accusations as a campaign tactic from PAS, which would have sought to present itself as the single viable pro-European force.[11]

Member parties

The members of the bloc are the National Alternative Movement (MAN), the Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova (PDCM), and the Common Action Party – Civil Congress (PAC–CC), as well as a number of independent politicians. At a time shortly after the bloc's founding, the PDCM was the bloc member with the most developed party network in Moldova of the three, having for instance obtained over 5% of votes in local and district councils at the 2023 local elections in comparison to MAN which obtained under 2% and the PAC–CC which obtained even less.[12]

Party Abbr. Leader Ideology Position List seats[13] Elected MPs
National Alternative Movement MAN Ion Ceban Social democracy Centre-left
55 / 106
3 / 8
Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova PDCM Ion Chicu Christian democracy Centre to centre-right
32 / 106
2 / 8
Common Action Party – Civil Congress PAC–CC Mark Tkachuk
Iurie Muntean
Democratic socialism Left-wing
10 / 106
1 / 8
Independents Ind. Alexandr Stoianoglo Nonpartisan
9 / 106
2 / 8

Positions

According to its leaders, the four pillars of the bloc's political program are pro-Europeanism, economic liberalisation, neutrality, and national reunification.[14] Despite its economic liberalism, it also supports strong social welfare programs, specifically in support of families, the elderly, children,[3] and people with autism or ADHD.[15] Additionally, the bloc advocates for sustainable development and environmental sustainability.[16][17][18]

According to its website, the Alternative bloc promotes a political platform based on human values, respect for diversity, professionalism in defending the public interest, and openness to sustainable international partnerships. The bloc views European integration as Moldova's most important constructive challenge, seeing it as a path to lasting development and national unity.[19]

In its manifesto, Alternative stated that European Union (EU) membership was only possible for Moldova after the reintegration of its Russian-backed unrecognized breakaway region of Transnistria; the EU had already clarified that resolving the Transnistria conflict would not be a precondition for accession. Alternative also argued that EU accession was only possible once Moldova's neutrality had been "consolidated" despite neutrality being already enshrined in the Constitution of Moldova and the EU not being a military alliance. According to Balkan Insight, the framing of this issue mirrored Russian propaganda, which deliberately blurred the line between EU accession and NATO membership.[20]

On the day of the bloc's founding, Ceban stated "So that there are no questions, we advocate for European integration as a major objective of the country. We speak and write in the Romanian language. We know that there is a war and an aggression in the East against Ukraine. And our focus must be on the needs of the people, of our citizens."[21]

On the national identity question, the bloc positions itself as anti-Moldovenist without advocating for the unification of Moldova and Romania.[10] However, despite this position, the bloc has announced its willingness to collaborate with all other political parties, including unionist ones.[22]

Media outlets have variously called the bloc centrist[8] or centre-left.[1][23] According to Moldovan political analyst Valeriu Pașa, it is seeking to occupy the political space formerly held by the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) prior to its electoral collapse in the 2021 parliamentary election.[1] For its part, the Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) think tank stated that Alternative sought to attract what it described the "neither-nor" electorate, i.e. neither Russia nor the West.[24]

Accusations of false pro-Europeanism

In an article for Deutsche Welle, Moldovan journalist Vitalie Călugăreanu described the Alternative bloc as "false pro-Europeans". He pointed out the past affiliations of its leaders with the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) and stated that, according to political analysts, if the bloc were to enter the parliament, its goal would be to torpedo Moldova's accession into the EU from within.[25]

Călugăreanu pointed out that, in 2014, Ceban protested in Brussels against the signing of the Moldova–European Union Association Agreement;[25] he also promoted that year the 2014 Gagauz referendums on Gagauzia's independence and its accession into the Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union.[26] In February 2024, Ceban stated that he did not regret his communist and socialist past and that he had always been sincere.[25] According to Moldovan political analyst Ion Tăbârță, since assuming the leadership of his party, the MAN, Ceban sought to move from the left-wing parties in which he began and consolidated his political career, the PCRM and the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), to the right of the spectrum. However, as Tăbârță stated, Ceban and the MAN tended to be viewed questionably by right-wing parties, especially by the then ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS); these considered him a Russian "Trojan horse" with the aim of taking part of the pro-European vote according to Tăbârță.[12]

As for the other leaders of the bloc, Călugăreanu pointed out Stoianoglo's poor knowledge of the Romanian language and that he was supported by the pro-Russian vote in the 2024 presidential election; that Chicu was Minister of Finance during Moldovan oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc's regime and advisor and later Prime Minister to pro-Russian President Igor Dodon, having in the past blamed European officials for "the disaster the Republic of Moldova has reached"; and that Tkachuk was an advisor to president Vladimir Voronin, of the PCRM, and that in 2014, after he left the PCRM, Tkachuk advocated for a referendum on Moldova's accession to the Eurasian Customs Union.[25] In his term as parliament member from 2009 to 2014, Stoianoglo was part of the Alliance for European Integration.[26] On 10 September 2025, Tkachuk stated that the 2003 Kozak memorandum to turn Moldova into a federation should have been signed. The memorandum aimed to make Russian an official language in Moldova,[27] allow the stationing of Russian troops in the country for 20 years and award Transnistria and Gagauzia veto power[28] in the Parliament of Moldova.[27] Tkachuk's declaration sparked a protest by dozens of Transnistrian War veterans two days later.[27][28]

With regards to the 2024 Moldovan European Union membership constitutional referendum, the MAN registered as a participant in the referendum, supporting the "yes" option. Meanwhile, even though the PDCM signed the Pact for Europe, a multi-party agreement aimed at promoting Moldova's European integration, the party boycotted the referendum. Stoianoglo did not participate in the referendum either, stating that this decision was "not because he opposes the European integration of the Republic of Moldova" but because he was "against the current government [of the PAS]". Tkachuk did not publicly comment on the referendum, and the PAC–CC's program did not mention European integration as of shortly after Alternative's formation.[26]

According to Tăbârță, Russia sought to gain control over political decisions in Chișinău through Alternative following the 2025 Moldovan parliamentary election regardless of the coalition government formed after them, even if it were a declaredly pro-European one; the latter would allow it to influence the pace of EU accession negotiations.[12] According to Moldovan political analyst Andrei Curăraru, Alternative would be part of a three-tiered game by Russia, with each playing its perfectly calibrated role: Alternative would address the disillusioned pro-European segment, the PSRM would appeal to the traditional pro-Russian electorate and Ilan Shor would be "the middleman, the man without ideology, but with money".[23]

Despite these accusations, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Russia Eurasia Center has stated that there is no evidence of the bloc being pro-Russian or supported by Russia in a way comparable to Shor or the PSRM, and has claimed that such accusations are an attempt on the part of the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) to present itself as the only viable pro-European party.[11]

History and elections

On 11 August 2025, the bloc presented its electoral list for the upcoming parliamentary election to the Central Electoral Commission of Moldova (CEC). Ceban is the list's lead candidate, however he has stated that he intends to refuse his seat if elected and remain the Mayor of Chișinău. He is followed by Stoianoglo, Chicu, Tkachuk, and the sole incumbent Alternative MP, Gaik Vartanean.[29] Overall, the National Alternative Movement holds a majority of candidates on the list.[30]

On 24 September, four days before the parliamentary election, 200 election ballots with a "voted" stamp marked for the Alternative bloc were found in a printing shop in Chișinău by the city's police. Prime Minister Dorin Recean and the Moldovan authorities described a Russian-backed "carousel-type scheme" for electoral fraud under which the ballots were allegedly to be used: a paid voter would insert a fake ballot into the ballot box, a clean official one marked with the same political formation as the fake one would be taken out of the polling station, and it would then be used by the next paid voter.[31] Ceban stated that the ballots were models for campaign advertising, demanded a public apology from the police and stated that the publication of images with pre-stamped ballots was a "PAS-brand lie in full complicity with state bodies".[32] Nevertheless, the CEC stated that the ballots did not fulfill publicity law requirements and that they constituted electoral agitation and de facto misleading advertising, given, as CEC vice president Pavel Postica stated, the difficulty for a simple voter to distinguish between a real ballot and a printed one.[33] Further, Minister of Education and Research Dan Perciun stated that Alternative's models looked identical to real ballots.[32]

Election results

Parliament

Election Leader Performance Rank Government
Votes % ± pp Seats +/–
2025 Ion Ceban 125,706
7.96%
New
8 / 101
New 3rd Opposition

Reactions

Igor Grosu, president of the governing Party of Action and Solidarity, has accused the bloc of being pro-Russian.[34] Meanwhile, bloc leader Ion Ceban has accused PAS of not doing enough to bring Moldova into the European Union.[35]

Dodon, president of the opposition PSRM, has welcomed the creation of the bloc as an alternative to PAS for the pro-European and pro-Romanian electorate, while reaffirming his and his party's opposition to these positions.[36]

Tudor Ulianovschi, president of the European Social Democratic Party (previously known as Democratic Party of Moldova), stated that his party had not been invited and that "it is important to see the actions, not just the statements."[37] PSDE and MAN previously planned to merge.[38]

Irina Vlah, president of the Heart of Moldova Republican Party, called on the alliance to sign a declaration committing not to support PAS.[39]

See also

References

  1. ^ a b c d "Expert: Blocul Alternativa vrea să capteze voturile de centru-stânga". stiri.md. Retrieved 2025-03-07.
  2. ^ Dubasova, Ecaterina (4 October 2025). "Eșecul "Alternativei" la Chișinău: de ce Ion Ceban nu a reușit să convingă alegătorii (ANALIZĂ)". NewsMaker (in Romanian).
  3. ^ a b "Blocul Alternativa propune un program social amplu pentru susținerea familiilor, vârstnicilor și copiilor: "Investiția în oameni este investiție în viitor"". Telegraph Moldova – Agenție de presă. 25 April 2025. Retrieved 2025-04-25.
  4. ^ "Blocul Alternativa: PAS protejează corupția mare și a transformat legea într-un instrument de represiune a cetățenilor". Telegraph Moldova – Agenție de presă. 3 June 2025. Retrieved 2025-06-04.
  5. ^ a b c Dowell, Stuart (23 September 2025). "Analysis: As US retreats, Europe braces for Moldova's make-or-break election". TVP World. Brussels and PAS both see Alternativa as a Trojan horse designed to stall accession talks from within.
  6. ^ a b "Parliamentary elections 2025 and the European perspective of the Republic of Moldova. Op-ed by Anatol Taranu". IPN Press Agency. 4 April 2025. Although "Alternativa" presents itself as a pro-European force, multiple media sources and political analysts have raised questions about its true orientation, suggesting pro-Russian sympathies.
  7. ^ "Moldova: Politicieni proruşi, inclusiv Stoianoglo, şi-au unit forţele într-un nou bloc, "Alternativa". Ei se declară "proeuropeni"". February 2025.
  8. ^ a b "Moldova: Politicieni proruşi, inclusiv Stoianoglo, şi-au unit forţele într-un nou bloc, "Alternativa". Ei se declară "proeuropeni"". www.digi24.ro (in Romanian). 2025-02-01. Retrieved 2025-03-07.
  9. ^ "Ceban, Stoianoglo, Chicu și Tkaciuk creează blocul politic Alternativa". IPN (in Romanian). 2025-01-31. Retrieved 2025-03-05.
  10. ^ a b "Noul bloc Alternativa pledează pentru integrarea europeană ca obiectiv major al țării". IPN (in Romanian). 2025-01-31. Retrieved 2025-03-05.
  11. ^ a b "Consolidating Power, Losing Ground: Moldova Risks Repeating Past Mistakes Ahead of Fall Elections". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved 2025-09-01.
  12. ^ a b c Tăbârță, Ion (15 February 2025). "Blocul "Alternativa", între proeuropenism și cal troian rusesc". Veridica (in Romanian).
  13. ^ "Lista candidaților BeA la alegerile parlamentare din 2025 – alegeri.md". alegeri.md (in Romanian). Retrieved 2025-09-05.
  14. ^ "Blocul ALTERNATIVA lansează patru piloni pentru o guvernare responsabilă și un viitor demn al Republicii Moldova". ALERTA.MD (in Romanian). 2025-08-05. Retrieved 2025-08-05.
  15. ^ "Cazurile de autism și ADHD, în creștere: Mesajul Blocului Alternativa". stiri.md. Retrieved 2025-08-05.
  16. ^ "Blocul Alternativa" (in Romanian). Retrieved 2025-08-20.
  17. ^ ""Țara trebuie salvată de poluare și sărăcie". Blocul ALTERNATIVA lansează programul "Moldova Verde" - Independent" (in Romanian). 2025-09-17. Retrieved 2025-09-17.
  18. ^ "VIDEO // Blocul Electoral ALTERNATIVA a prezentat programul "Moldova Verde – dreptate pentru oameni și natură"". Telegraph Moldova - Agenție de presă (in Romanian). 2025-09-17. Retrieved 2025-09-17.
  19. ^ "About Us – Blocul Alternativa". Retrieved 2025-08-20.
  20. ^ Harrington, Keith (26 September 2025). "Russia is Working to Split the Pro-EU vote in Moldova's Election". Balkan Insight.
  21. ^ Cotoros, Alina (31 January 2025). "Coaliție pro-rusă în Republica Moldova. Primarul Chișinăului formează un nou bloc politic. Reacția puterii: Oferta rusească". Adevărul (in Romanian).
  22. ^ "Stoianoglo: Blocul Alternativa, deschis colaborării cu toate partidele". stiri.md. Retrieved 2025-03-18.
  23. ^ a b "/VIDEO/ Ce stă în spatele blocului "Alternativa"? "Nu este de mirare că s-au unit acești politicieni"" (in Romanian). TV8. 31 January 2025.
  24. ^ Parmentier, Florent (22 September 2025). "Moldova's Crucial Parliamentary Election. What's at Stake?" (in French). Institut français des relations internationales.
  25. ^ a b c d Călugăreanu, Vitalie (30 June 2025). "Analiză: Patru coșuri cu "ouă" rusești la alegeri în Moldova" (in Romanian). Deutsche Welle.
  26. ^ a b c Nistor, Măriuța (11 February 2025). "Alternativa "pro-europeană" a unor politicieni cu ștate vechi și trecut pro-rus". Ziarul de Gardă (in Romanian).
  27. ^ a b c ""Tkaciuk, afară!" Veteranii, în stradă după declarațiile unuia dintre liderii blocului "Alternativa" despre "Memorandumul Kozak"". Deschide.MD (in Romanian). 12 September 2025.
  28. ^ a b "Veteranii de la Nistru îi cer explicații lui Tkaciuk, după ce și-a exprimat regretul că Voronin nu a semnat "memorandumul Kozak"" (in Romanian). Radio Moldova. 12 September 2025.
  29. ^ Urușciuc, Eugen (11 August 2025). "Blocurile de opoziție "Patriotic" și "Alternativa" și-au depus listele de candidați la CEC". moldova.europalibera.org. Retrieved 2025-08-12.
  30. ^ "Candidați la funcția de deputat – Blocul Alternativa" (in Romanian). Retrieved 2025-08-16.
  31. ^ Donțu, Camelia; Hoară, Robert (24 September 2025). "Poliția din Chișinău a descoperit 200 de buletine de vot care erau deja ștampilate în favoarea blocului Alternativa" (in Romanian). Pro TV.
  32. ^ a b Vovc, Marcela (24 September 2025). ""Buletinele sunt un model". Ceban îndeamnă Poliția să-și ceară public scuze". Agora (in Romanian).
  33. ^ Miron Țîbuleac, Irina (24 September 2025). "CEC, despre cele 200 de buletine-model ale "Alternativei": Nu este ok un astfel de material de agitație electorală"". NewsMaker (in Romanian).
  34. ^ Conovali, Mihaela (2025-02-14). "Grosu, despre o eventuală coaliție cu blocul Alternativa: "Să se lepede întâi de satana" VIDEO". NewsMaker (in Romanian). Retrieved 2025-03-09.
  35. ^ "Investigație: Alternativa europeană a unor politicieni cu trecut prorus". stiri.md. Retrieved 2025-03-09.
  36. ^ "Ce a declarat Dodon despre blocul Alternativa, liderii săi și poziția lor". noi.md (in Russian). Retrieved 2025-03-09.
  37. ^ OPINIE! Președintele PSDE, Tudor Ulianovschi spune că formațiunea pe care o reprezintă nu a fost invitată să facă parte din Blocul "Alternativa". Cinema1 (in Romanian). 2025-02-10. Retrieved 2025-03-11.
  38. ^ "Ați chemat "Alternativa"?". noi.md (in Romanian). 2025-02-13. Retrieved 2025-03-11.
  39. ^ "Irina Vlah invites "Alternativa" to sign pact against an alliance with PAS". ipn.md. 2025-02-10. Retrieved 2025-03-11.