Sensus divinitatis (Latin for "sense of divinity"), also referred to as sensus deitatis ("sense of deity") or semen religionis ("seed of religion"), is a term first employed by French Protestant reformer John Calvin to describe a postulated human sense. Instead of knowledge of the environment (as with, for example, smell or sight), the sensus divinitatis is believed to give humans a knowledge of God.^[1]

In Calvin's view, there is no reasonable non-belief:

Philosopher Evan Fales presents three arguments against the presence of a sensus divinitatis:^[6]

1. The divergence of claims and beliefs (lack of reliability, even within Christian sects).^{[clarification needed]}
2. The lack of demonstrably superior morality of Christians versus non-Christians.^{[clarification needed]}
3. Bible verses, accepted by most Christians as authored by men inspired by the Holy Spirit—presumably with a functioning sensus divinitatis—in which "God performs, commands, accepts or countenances rape, genocide, human sacrifice, pestilence to punish David for taking a census, killing David's infant to punish him, hatred of family, capital punishment for breaking a monetary promise, and so on".^{[citation needed]}

Philosopher Steven Maitzen claimed in 2006 that the demographics of religious belief make the existence of the sensus divinitatis unlikely, as this sense appears so unevenly distributed.^[7] However, Maitzen may^{[according to whom?]} have confused Aquinas's sensus dei^[8] with sensus divinitatis—sensus divinitatis (a religious sense) only necessitates a core religious/faith component to one's beliefs, whereas the sensus dei aims at a natural knowledge of God.^[9]

Hans Van Eyghen argues that the phenomenology of the "sensus divinitatis" conflicts with findings from the cognitive science of religion^[10]:

Alvin Plantinga posits a distinct, god-given faculty for belief, but results in cognitive science instead explains religious belief as arising from ordinary social cognition, similar to belief in other minds. Van Eyghen cites alternative accounts such as hyperactive agent detection and emotional attachment, which allows an interpretion of religion as a byproduct of general cognitive processes. He further argues that a "sensus divinitatis" is unnecessary, as a deity could reveal itself more directly. The research he cites indicates that beliefs about agency and morality develop through interaction with perceived agents. Here perception precedees cognition, making the link between effect and supposed cause more direct, suggesting a explanatorily redundancy for a distinct religious faculty.