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== Gerry Wright. HMNZS Royalist. Compilation -Collection book . A Flawed defense of the discredited Peter Phipps & Frank Corner == |
== Gerry Wright. HMNZS Royalist. Compilation -Collection book . A Flawed defense of the discredited Peter Phipps & Frank Corner == |
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This recent glossy NZ publication (2018) republishes various published and unpublished works on the Royalist including part of the wiki article in its 2017 state Wrights editorial view is the Royalist was an ill advised and poor investment given its poor hull condition and cramped crew conditions which had hardly been improved from WW2. Wright claims that there no other ships using the RN DP 5.25 gun, although the RN still had 5 battleships in reserve when Royalist recommissioned in 1956 and it was the following years 1957 Sandys defense review which led to the RN deciding to scrap the last four Dido cruisers it had in reserve HMS Euralyus, Cleopatra, Dido and Bellona and the final RN shore emplacement 5.25 battery remained operational until 1980 with four new single 5.25 mounts for AA and anti ship action being installed as late as 1955 Gibraltar. On 25 March 1955, NZ National MP, Sid Holland was considering purchasing HMS Royalist or HMS Diadem (which was instead sold to Pakistan and transferred after an 18 months in Mid 1957) after an equally controversial refit at a very great cost that Pakistan was eventually forced to pay, less than cost for |
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This recent glossy NZ publication (2018) republishes various published and unpublished works on the Royalist including the wiki article in its state about 18 months ago in various sections. |
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the UK refit. The US provided 0.25 million MODA grant Diadem, which still left a bill to Pakistan, outrageously high, even to RN officers and posing a explosive provocation in Calcutta and Karachi ( Goldrick - more colorful |
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English also used to describe the Dido/Battle offer to Venuezula. Diadem received a thorough overhaul, a new bridge and light 40mm Mk 5 (3x2) and Mk 7 (8 X1) armament and served in a number of wars with India 1962, 1965 and 1971 the third encounter providing an interesting alternative view to the Falklands and Gulf of how 1950s UK frigates, cruisers and RAF and RN carrier borne aircraft would fare in conflict. It is generally recorded that Diadem was reduced to a training ship in 1961. However Mountbatten ( Rec soc, RAN CNS correspondence with First Sea Lord) fought with everything to have Diadem enter IPN service as a surface counter to the UK reconstructed Mysore (HMS Nigeria rebuilt to the std if Newfoundland 1952). The Dido AD cruisers were something of the first 'hot' ships and could not really be turned off and like the Royalist could only be briefly refitted and and it had to be half manned, in 1958-61 untilreturned to service as an operational warship. Retired Australian Admiral James Goldrick wrote extensively about the Diadem in his book on the Indian, Pakistan, Ceylon and Bengal Navies and the Diadem is something of a parallel story to Royalist the final 1944 Dido partly being rejected in 1946 and 1955 by the RNZN because one of its 5.25 turrets was electrically rather than hydralic powered and the Brtish navies could never make up there mind, the final 3 Tiger cruisers being H/H, E/H and E/E for HMS Blake. Diadem bombardment performance backing the DD Day invasion with HMS Belfast was an impressive debut. |
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Wright repeats the claim that Rear Admiral Peter Phipps is reputed to have made that the HMNZS Royalist lacked the range to reach Tahiti. The original |
Wright repeats the claim that Rear Admiral Peter Phipps is reputed to have made that the HMNZS Royalist lacked the range to reach Tahiti. The original |
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Phipps claims that Royalists 5.25 guns were inadequate to counter raiders. Given WW2 type German raiders lacked fire control of any sophistication it would surely be truer that if the Commonwealth cruiser was armoured it would make little difference if had a main armament of 6 inch, 5.25 or 4.5 destroyer main armament. The effectiveness of German raiders during WW2 was partly because the officers were usually elite Kreigsmarine officers, who had chosen the Raiders because the Kreigsmarine considered a raider post and command the best way to actually get surface action and because in Germany it was considered Hitler wanted the Kriegsmarine battlecruisers and cruisers only for show, and did not intend to risk them in combat and had expected the British and French to surrender or rather abandon their opposition with no or little fight. The South Pacific Raider operations like Rommel Afrika Corp were essentially diversionary and intended to tie down allied forces and cruisers. It is arguable and speculated that the Kreigmarine target were actually far more 'cruisers' regardless of what specific orders that Hitler and Raeder had given, as they were often disobeyed. Other than HMAS Sydney other RN cruisers like Dorchester were nearly entrapped. Hennesey and Jinks. The Silent Deep has interesting speculation on the attitude of Kreigsmarine officers and their aims and motivations. |
Phipps claims that Royalists 5.25 guns were inadequate to counter raiders. Given WW2 type German raiders lacked fire control of any sophistication it would surely be truer that if the Commonwealth cruiser was armoured it would make little difference if had a main armament of 6 inch, 5.25 or 4.5 destroyer main armament. The effectiveness of German raiders during WW2 was partly because the officers were usually elite Kreigsmarine officers, who had chosen the Raiders because the Kreigsmarine considered a raider post and command the best way to actually get surface action and because in Germany it was considered Hitler wanted the Kriegsmarine battlecruisers and cruisers only for show, and did not intend to risk them in combat and had expected the British and French to surrender or rather abandon their opposition with no or little fight. The South Pacific Raider operations like Rommel Afrika Corp were essentially diversionary and intended to tie down allied forces and cruisers. It is arguable and speculated that the Kreigmarine target were actually far more 'cruisers' regardless of what specific orders that Hitler and Raeder had given, as they were often disobeyed. Other than HMAS Sydney other RN cruisers like Dorchester were nearly entrapped. Hennesey and Jinks. The Silent Deep has interesting speculation on the attitude of Kreigsmarine officers and their aims and motivations. |
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In terms of warship raiders, it appears the post war Soviet Chapevs and Sverdlovs were partly intended to play a similar role to the WW2 Kreigsmarine, battlecruisers and armoured cruisers like Graf Spee, given the Sverdlov were near 20,000 displacement and had 6 inch armour on their 6 inch triple turrets and belt, no cruiser may have been the answer. The RN view post war however was the expected standard of the Soviet fleet would be low and a pair of 4.5 gunned Daring Destroyers or even a pair of Type 41 diesels with two twin 4.5 inch would have been adequate. Part of the justification for the Royalist was actually that it might be more of a counter to the Sverdlov transferred to Indonesia , INS Irain than British destroyers or the County GMD unarmoured and with only 4.5 guns. The Indonesians did not seem interested in maintaining the Sverdlov in combat capable condition, but it known that in 1964 the Russian Navy did take the cruiser back to Russia for a refit and returned it again to Indonesia in a combat capable condition and that Indonesia also had a few ex Soviet destroyers with 5.1 |
In terms of warship raiders, it appears the post war Soviet Chapevs and Sverdlovs were partly intended to play a similar role to the WW2 Kreigsmarine, battlecruisers and armoured cruisers like Graf Spee, given the Sverdlov were near 20,000 displacement and had 6 inch armour on their 6 inch triple turrets and belt, no cruiser may have been the answer. The RN view post war however was the expected standard of the Soviet fleet would be low and a pair of 4.5 gunned Daring Destroyers or even a pair of Type 41 diesels with two twin 4.5 inch would have been adequate. Part of the justification for the Royalist was actually that it might be more of a counter to the Sverdlov transferred to Indonesia , INS Irain than British destroyers or the County GMD unarmoured and with only 4.5 guns. The Indonesians did not seem interested in maintaining the Sverdlov in combat capable condition, but it known that in 1964 the Russian Navy did take the cruiser back to Russia for a refit and returned it again to Indonesia in a combat capable condition and that Indonesia also had a few ex Soviet destroyers with 5.1 guns. These ships were sufficiently daunting as an indication to the Netherlands who had been prepared to send one of its two cruisers into the area to defend West Irian that the Netherlands agreed to withdraw it force and effectively concede Papua. The RN had no other cruiser available other than Royalist to run with its carrier forces as HMS Blake and HMS Belfast were both placed in reserve in 1965 and HMS Lion suffered a boiler explosion in late 1963 and was forced to return to the UK and was never combat ready. Withour the Tigers the RN probably really needed the Royalist at least for show. The Royalists modernisation was only expected to cover a lifespan of 6 years.A RN reconstruction meant a warship upgraded to the std to fight in WW3 in 1956-1963 with significant upgrade in main AA and surface fighting capability. Reconstruction did not necessarily involve reboilering, new drive train and engines, if the existing boilers, hull and engine would last to the ships planned 20 year life. A Life extension of a cruiser for 10-20years did involve renewal of the power plant, hull and electrics but not significant new weapon systems beyond replacing secondary and self defence CWS with CF systems. The expected lifespan of a war built Dido or Colony cruiser was no more than 20 years the usual age of their withdrawal and it was to be expected the accuracy of the AA gun alignment in Royalists Mk 6 275 directors would deteriorate from mid 1963 as they did. The real question would have to be why the Holyoake government did not take out another interim lease of a Daring destroyer known to have been recently refitted, available and fitted with new fire control MRS3 in the case of HMS Defender. Partly HMNZS Royalist provided more impressive display deterence given the known inadequacy of RN Sea Vixen's and Scimitar and limitations of the Mk 1 Buccanear. Properly considered there may have been very good reasons for having the Royalist turn up. Wright prints a lot of dubious NZ/ UK Foreign office comment, much of it obviously disingeneous and misinformed. Historically it is clear the British MOD and RN dismissed Egypt, Indonesia and Argentina as bunches of wops who would not dare to challenge the RN force and if they did. Like wise Russia had been assumed to be unable to fight the German Army effectively. In the actuality. In first two weeks in the battle of Moscow December 1941 the Russian army, proved unexpectantly superior when the T34 forces of Rossovolinsky and Zurkov, Guards units and NK shock troops and their rockets destroyed the best German and SS armies killing a million elite German troops and Hitler sensing he had lost declared war on the United States . The point is that the Egyptian Badger and Mig planes could easily have suddenly have been in the hands of Russian pilots just as in November 1950 in North Korea ,MacArthur found himself facing the Chinese Army with the Russian pilots in the Migs giving ground support to the North Korean and Chinese Army.The apparent unstoppable power of the Russian and Chinese Army considered with the limitationsions of the British WW2 army made the Churchill, MacMillan and Eden government sceptical of the realism of future conventional war or fighting the Soviets and the Royalist was about the most advanced serious surface gunship the Tory Cabinet would look at. It can not be assumed that he apparent threat to the RN/ RNZN taskforce of the Israeli AF force represented a greater threat than Egypt's fighter and bombers which could in a crisis have Russian pilots. The idea that Israel would ever have launched against the full Royal Navy or French Navy in 1956 is a diplomatic fiction. |
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The triple Mk 6 inch and twin 4 inch cruiser weapons used by other RN cruisers in the 1950s saw only a few more years service in the RN. The 5.25 turrets were more modern and accurate and required 60 crew per turret cf with 90 for a Mk 23 triple 6. The twin |
The triple Mk 6 inch and twin 4 inch cruiser weapons used by other RN cruisers in the 1950s saw only a few more years service in the RN. The 5.25 turrets were more modern and accurate and required 60 crew per turret cf with 90 for a Mk 23 triple 6. The twin 4inch X1X was obsolete and inaccurate |
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The Royalist and Dido conversions were considered prototype cruiser destroyers by the RN in 1949 and the late 1940s view in Britain was that anti sub frigates and minesweepers should be all the Navy required. Given the immediate requirements of the Korean war and the UK Treasury restricting any cruiser to 370O ton dimensions of he USS Mitcher the HMS Royalist conversion was a rare major surface warship that could go forward after the success of the similar update of USS Juneau in a unique and rather too succesful USN conversion in 1951 with modern AA radar for 12 5inch guns and 14 twin 3/50 the Juneau outshooting the USS Worchester and early Terrier ships. The decade of problems with Sea Slug and Terrier/Tartar in the USA meant the AA success on test against Jet drones of the Royalist/ Juneau made them a very unwanted development which the RN & USN wanted out of the way. The Royalist was successful against multiple meteor jet drones while Seaslug managed comparable performance tests against slower Firefly drones. <!-- Template:Unsigned IP --><small class="autosigned">— Preceding [[Wikipedia:Signatures|unsigned]] comment added by [[Special:Contributions/210.48.175.44|210.48.175.44]] ([[User talk:210.48.175.44#top|talk]]) 00:09, 2 October 2018 (UTC)</small> <!--Autosigned by SineBot--> |
The Royalist and Dido conversions were considered prototype cruiser destroyers by the RN in 1949 and the late 1940s view in Britain was that anti sub frigates and minesweepers should be all the Navy required. Given the immediate requirements of the Korean war and the UK Treasury restricting any cruiser to 370O ton dimensions of he USS Mitcher the HMS Royalist conversion was a rare major surface warship that could go forward after the success of the similar update of USS Juneau in a unique and rather too succesful USN conversion in 1951 with modern AA radar for 12 5inch guns and 14 twin 3/50 the Juneau outshooting the USS Worchester and early Terrier ships. The decade of problems with Sea Slug and Terrier/Tartar in the USA meant the AA success on test against Jet drones of the Royalist/ Juneau made them a very unwanted development which the RN & USN wanted out of the way. The Royalist was successful against multiple meteor jet drones while Seaslug managed comparable performance tests against slower Firefly drones. <!-- Template:Unsigned IP --><small class="autosigned">— Preceding [[Wikipedia:Signatures|unsigned]] comment added by [[Special:Contributions/210.48.175.44|210.48.175.44]] ([[User talk:210.48.175.44#top|talk]]) 00:09, 2 October 2018 (UTC)</small> <!--Autosigned by SineBot--> |
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Revision as of 01:19, 24 November 2021
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Gerry Wright. HMNZS Royalist. Compilation -Collection book . A Flawed defense of the discredited Peter Phipps & Frank Corner
This recent glossy NZ publication (2018) republishes various published and unpublished works on the Royalist including part of the wiki article in its 2017 state Wrights editorial view is the Royalist was an ill advised and poor investment given its poor hull condition and cramped crew conditions which had hardly been improved from WW2. Wright claims that there no other ships using the RN DP 5.25 gun, although the RN still had 5 battleships in reserve when Royalist recommissioned in 1956 and it was the following years 1957 Sandys defense review which led to the RN deciding to scrap the last four Dido cruisers it had in reserve HMS Euralyus, Cleopatra, Dido and Bellona and the final RN shore emplacement 5.25 battery remained operational until 1980 with four new single 5.25 mounts for AA and anti ship action being installed as late as 1955 Gibraltar. On 25 March 1955, NZ National MP, Sid Holland was considering purchasing HMS Royalist or HMS Diadem (which was instead sold to Pakistan and transferred after an 18 months in Mid 1957) after an equally controversial refit at a very great cost that Pakistan was eventually forced to pay, less than cost for
the UK refit. The US provided 0.25 million MODA grant Diadem, which still left a bill to Pakistan, outrageously high, even to RN officers and posing a explosive provocation in Calcutta and Karachi ( Goldrick - more colorful
English also used to describe the Dido/Battle offer to Venuezula. Diadem received a thorough overhaul, a new bridge and light 40mm Mk 5 (3x2) and Mk 7 (8 X1) armament and served in a number of wars with India 1962, 1965 and 1971 the third encounter providing an interesting alternative view to the Falklands and Gulf of how 1950s UK frigates, cruisers and RAF and RN carrier borne aircraft would fare in conflict. It is generally recorded that Diadem was reduced to a training ship in 1961. However Mountbatten ( Rec soc, RAN CNS correspondence with First Sea Lord) fought with everything to have Diadem enter IPN service as a surface counter to the UK reconstructed Mysore (HMS Nigeria rebuilt to the std if Newfoundland 1952). The Dido AD cruisers were something of the first 'hot' ships and could not really be turned off and like the Royalist could only be briefly refitted and and it had to be half manned, in 1958-61 untilreturned to service as an operational warship. Retired Australian Admiral James Goldrick wrote extensively about the Diadem in his book on the Indian, Pakistan, Ceylon and Bengal Navies and the Diadem is something of a parallel story to Royalist the final 1944 Dido partly being rejected in 1946 and 1955 by the RNZN because one of its 5.25 turrets was electrically rather than hydralic powered and the Brtish navies could never make up there mind, the final 3 Tiger cruisers being H/H, E/H and E/E for HMS Blake. Diadem bombardment performance backing the DD Day invasion with HMS Belfast was an impressive debut.
Wright repeats the claim that Rear Admiral Peter Phipps is reputed to have made that the HMNZS Royalist lacked the range to reach Tahiti. The original
NZ News Herald reports on 21/12/ 56 in the Auckland weekly news reprint is that what he said was that it could not reach Panama unrefueled from Auckland. Secondly in Mr Gerry Wrights previous work on HMNZS Blackpool, Blackpool is recorded as draining its fuel tanks to just make the 2500nm transit from Pearl Harbour to San Diego at 15knots cruising speed where the log of the Royalist 1965 voyage out to Pearl Harbour shows its speed throughout the 3200 mile longer transit from Suva to Pearl Harbour at 18/19K.
Phipps claims that Royalists 5.25 guns were inadequate to counter raiders. Given WW2 type German raiders lacked fire control of any sophistication it would surely be truer that if the Commonwealth cruiser was armoured it would make little difference if had a main armament of 6 inch, 5.25 or 4.5 destroyer main armament. The effectiveness of German raiders during WW2 was partly because the officers were usually elite Kreigsmarine officers, who had chosen the Raiders because the Kreigsmarine considered a raider post and command the best way to actually get surface action and because in Germany it was considered Hitler wanted the Kriegsmarine battlecruisers and cruisers only for show, and did not intend to risk them in combat and had expected the British and French to surrender or rather abandon their opposition with no or little fight. The South Pacific Raider operations like Rommel Afrika Corp were essentially diversionary and intended to tie down allied forces and cruisers. It is arguable and speculated that the Kreigmarine target were actually far more 'cruisers' regardless of what specific orders that Hitler and Raeder had given, as they were often disobeyed. Other than HMAS Sydney other RN cruisers like Dorchester were nearly entrapped. Hennesey and Jinks. The Silent Deep has interesting speculation on the attitude of Kreigsmarine officers and their aims and motivations. In terms of warship raiders, it appears the post war Soviet Chapevs and Sverdlovs were partly intended to play a similar role to the WW2 Kreigsmarine, battlecruisers and armoured cruisers like Graf Spee, given the Sverdlov were near 20,000 displacement and had 6 inch armour on their 6 inch triple turrets and belt, no cruiser may have been the answer. The RN view post war however was the expected standard of the Soviet fleet would be low and a pair of 4.5 gunned Daring Destroyers or even a pair of Type 41 diesels with two twin 4.5 inch would have been adequate. Part of the justification for the Royalist was actually that it might be more of a counter to the Sverdlov transferred to Indonesia , INS Irain than British destroyers or the County GMD unarmoured and with only 4.5 guns. The Indonesians did not seem interested in maintaining the Sverdlov in combat capable condition, but it known that in 1964 the Russian Navy did take the cruiser back to Russia for a refit and returned it again to Indonesia in a combat capable condition and that Indonesia also had a few ex Soviet destroyers with 5.1 guns. These ships were sufficiently daunting as an indication to the Netherlands who had been prepared to send one of its two cruisers into the area to defend West Irian that the Netherlands agreed to withdraw it force and effectively concede Papua. The RN had no other cruiser available other than Royalist to run with its carrier forces as HMS Blake and HMS Belfast were both placed in reserve in 1965 and HMS Lion suffered a boiler explosion in late 1963 and was forced to return to the UK and was never combat ready. Withour the Tigers the RN probably really needed the Royalist at least for show. The Royalists modernisation was only expected to cover a lifespan of 6 years.A RN reconstruction meant a warship upgraded to the std to fight in WW3 in 1956-1963 with significant upgrade in main AA and surface fighting capability. Reconstruction did not necessarily involve reboilering, new drive train and engines, if the existing boilers, hull and engine would last to the ships planned 20 year life. A Life extension of a cruiser for 10-20years did involve renewal of the power plant, hull and electrics but not significant new weapon systems beyond replacing secondary and self defence CWS with CF systems. The expected lifespan of a war built Dido or Colony cruiser was no more than 20 years the usual age of their withdrawal and it was to be expected the accuracy of the AA gun alignment in Royalists Mk 6 275 directors would deteriorate from mid 1963 as they did. The real question would have to be why the Holyoake government did not take out another interim lease of a Daring destroyer known to have been recently refitted, available and fitted with new fire control MRS3 in the case of HMS Defender. Partly HMNZS Royalist provided more impressive display deterence given the known inadequacy of RN Sea Vixen's and Scimitar and limitations of the Mk 1 Buccanear. Properly considered there may have been very good reasons for having the Royalist turn up. Wright prints a lot of dubious NZ/ UK Foreign office comment, much of it obviously disingeneous and misinformed. Historically it is clear the British MOD and RN dismissed Egypt, Indonesia and Argentina as bunches of wops who would not dare to challenge the RN force and if they did. Like wise Russia had been assumed to be unable to fight the German Army effectively. In the actuality. In first two weeks in the battle of Moscow December 1941 the Russian army, proved unexpectantly superior when the T34 forces of Rossovolinsky and Zurkov, Guards units and NK shock troops and their rockets destroyed the best German and SS armies killing a million elite German troops and Hitler sensing he had lost declared war on the United States . The point is that the Egyptian Badger and Mig planes could easily have suddenly have been in the hands of Russian pilots just as in November 1950 in North Korea ,MacArthur found himself facing the Chinese Army with the Russian pilots in the Migs giving ground support to the North Korean and Chinese Army.The apparent unstoppable power of the Russian and Chinese Army considered with the limitationsions of the British WW2 army made the Churchill, MacMillan and Eden government sceptical of the realism of future conventional war or fighting the Soviets and the Royalist was about the most advanced serious surface gunship the Tory Cabinet would look at. It can not be assumed that he apparent threat to the RN/ RNZN taskforce of the Israeli AF force represented a greater threat than Egypt's fighter and bombers which could in a crisis have Russian pilots. The idea that Israel would ever have launched against the full Royal Navy or French Navy in 1956 is a diplomatic fiction.
The triple Mk 6 inch and twin 4 inch cruiser weapons used by other RN cruisers in the 1950s saw only a few more years service in the RN. The 5.25 turrets were more modern and accurate and required 60 crew per turret cf with 90 for a Mk 23 triple 6. The twin 4inch X1X was obsolete and inaccurate
The Royalist and Dido conversions were considered prototype cruiser destroyers by the RN in 1949 and the late 1940s view in Britain was that anti sub frigates and minesweepers should be all the Navy required. Given the immediate requirements of the Korean war and the UK Treasury restricting any cruiser to 370O ton dimensions of he USS Mitcher the HMS Royalist conversion was a rare major surface warship that could go forward after the success of the similar update of USS Juneau in a unique and rather too succesful USN conversion in 1951 with modern AA radar for 12 5inch guns and 14 twin 3/50 the Juneau outshooting the USS Worchester and early Terrier ships. The decade of problems with Sea Slug and Terrier/Tartar in the USA meant the AA success on test against Jet drones of the Royalist/ Juneau made them a very unwanted development which the RN & USN wanted out of the way. The Royalist was successful against multiple meteor jet drones while Seaslug managed comparable performance tests against slower Firefly drones. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 210.48.175.44 (talk) 00:09, 2 October 2018 (UTC)
- Suggest you break it down into short specific issues with room to discuss each. GraemeLeggett (talk) 20:06, 10 October 2021 (UTC)
The need to remove Graeme Leggett as a wikipedia editor
This article has essentially been written by me since 2011. My decision to write and edit of the RN/RNZN cold war ship articles followed the development of the Key government and their review of the new OPV class, cut in naval officer pay rates and fuel allocation. There were also the speeches of Mike Moore and Tim Grosser as NZ ambassadors to the USA. Moore and Tim Grosser asserted in speeches in the USA that 'Royalist' was not even in the Med at the time of the Suez crisis. In many senses the Royalist was the last RN cruiser, and the RNZN should have been honoured to run her. Mr Leggat and Gerry Wright, two edition magnus opus on Royalist, the first largely stolen from my various Royalist wiki articles, the second edition largely removing my contribution except for a badly edited section, The reedit removed the fact that Royalist was still on active service with the RN fleet at least of the first day of Muskeeter. I had to counter this complete destruction of historical truth. Essentially the Key government had decided to violate the basic requirement post ANZUS of maintaining any credible relationship with the US and chance of resumption of Anzus lay in maintaining a credible officer core which was essentially destroyed by the pay, conditions and equipment decisions of the Key government and his unqualified Defense Minister Wayne Mapp, now protesting against that vital, national asset and tech advance of Becks rocket lab. Also Mapp's Key staff Deputy Minister Heather Roy and speech writer Stuart Boag were people from Timaru, my original town where I attended TBHS 1970-74 and worked for the post office 1975-6, Waterside Commission 77-8, Waimate CC and OUP 1982 (on the planning of the proposed hydro scheme) and as largely full time editorial writer 1984-5 Anzus crisis. It needs to be pointed out that I have written on RNZN issues for the NZIIA under Ian McGibbon and was interviewed for several MOD A0 positions in 1980/84 and of course have met such RNZN planning officers Ian Bradley, Robert Martin, Ryan and was interviewed by MOD officer Chris Rosanowski, son of a Timaru College teacher and close friend of my mother. The reason I entered journalism after getting a 2/2 MA was the state of the railways and the lack of a real defense or rail policy under Muldoon. My main purpose was opposing the RNZN/RN joint submarine proposal ( 1983 Memo to include RNZN in Collins project) signed up to by Muldoon. Contrary to popular opinion I have never met Helen Clark. My father Alan Miles was certainly not mad and neither was Frederick Fisher Miles slandered beyond belief in SJ Harper's travesty on Gallipoli. Both actually did attend Balliol in 1913-13,19-20 and 49-50 and served as officers in WW1 and WW2 in the Gloucester Regiment and in Alan Miles case presumably as a RNZN/RN War service Reserve Officer on HMS Kledive, Hunt destroyers and in New York on prep planning of the Sth France invasion. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 115.188.67.34 (talk) 00:43, 12 October 2021 (UTC)
- I consider Lynships comments along with the whole efforts of the Roy/ Boag families to destroy and erase me criminal slander. I mean my and my families academic and financial records are on the public record. I do actually have 4 university degrees and serious academic publications. My trust was just a rich boys trust asked for by me. Edgar Bradley LLB ret was supposedly a family friend. His son Stephen Bradley was in the 6th/7th form at TBHS in the same classes as me and my IQ is about ten points higher. So it is just sour grapes on his part that he failed to win in History. in terms of Mr Philip Smith another supposed family friend. He is a national party member and fundamentalist and furthur comments from that direction would make a serious fraud inquiry into the relevant law firms essential.
In terms of my record and that of my family. It is not difficult to confirm that Alan Miles was at Balliol in 1949-50 that he was nominated for a Rhodes Scholarship and on the staff of Vic Uni, Wellington in 1948-49. Likewise with Frederick Fisher Miles. In terms of my mothers money and class, I am sure her share holdings in the first decade of this century can easily be checked. She was an hons student in Alan Miles class about 1947/48. . Do you thing such right wing, families as most of my relatives, would actually marry frauds, beads and idiots. On my fathers death in 1981, I examined his personal papers, re the offer of a permanent commission in the RNZN and the offer of Balliol in 1950, to return to the college for 3 weeks to compile a bibl, to complete a B.Litt. He chose to return to NZ because at Balliol/ Oxford in 1949/50 austerity, coldest and worst conditions re food in UK for 50 years. My aim is to widen the context of the article to include the essential facts that the Bellona/ Royalist mod and Tiger class completion was mainly as interim stop gap specialist AA cruisers to replace the lost unusable AA capability of the KGV, Vanguard and wartime 40-44 fleet carriers with their encase single feed 4.5 twins. The 5.25/ Mk 6 275 fire control gun system was essentially that proven in combat against the Japanese in 1945 on HMS Howe and Anson. Refitting the proven successful AA system postwar was a great problem for the RN postwar. Immediately in 1948 transferring the 5.25 guns or new Tiger guns to the Colonies was planned and rejected. The general argument of Phipps about the superiority of the RN 6 inch Mk 23 and MK 26 ignores the fact their bulk meant the general 1950s RN plan was to scrap the Colony class by 1955 and they could only man 1 turret only if a RM detatchment was aboard and secondly the Tigers are only AA flak ships which whole point and jusftification is fast short bursts of AA fire, and they were not designed for GFS or anti Sverdlov action.
- I did leave a note on the IP editors talk page User talk:115.188.67.34 offering solutions to any issues they had with my editing. GraemeLeggett (talk) 08:40, 12 October 2021 (UTC)
Talkpage conduct
IP editor, you need to read Wikipedia:Talk page guidelines. Especially taking note of instructions against editing other users comments.
Also Wikipedia:No legal threats to make sure you don't misrepresent your intent. GraemeLeggett (talk) 22:55, 15 November 2021 (UTC)





