Talk:Palestinian nationalism

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 1 April 2021

Under ==Origins and Starting Points== After the sentence "In keeping with this philosophy, Al-Quds University states that although "Palestine was conquered in times past by ancient Egyptians, Hittites, Philistines, Israelites, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Romans, Muslim Arabs, Mamlukes, Ottomans, the British, the Zionists … the population remained constant—and is now still Palestinian."[5]"

The term Palestinian has changed meanings over the centuries and in different contexts. For many in Europe, before the founding of the modern state of Israel, Palestinian meant to refer to Jews, whereas Arabs were merely known as Arabs in the land of Palestine. A prominent example of this is Immanuel Kant, an 18th-century Prussian philosopher who referred to European Jews as "Palestinians living among us." [1] Another example is a comic in the New York times, portraying 'Palestinians' fighting Nazis and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husseini. [2] Shenkin25 (talk) 10:20, 1 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Please outline the exact edit you would like to make, and get consensus for the change, before requesting an edit. Thanks. ScottishFinnishRadish (talk) 11:06, 1 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Comics count for nothing. The Kant reference is a good example of "be careful what you wish for". What Kant wrote was "Die unter uns lebenden Palästiner sind durch ihren Wuchergeist seit ihrem Exil, auch was die größte Menge betrifft, in den nicht ungegründeten Ruf des Betruges gekommen." (You can google-translate it if you can't read it.) It is true that Jews, but more often Zionists, were sometimes called Palestinians but it is not true that Arabs never were so called. In any case, Shenkin25 seems to be complaining about a direct quotation, which we are not permitted to alter. Zerotalk 13:15, 1 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ Kant, Immanuel (1974): Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, cited in Chad Alan Goldberg, Politicide Revisited. University of Wisconsin-Madison
  2. ^ New York Times, May 16, 1948, Section E, Page 4, available at https://www.nytimes.com/1948/05/16/archives/jews-in-grave-danger-in-all-moslem-lands-nine-hundred-thousand-in.html

Should Famous Palestinian Nationalists Be Mentioned Within the Lead?

I feel like we ought to name specific individuals. Yet whom should be included? CoffeeWithMarkets (talk) 02:36, 22 May 2022 (UTC)[reply]

Opposition to pre-Zionist occupation

According to the article, "and the preceding non-domestic Arab occupations over the Gaza Strip (by Egypt) and the West Bank (by Jordan) additionally had opposition." I have never heard of any such opposition. Furthermore no source is provided for this implausible claim. I propose that this passage be deleted as an obvious lie. Banderswipe (talk) 20:36, 23 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Idk if it is a lie or not but it is unsourced and not afaics in the article body either, so I removed it. Selfstudier (talk) 22:19, 23 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]

"From the river to the sea (album)" listed at Redirects for discussion

The redirect From the river to the sea (album) has been listed at redirects for discussion to determine whether its use and function meets the redirect guidelines. Readers of this page are welcome to comment on this redirect at Wikipedia:Redirects for discussion/Log/2023 October 10 § From the river to the sea (album) until a consensus is reached. GnocchiFan (talk) 21:34, 10 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

"From the River to the Sea (album)" listed at Redirects for discussion

The redirect From the River to the Sea (album) has been listed at redirects for discussion to determine whether its use and function meets the redirect guidelines. Readers of this page are welcome to comment on this redirect at Wikipedia:Redirects for discussion/Log/2023 October 30 § From the River to the Sea (album) until a consensus is reached. GnocchiFan (talk) 21:31, 30 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

"Historic Palestine" listed at Redirects for discussion

The redirect Historic Palestine has been listed at redirects for discussion to determine whether its use and function meets the redirect guidelines. Readers of this page are welcome to comment on this redirect at Wikipedia:Redirects for discussion/Log/2023 October 30 § Historic Palestine until a consensus is reached. GnocchiFan (talk) 21:32, 30 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

"was the first instance that indigenous Sephardi and Mizrahi had been killed."

Under the section "politicization of the Wailing Wall". This is incorrect and should be deleted:

1517 Hebron attacks

1517 Safed attacks

1834 Safed pogrom

Nebi Musa riots

Jerusalem stabbings (1921)

ect. Hawar jesser (talk) 03:13, 21 November 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Discussion of Opposition to and Criticisms of Palestinian Nationalism

One of the core reasons for the lack of resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict is that Palestinian nationalism is seen as being problematic along various axes by Israelis and Zionists, academics, the international community, and other important parties to the conflict. Very little of this is discussed in this article, and I see this as a huge deficiency.

A few of the significant points include:

  • Palestinian nationalist organizations seek to ethnically-cleansing and/or commit genocide against Jews in a future Palestinian state.[1][2]
  • Many Palestinian nationalist organizations seek to destroy Israel, thereby depriving Israeli Jews of their nationalistic rightsgoals and aspirations[1]
  • A full right of return of Palestinians to Israel, which is a common demand, would turn Israel into a de-facto Palestinian state[3]
  • Jews in a Palestinian state would likely be unequal and unsafe.[4]
  • Palestinian nationalists deny the Jewish connection to Palestine, especially regarding Jerusalem and the ancient Jewish temples there (temple denial).[5]

Many of the quotations I cite in the footnotes apply for several of the points simultaneously.

These are but a few of the serious objections levelled against Palestinian nationalists and Palestinian nationalist movements. These points are consequential now and in the future. I see no reason why these should not be discussed in detail in the main article.

  • Amos, John W. (1980). Palestinian Resistance: Organization of a Nationalist Movement. Burlington: Elsevier Science. ISBN 9781483189413.
  • Barkan, Eliezer (2005). Lesch, Ann; Lustick, Ian (eds.). Exile and return: predicaments of Palestinians and Jews. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. ISBN 9780812220520.
  • Becker, Jillian (1984). The PLO: the rise and fall of the Palestine Liberation Organization. New York: St. Martin's Pr. ISBN 9780312593803.
  • Beres, Louis René (1997). "Why the Oslo Accords Should Be Abrogated by Israel". American University International Law Review. 12 (2): 267–284.
  • Edmunds, Donna Rachel (1 December 2019). "Palestinian academics deny archaeological evidence of Jews in Israel". The Jerusalem Post.
  • Gresh, Alain (1985). The PLO:The Struggle Within : Towards an Independent Palestinian State. The University of Michigan. ISBN 9780862322724.
  • Karsh, Efraim (2013). "Zionism and the Palestinians". In Karsh, Efraim (ed.). Israel at Sixty: Rethinking the birth of the Jewish state. Taylor and Francis. pp. 30–48. ISBN 9781317967767.
  • Morris, Benny (2009). One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict. Yale University Press. ISBN 9780300164442.
  • Nüsse, Andrea (1998). Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of Hamas. Taylor & Francis Group. ISBN 9781135297657.
  • Peled, Yoav; Rouhana, Nadim (2007). Benvenisti, Eyal (ed.). Israel and the Palestinian refugees. Berlin: Springer. ISBN 9783540681618.
  • Reiter, Yitzhak (2008). Jerusalem and its role in Islamic solidarity (1st ed.). New York, N.Y: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-230-60782-8.
  • Ross, Dennis (2005). The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. ISBN 9780374708085.
  • Sayigh, Yezid (1997). Armed Struggle and the Search for State:The Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198292654.

אקעגן (talk) 18:42, 20 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]

"nationalistic rights" What? How do you define these rights, and under which legal authority? Since when does nationalism come with its own set or rights? Dimadick (talk) 20:32, 20 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Sure, perhaps I should have written "nationalistic goals and aspirations." According to various authorities, virtually(?) all Palestinian nationalist organizations intend to destroy the State of Israel, thereby depriving Jews of political autonomy and self-determination, and physical safety, which were and are primary goals of Zionism. אקעגן (talk) 21:11, 20 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]
thereby depriving Jews of political autonomy and self-determination, and physical safety, which were and are primary goals of Zionism
If those are primary goals of Zionism (itself a form of nationalism), is it a problem that Israel deprives Palestinians of political autonomy, self-determination and physical safety per Palestinian nationalism? Why should we side with one nationalism over another? The fact of the matter is that all forms of nationalism are opposed, critiqued or undermined by other forms of nationalism. This is not something unique to Palestinian nationalism. Lewisguile (talk) 16:18, 22 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I should add: the newest source in your list is 16 years old. We would need an assessment of the consensus among experts who have published in this area recently.
In terms of your points, they are pretty much already included in the article, where WP:DUE and relevant. I incorporated anything from your attempted edit that was due to the article after my reversion.
If you'd like both the articles on Zionism and Palestinian nationalism to devote more time talking about one form of nationalism's impact on the other, then maybe raise an RfC on the topic. But I suspect that will not be uncontroversial. Lewisguile (talk) 16:30, 22 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]
The page for Zionism is very critical of it for its perspective of Palestinians and Palestinian nationalism. We find quotes like:
  • The Zionist claim to Palestine was based on the notion that the Jews' historical right to the land outweighed that of the Arabs.
  • Criticism of Zionism often characterizes it as a supremacist, colonialist, racist, or exceptionalist ideology or as a settler colonialist movement.
  • According to Israeli historian Simha Flapan, the view expressed by the proclamation "there was no such thing as Palestinians" is a cornerstone of Zionist policy.
  • Israeli historian Yosef Gorny argues that this demographic change required annulling the majority status of the Arabs.
  • Zionists used the term "transfer" as a euphemism for the removal, or what would now be called ethnic cleansing, of the Palestinian population. According to Benny Morris, the idea of transfer played a large role in Zionist ideology from the inception of the movement and was seen as the main method of maintaining the "Jewishness" of the Zionist's state.
I can find many, many more. There are expansive sections entitled "Anti-Zionism" and "Zionism and colonialism," and very critical remarks are made in the lead, including "Zionists wanted to create a Jewish state in Palestine with as much land, as many Jews, and as few Palestinian Arabs as possible" found in the first paragraph. In spite of the sources I brought above, there is no critical perspective of Palestinian nationalism that approaches the degree of criticism in the Zionism article.
The statements in the current article on Palestinian nationalism greatly weaken the content of the sources themselves. I can illustrate with an example. One of the quotes from Morris 2009 I reproduced here starts as follows: "The Palestinian national movement started life with a vision and goal of a Palestinian Muslim Arab-majority state in all of Palestine—a one-state “solution”—and continues to espouse and aim to establish such a state down to the present day. Moreover, and as a corollary, al-Husseini, the Palestinian national leader during the 1930s and 1940s; the PLO, which led the national movement from the 1960s to Arafat’s death in November 2004; and Hamas today—all sought and seek to vastly reduce the number of Jewish inhabitants in the country, in other words, to ethnically cleanse Palestine." A basic understanding of this quote is that ethnic cleansing has been a fundamental aspect of Palestinian nationalism since its inception, since Al-Husseini, to the PLO, to Arafat, to Hamas. As we saw in the case of the article on Zionism, a fact like this could be important enough for inclusion in the first paragraph of the lead!
However, this quote is just used to argue that the PLO charter "called for the dissolution of Israel and the expulsion of all Jews that had arrived after the Balfour Declaration, with any remaining Jews considered part of a single democratic state." While true, the rest of the content of this quote is neglected in this article.
The right of return, a perennial demand by Palestinian nationalists, is seen as the end of Israel by many, which could very well end with massacre and oppression. This is not an insignificant point; lack of agreement on the right of return was one of the reasons that the Clinton negotiations failed. No mention of this is made in this article, which describes the "right of return" in fairly mundane terms.
Hamas, PIJ, and other Islamist organizations have wide support in the Palestinian territories. I think it is very notable that they want to conquer a land with millions of Jews and are all expressly anti-Semitic. Fatah is more moderate, but there are enough anti-Semitic quotes from notables and from textbooks that raise alarms on this front as well. The list goes on. I brought a bunch of quotes, and I could bring more, but I really do think that these are enough to prove the point, at least in principle. אקעגן (talk) 19:46, 22 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Firstly, "Anti-Zionism" and "Zionism and colonialism" are not just "Criticism" sections, which are best avoided per WP:CRITICISM anyway. The best way to incorporate criticism is in the same place we mention the topic it's related to.
Secondly, as I said above, most of your sources are old. Not just historic documents, but the scholars you've cited. This is an issue. If you have more recent sources, let's look at those instead and see what's justified. We shouldn't use primary sources for strong claims, either.
Thirdly, we need to establish a consensus among those sources writing today that a) these issues are notable, b) they are accurate, and c) they are WP:DUE. Statements should also be weighted based on how prominent they are in reliable sources and whether they are mainstream/majority or marginal/minority views.
Fourthly, we should avoid WP:SYNTH and WP:OR to say things the sources themselves don't say. The 2019 source doesn't appear to be saying what they're sourced for, which is a claim made in another source. That a person lists some Palestinians who believe in Canaanism is not the same as making this claim about Palestinian nationalism as a whole. If you have more sources which support that claim, please do add them here.
If it's helpful you can draft your proposed text here or on your sandbox, and then we can try to find the most appropriate wording per those sources. Lewisguile (talk) 22:43, 22 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]
The anti-Zionism section describes different forms of opposition to Zionism, with various rationales for this. It's hard not to see this as a synonym for "criticism of Zionism" or the like.
The incorporation of critical viewpoints in the relevant sections has also not been done in the article; vide the points above.
I could find more sources that are newer, if you like. In that case, I would like a definition of what really constitutes a new enough source. Morris' works, which I have intentionally included in great numbers, tend to still be current in the literature, for example. The second edition of Becker's book on the PLO was published 2014—is that still too old? אקעגן (talk) 22:27, 24 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]
"is it a problem that Israel deprives Palestinians of political autonomy, self-determination and physical safety per Palestinian nationalism?" The basic context of this entire conflict between the two rival nationalist ideologies is the following: 1) Both the Palestinians and the Israelis have a right to self-determination according to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, 2) both groups think that they have indigenous rights over the entire Southern Levant and possibly over the region's surrounding areas, 3) both think that they can achieve their goals through military campaigns and state terrorism, 4) their view on how to deal with either direct attacks or challenges to their authority is basically the lex talionis (law of exact retaliation). Good luck with ever resolving this conflict. Dimadick (talk) 09:31, 24 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]
This is one perspective on the conflict. In any event, I'm not sure what the relevance of this comment is. אקעגן (talk) 22:19, 24 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  1. ^ a b
    • Morris 2009: "The Palestinian national movement started life with a vision and goal of a Palestinian Muslim Arab-majority state in all of Palestine—a one-state “solution”—and continues to espouse and aim to establish such a state down to the present day. Moreover,and as a corollary, al-Husseini, the Palestinian national leader during the 1930s and 1940s; the PLO, which led the national movement from the 1960s to Arafat’s death in November 2004; and Hamas today—all sought and seek to vastly reduce the number of Jewish inhabitants in the country, in other words, to ethnically cleanse Palestine. Al-Husseini and the PLO explicitly declared the aim of limiting Palestinian citizenship to those Jews who had lived in Palestine permanently before 1917 (or, in an-other version, to limit it to those fifty thousand-odd Jews and their descendants). This goal was spelled out clearly in the Palestinian National Charter and in other documents. Hamas has been publicly more reserved on this issue, but its intentions are clear.
      "The Palestinian vision was never, as described by various Palestinian spokesmen in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s to Western journalists, of a “secular, democratic Palestine” (it certainly sounded more palatable than, say, the “destruction of Israel,” which was the goal it was meant to paper over or camouflage). Indeed, “a secular democratic Palestine” had never been the goal of Fatah or the so-called moderate groups that dominated the PLO between the 1960s and the 2006 elections that brought Hamas to power."
    • Sayigh 1997: "The outlines of Fateh's political thinking took shape as these various strands came together. Its ultimate goal was clear: to liberate the whole of Palestine and destroy the foundations of what it termed a colonialist, Zionist occupation state and society. In short, Fateh sought to destroy Israel as an economic, political, and military entity and restore Palestine as it still existed in the mind of most Palestinians, the homeland that was before 1948. There was little difference between Fateh and any other Palestinian group in this respect (with the solitary exception of the communists).
      "Here was little room for the Jews in this outlook. The original Jewish community in Palestine, that pre-dated the British mandate, could remain but would do so under unequivocally Arab sovereignty. The majority of the Israeli population were an 'alien human assembly', however."
    • Ross 2005: "The PLO has its own policy of denial and rejection. Its charter called for the eradication of the Zionist entity (i.e., Israel); the departure from Palestine of all the Jews who arrived after the Balfour Declaration; and the creation of a binational democratic state in which Palestinians would be the decisive majority and Jews a distinct minority."
    • Amos 1980: "Not unsurprisingly, Palestinian reaction to this was to state nationalist goals in the maximum possible terms (as already indicated, Resistance organizational dynamics would have predisposed Resistance leaders toward this option anyway). The result was the formulation of the goal of the "democratic, secular state" in Palestine, a concept that (Israeli analysts were quick to point out) would mean the end of Israel."
    • Beres 1997: "Referring to the imminent takeover of Jerusalem from the Jews, Arafat was quoted at a meeting of Arab dignitaries as saying, "You understand that we plan to eliminate the State of Israel and establish a purely Palestinian state. I have no use for Jews; they are and remain Jews." Arafat further announced in an appearance before Palestinian forces on September 24, 1996, that, "[t]hey will fight for Allah, and they will kill and be killed ....Palestine is our land and Jerusalem is our capital." [...] On January 30, 1996, at the Grand Hotel in Stockholm, Sweden, Arafat delivered a speech to forty Arab diplomats on "The Impending Total Collapse of Israel." Said Arafat, "We Palestinians will take over everything, including all of Jerusalem ....All the rich Jews who will get compensation will travel to America." Arafat continued, "We of the PLO will now concentrate all our efforts on splitting Israel psychologically into two camps. Within five years we will have six to seven million Arabs living on the West Bank and in Jerusalem .... You understand that we plan to eliminate the State of Israel and establish a purely Palestinian State ....I have no use for Jews; they are and remain Jews. We now need all the help we can get from you in our battle for a united Palestine under total Arab-Moslem domination. "
  2. ^
    • Morris 2009: "But clearly Fatah's leaders had some level of expulsionist intent. As Salah Khalaf ("Abu Iyad") put in (in A Dialogue about the Principal Issues), hinting, or more than hinting, at the goal, the movement had asked the Arab states 'to allow former Jewish Nationals to reclaim their citizenship and property, with the aim of opening a floodgate for "reverse emigration" from Israel.'"
    • PLO 1968: "The Jews who had normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians. [...] Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history and the true conception of what constitutes statehood. Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own; they are citizens of the states to which they belong."
    • Hamas 1988: "Moreover, if the links have been distant from each other and if obstacles, placed by those who are the lackeys of Zionism in the way of the fighters obstructed the continuation of the struggle, the Islamic Resistance Movement aspires to the realisation of Allah's promise, no matter how long that should take. The Prophet, Allah bless him and grant him salvation, has said: 'The Day of Judgement will not come about until Moslems fight the Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say O Moslems, O Abdulla, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him. Only the Gharkad tree, (evidently a certain kind of tree) would not do that because it is one of the trees of the Jews.' (related by al-Bukhari and Moslem)."
    • Peel Commission 1937: "But it must be remembered that those Jewish minorities elsewhere are relatively very small and that the Jewish minority in Palestine is already regarded by the Arabs as too big. On this point the following questions put to the Mufti of Jerusalem and his replies should be noted:
      "Q. Does His Eminence think that this country can assimilate and digest the 400,000 Jews now in the country?
      "A. No.
      "Q. Some of them would have to be removed by a process kindly or painful as the case may be?
      "A. We must leave all this to the future.
      "We are not questioning the sincerity or the humanity of the Mufti’s intentions and those of his colleagues; but we cannot forget what recently happened, despite treaty provisions and explicit assurances, to the Assyrian minority in ‘Iraq; nor can we forget that the hatred of the Arab politician for the National Home has never been concealed and that it has now permeated the Arab population as a whole."
    • Karsh 2009, p. 43-44: "Fawzi Qawaqji, commander of the pan-Arab force that invaded Palestine in early 1948 vowed 'to drive all Jews into the sea,' Abdel Qader Husseini, the Mufti's foremost henchman, stated that 'the Palestine problem will only be solved by the sword; all Jews must leave Palestine', and the Syrian minister of defence pledged to turn the year 1948 into 'a bloodbath in which the Arab countries will make a stand against all the injustice suffered at the hands of foreign powers.' As it was, the Palestinian and pan-Arab attempt to 'ethnically cleanse' the Jewish community backfired spectacularly."
    • Karsh 2004: "The new "free and democratic society" was perceived not as a true partnership between equal groups sharing sovereignty over a specific territory, but rather as an Arab-Muslim state in which Jews would be reduced to a permanent minority status, a modern-day version of the ahl al-dhimma" system of "protected non-Muslim minorities" that had existed since Islam's early days. [...] The PLO's pretence that those Jewish citizens of the defunct state of Israel who would like to become citizens new Arab Palestine would be allowed to do so was patently false. Its founding document, the Palestinian National Covenant, revised in July 1968, to reflect the more militant line of Fatah and the guerrilla organizations, states explicitly that only those Jews "who were normally resident in Palestine up to the beginning of the Zionist invasion are Palestinians." Since most of Israel's citizens are an integral part of this "Zionist invasion," the practical meaning of this declaration is that the prospective Palestinian state would be virtually Judenrein."
  3. ^
    • Barkan 2005: "the demand to allow one to three million Palestinians to settle within Israel, which is a frequent interpretation of the right of return, is viewed by Israelis as a plan to deny and erase [their] right of Israeli nationalism."
    • Peled & Rouhana 2007: "For Israeli Jews, the right of return signifies an existential threat to the Jewish character of their society, if not to its very existence."
    • Morris 2009: "The Palestinian insistence on Israel’s acceptance of the “right of return” and its implementation, given the demographic realities, would seem to mean that the PNA-PLO strove and is striving for the conversion of Israel from a Jewish to an Arab-majority state as well as a West Bank–Gaza state that is Arab. Presumably these two Arab-majority states would then merge or unify into one Palestinian Arab-majority state."
    • Morris 2008: "The Palestinian Arabs, backed by the wider Arab and Muslim worlds, continue to endorse the refugees' right of return and demand its implementation. Many Arabs no doubt view the return as a means of undermining Israel's existence."
  4. ^
    • Nüsse 1998, regarding Hamas: "This classical Islamic view of protected religious minorities is incompatible with the Western idea of pluralism and equality of individual citizens in a nation-state. Christians and Jews are in fact different citizens than their Muslim fellow men. It becomes obvious that the Islamists' idea of democracy and political pluralism is very different from the Western one. An ideological order that separates non-Muslims from the body politic by tolerating them, rejects the idea of political pluralism; it only allows political separation. The Islamists' claims that every group of a people must have the right to express its views openly is limited by the conviction that non-Muslims have to recognise the superiority of Islam. No behaviour or statement impinging upon Islamic belief can be tolerated.The best proof for this is the Islamists' proclaimed right to close Christian bars and shops selling wine.18 This is against Islamic law and thus is not subject to tolerance."
    • Morris 2009: "And today, again, and for the same reasons—the phrase retains its good, multicultural, liberal ring—“a secular, democratic Palestine” is bandied about by Palestinian one-state supporters. And a few one-statists, indeed, may sincerely believe in and desire such a denouement. But given the realities of Palestinian politics and behavior, the phrase objectively serves merely as camouflage for the goal of a Muslim Arab–dominated polity to replace Israel. And, as in the past, the goal of “a secular democratic Palestine” is not the platform or policy of any major Palestinian political institution or party.
      "Indeed, the idea of a “secular democratic Palestine” is as much a nonstarter today as it was three decades ago. It is a nonstarter primarily because the Palestinian Arabs, like the world’s other Muslim Arab communities, are deeply religious and have no respect for democratic values and no tradition of democratic governance. It is indicative that the first major leader of the Palestinian national movement—Haj Amin al-Husseini—was an autocratic cleric who ruled with the gun; and it was no accident that he continuously employed religious symbols and rhetoric to mobilize his people to action against the infidel “invaders.” That was the language that could reach the hearts of the Palestinian masses. To have brandished the slogan of a “secular, democratic Palestine” as the national movement’s goal, both during the al-Husseini and Arafat years, would simply have alienated the masses—which at least partly explains why the PNC and PLO never adopted it."
    • Wieseltier 2003: "Will the jihadists of Hamas really stay their hands when Afula finally is theirs? And who will protect the Jews in Greater Palestine from their wrath? An "international force"? The suggestion is outrageous. The record of international forces in conditions of ethnic cleansing is a sentence of death for any people who would look to them for salvation."
    • Becker 1984: "The 'democratic state’ (or the ‘secular, democratic state' as Western journalists have often phrased it) might have the ring of good promise to many; but to know what a PLO state would really be like we cannot examine some unrealized ideal; we can only look at how the PLO actually ruled, in southern Lebanon."
  5. ^
    • Morris 2009: "From that point on, the Palestinian Arab elite struggled tooth and nail to deny the “Jewishness” of Palestine. (An exception was the leading Palestinian intellectual and politician Yusuf Diya al-Khalidi, who at the end of the nineteenth century wrote to Zadok Kahn, the chief rabbi of France: “Who can challenge the rights of the Jews in Palestine? Good Lord, historically it is really your country.”) An apt indication of this denial was provided by the Jerusalem Christian Arab educator Khalil al-Sakakini, when he fulminated in 1936 that the British Mandate’s new radio station referred to the country in Hebrew as “eretz yisrael” (the Land of Israel). “If Palestine [ falastin] is eretz yisrael,then we, the Arabs, are but passing strangers, and there is nothing for us to do but to emigrate,” al-Sakakini jotted down in his diary. This effacement of the “Jewishness” of Palestine has characterized the Palestinian Arab national movement ever since. The complete deletion of the Jewish presence in and history of the country is epitomized in the textbooks published by the Palestine National Authority since the 1990s, in the destruction by Palestinians of Jewish sites in the PNA-controlled territories during the Second Intifada (for example, the torching of “Joseph’s Tomb” in Nablus), and in the repeated “historical” pronouncements on this matter by the leader of the Palestinian national movement between 1969 and 2004, PLO chairman Yasser Arafat."
    • Ross 2005: "Again, [Arafat] was nonresponsive, and now raised his new mythology, saying, "Of course, the Temple did not exist in Jerusalem, but in Nablus.""
    • Reiter 2008: "On September 25, 2003, a delegation of Arab leaders from northern Israel visited Yasser Arafat at his Muqata`a compound of Ramallah in a show of solidarity with the Palestinians in the al-Aqsa Intifada; the guests were surprised when Arafat lectured to them for about a quarter of an hour on al-Aqsa, making the central claim that the Jewish Temple had not existed in Jerusalem but rather in Yemen.
      "[...] A similar claim to that made by Arafat has been expounded by another Palestinian public figure, Hajj Zaki al-Ghawl—who, from Amman, served as Jerusalem’s “shadow” mayor. In a lecture that he delivered in 2002 at the annual al-Quds conference in Jordan, al-Ghawl stated that King Solomon ruled over the Arabian Peninsula and that it was there, not in Jerusalem, that he built his Temple. Another theory proffered by Arafat with regard to the ancient Temple’s location, one that he raised during the Camp David peace talks in 2000 and that was quoted by a senior member of the American negotiation team, was that “the Temple never existed in Jerusalem, but rather in Nablus.” Arafat’s appointed mufti `Ikrima Sabri expressed this view in an interview to an Israeli newspaper already in 1998 by saying: “I heard that your Temple was in Nablus or perhaps Bethlehem."
      "[...] The basic claim of the new Arab and Muslim historians—those who have been publishing books and articles since 1967—is that the Jews’ sovereign existence in Jerusalem existed for only 60 or 70 years, and that this brief presence does not justify a recognition of Jewish territorial rights after an absence of 2,000 years.
      "[...] It is interesting to note an important finding of Nimrod Luz in his research on al-Haram al-Sharif in the Israeli-Arab discourse: not only does the head of the Islamic Movement’s northern branch, Sheikh Ra’id Salah, deny the Jewish connection to the Temple Mount, but high-ranking Muslim members of the Communist Hadash Party—Shawqi Khatib, chairman of the Israeli-Arab Follow-Up Committee, and Knesset member Muhammad Barakeh—too express similar opinions."
    • Edmunds 2019: ""The Jews claim that they were in Palestine 2,000 years ago," Riyad al-Aileh, a Palestinian political science lecturer from Al-Azhar University stated on a program called The Supreme Authority on November 6.
      "He continued: "If we look at the history, we will see that they were not in Palestine in the past, but rather only as invaders less than 70 years ago. For these 70 years they have been invaders, like the Hyksos, the Byzantines, the Persians and [British] colonialism. The Canaanite Palestinian people have since succeeded in defeating those invaders and continue [to live] in this land." Similarly, Abir Zayyad, an archaeologist and member of Fatah’s Jerusalem branch, said on November 7 in a program called The Scent of History: “We have no archaeological evidence of the presence of the children of Israel in Palestine in this historical period 3,000 years ago, neither in Jerusalem, nor in all of Palestine.”
      "Their claims came a month after a Palestinian author asserted in an interview that Jewish history had been "falsified."
      "Speaking to Palestine This Morning on October 6, Haidar Massad said: “I wrote a novel called The Palace that was published in 2019. This novel… is about the falsification of the historical geography in the Zionist and Talmudic (i.e., Jewish) narrative… The reader can establish… that in this land, Palestine, which has always been Arab – the children of Israel were never there.”"
allikas: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Palestinian_nationalism