Zhejiang-Jiangxi campaign

Zhejiang-Jiangxi campaign
Part of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific Theater of World War II

A Japanese soldier with 50 mm heavy grenade discharger during the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign, 30 May 1942
Date (1942-05-15) (1942-09-04)May 15 – September 4, 1942
(3 months, 2 weeks and 6 days)
Location
Result Japanese victory
Belligerents
 China
United States
 Japan
Commanders and leaders
Republic of China (1912–1949) Gu Zhutong
Republic of China (1912–1949) Shangguan Yunxiang
Republic of China (1912–1949) Tang Shih-Tsun
Republic of China (1912–1949) Wang Jingjiu
Republic of China (1912–1949) Li Jue
Republic of China (1912–1949) Xue Yue
Republic of China (1912–1949) Ou Zhen
Republic of China (1912–1949) Shi Zhongcheng
Republic of China (1912–1949) Wang Yaowu
Republic of China (1912–1949) Xia Chuzhong
Republic of China (1912–1949) Sun Du
Republic of China (1912–1949) Feng Sheng-Fa
Republic of China (1912–1949) Ding Zhipan
Republic of China (1912–1949) Wang Tieh-Han
Republic of China (1912–1949) Chang Wen-Ching
Republic of China (1912–1949) Tao Kuang
Republic of China (1912–1949) Liu Yu-Ching
Republic of China (1912–1949) Fan Tse-Ying
Republic of China (1912–1949) Mo Yu-Shuo
Empire of Japan Shunroku Hata
Empire of Japan Shigeru Sawada
Empire of Japan Korechika Anami
Empire of Japan Sanji Ōkido
Empire of Japan Tetsuzo Ide
Empire of Japan Takayuki Uchida
Empire of Japan Toshijiro Takeuchi
Empire of Japan Johkichi Nanbu
Empire of Japan Haruo Yamamura
Empire of Japan Hachiro Tagami
Empire of Japan Tagaji Takahashi
Empire of Japan Shigeru Ōga
Empire of Japan Saburo Takehara
Empire of Japan Takejiro Imai
Empire of Japan Tokutaro Ide
Empire of Japan Giichi Hirano
Empire of Japan Naotsugu Sakai 
Units involved
 Republic of China Army  Imperial Japanese Army
Empire of Japan Unit 731
Strength
22,099 officers and 290,209 soldiers[1][a] 180,000
Casualties and losses
Chinese records:[1][a]
724 officers and 23,637 soldiers killed
914 officers and 24,366 soldiers wounded
600 officers and 18,040 soldiers missing

Western estimate: 30,000 killed or wounded[2]

Japanese claim:[3]: 260-264 : 294-295 
13th Army's claim:
24,430 killed
8,564 POWs

11th Army's claim:
15,758 killed
2,283 POWs
Chinese claim: 36,869 killed or wounded[1]

Japanese records:[3]: 260-264 : 294-295 
13th Army:
1,284 killed
2,767 wounded
11,812 fallen ill

11th Army:
336 killed
949 wounded
As many as 250,000 Chinese civilians killed[4][5]
  1. ^ a b The strength and casualties from the following units are not reported and thus not included:
    • Headquarters and units directly under the 88th Army, Qiantang River Northern Army, and 21st Army
    • 52nd Division, 148th Division, and three battalions of the 192nd Division
    • All engineer, artillery, and communications units excluding the engineer and artillery units temporarily attached to the 86th Army in Quzhou

The Zhejiang-Jiangxi campaign or the Chekiang–Kiangsi campaign (Japanese: 浙贛作戦, simplified Chinese: 浙赣战役; traditional Chinese: 浙赣戰役; pinyin: Zhè-Gàn Zhànyì), also known as Operation Sei-go (Japanese: せ号作戦), was a campaign by the China Expeditionary Army of the Imperial Japanese Army under Shunroku Hata and Chinese 3rd War Area forces under Gu Zhutong in Chinese provinces of Zhejiang and Jiangxi from mid May to early September 1942.

Hata's forces launched the campaign in retaliation for the Doolittle Raid, conducted by American pilots who had then landed in China's Zhejiang and Jiangxi provinces. Besides seizing local airfields, Japanese troops launched massive reprisal campaigns against the local population by "slaughtering every man and child." As many as 250,000 Chinese died in the Japanese reprisals, the majority civilians.

Background

Chinese soldiers assist Doolittle's pilots to safety in Eastern China, 1942.

On April 18, 1942, the United States launched the Doolittle Raid, an attack by 16 B-25 Mitchell bombers from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet on Tokyo, Nagoya, and Yokohama. The original plan was for the aircraft to bomb Japan and land at airfields in unoccupied portion of China. Because the raid had to be launched earlier than planned, all but one of the aircraft (which against orders diverted to the Soviet Union) ran out of fuel and crashed in the Chinese provinces of Zhejiang and Jiangxi or their offshore islands.

Sixty-four American airmen parachuted into the area around Zhejiang. Most were given shelter by Chinese civilians but eight Americans were captured by Japanese troops; three were shot after a show trial for crimes against humanity.[6]

The campaign

Imperial General Headquarters was aware of possible air attacks from Chinese territory on Japan. Two days before the Doolittle Raid, Headquarters set up an operational plan with the goal of defeating Chinese forces and destroying air bases. The operation started on May 15, 1942, with 40 infantry battalions and 15–16 artillery battalions of the Imperial Japanese Army.[7]

On May 15, the main force of the Japanese 13th Army invaded westward along the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway and both sides from Fenghua, Shangyu, Shaoxing, Xiaoshan and other towns in Zhejiang. Commander Korechika Anami of the 11th Army commanded two divisions and four detachments to advance from east to west from Hangzhou and Nanchang to attack in the direction of Shangrao, Jiangxi. On August 15, the Japanese army was ordered to retreat, and the Chinese army followed and pursued them. By the end of September, except for Jinhua, Wuyi and the northeastern region, all along the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway had been recovered.[8]

Japanese troops conducted a massive search for American airmen and in the process whole towns and villages that were suspected of harboring the Americans were burned to the ground and many civilians executed.[9] The Japanese also wanted to occupy the area to prevent American air force from ever using airfields in China that could put the Japanese mainland within reach.

Aftermath

When Japanese troops moved out of the Zhejiang and Jiangxi areas in mid-August, they left behind a trail of devastation. In Yihuang County, Japanese troops killed all orphans and the elderly sheltered at a missionary station. In that case, Japanese soldiers had bayonetted the victims, or tied them to stakes and burned them like "human candles".[10] In other cases, Japanese soldiers threw children into wells and drowned them.[11]

During the four-month campaign, Japanese soldiers slaughtered up to 250,000 civilians and thousands of farm animals, including at least 10,000 civilians killed for sheltering or assisting Doolittle's men.[6][9]

The Imperial Japanese Army had also spread cholera, typhoid, plague-infected fleas and dysentery pathogens.[12] The Japanese biological warfare Unit 731 brought almost 300 pounds of paratyphoid and anthrax to be left in contaminated food and contaminated wells with the withdrawal of the army from areas around Yushan, Kinhwa and Futsin.[13] This attack took place at Jinhua in Zhejiang and the Japanese soldiers inadvertently advanced in the area they spread with biological weapons and got themselves infected,[14][15][16][17][18] leading to over 1,700 dying and 10,000 getting sick.[19][20][21] This information about the Japanese killing their own soldiers in the campaign came from a Japanese POW captured by Americans in 1944, who admitted that the actual Japanese death toll was far higher than the 1,700 he saw on the documents at the biological warfare headquarters, and that Japanese regularly downplayed their own casualties: When Japanese troops overran an area in which a [biological weapons] attack had been made during the Chekiang [Zhejiang] campaign in 1942, casualties upward from 10,000 resulted within a very brief period of time. Diseases were particularly cholera, but also dysentery and pest [bubonic plague]. Victims were usually rushed to hospitals in rear. … Statistics which POW saw at Water Supply and Purification Dept Hq at Nanking showed more than 1,700 dead, chiefly from cholera; POW believes that actual deaths were considerably higher, ‘it being a common practice to pare down unpleasant figures.’” [22]

See also

References

Notes

  1. ^ a b c 抗日戰史: 浙贛會戰. 國防部史政局. 1966. pp. 180–181.
  2. ^ Frank, Richard (2020). Tower of Skulls. W. W. Norton & Company. p. 312.
  3. ^ a b War History Office of the National Defence College of Japan (1966). 戦史叢書第055巻 昭和十七・八年の支那派遣軍 [Senshi Sōsho Volume 55 : The China Expeditionary Army in Shōwa 17 and 18]. Senshi Sōsho. Asagumo Shimbunsha.
  4. ^ books.google.com/books?id=i2hjEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT107
  5. ^ Carter, James (2022). "THE COSTS OF ALLIANCE: THE DOOLITTLE RAID AND CHINA" (PDF). Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society China. 82 (1): 64. Retrieved 26 October 2025.
  6. ^ a b Haymond, John A. (22 March 2023). "During WWII the Japanese Created A Law To Commit War Crimes". HistoryNet.
  7. ^ Schoppa, R. Keith (2011). In a Sea of Bitterness, Refugees during the Sino-Japanese War. Harvard University Press. p. 368. ISBN 9780674059887., p.28
  8. ^ 熊武一,周家法 总编;卓名信,厉新光,徐继昌等 主编.军事大辞海·下.北京:长城出版社.2000.第2550页
  9. ^ a b Scott, James M. "The Untold Story of the Vengeful Japanese Attack After the Doolittle Raid". Smithsonian Magazine.
  10. ^ books.google.com/books?id=VH_hDwAAQBAJ&pg=RA1-PT68
  11. ^ books.google.com/books?id=ZPAeEQAAQBAJ&pg=PT162
  12. ^ Yuki Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, Westviewpres, 1996, p.138
  13. ^ Scott, James M., Target Tokyo, W. W. Norton & Co., 2015, p.387
  14. ^ Steiger, Brad; Steiger, Sherry Hansen; Hile, Kevin (2022). Conspiracies and Secret Societies: The Complete Dossier of Hidden Plots and Schemes (3 ed.). Visible Ink Press. ISBN 978-1578598038.
  15. ^ Tanaka, Yuki (2019). Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes In World War Ii (reprint ed.). Routledge. ISBN 978-0429720895.
  16. ^ Snodgrass, Mary Ellen (2017). World Epidemics: A Cultural Chronology of Disease from Prehistory to the Era of Zika, 2d ed. McFarland. p. 243. ISBN 978-1476631066.
  17. ^ Byrne, Joseph P.; Hays, Jo N. (2021). Epidemics and Pandemics: From Ancient Plagues to Modern-Day Threats [2 volumes] (illustrated ed.). ABC-CLIO. p. 229. ISBN 978-1440863790.
  18. ^ Tsuneishi, Kei-ichi (2011). "13 Reasons for the Failure to Prosecute Unit 731 and its Significance". In Tanaka, Yuki; McCormack, Timothy L.H.; Simpson, Gerry (eds.). Beyond Victor's Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited. Vol. 30 of International Humanitarian Law Series. BRILL. p. 186. ISBN 978-9004215917.
  19. ^ Mauroni, Albert J. (2007). Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Reference Handbook. Contemporary World Issues (revised ed.). ABC-CLIO. p. 139-140. ISBN 978-1598840278.
  20. ^ Hatcher, Paul E.; Battey, Nick (2011). Biological Diversity: Exploiters and Exploited. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-0470979860.
  21. ^ Tóth, Tibor (2006). The Implementation of Legally Binding Measures to Strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute, held in Budapest, Hungary, 2001. Vol. 150 of NATO Science Series II: Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry (illustrated ed.). Springer Science & Business Media. p. 19. ISBN 1402020988.
  22. ^ Keiichi, Tsuneishi (November 24, 2005). "Unit 731 and the Japanese Imperial Army's Biological Warfare Program". Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. 3 (11).

Bibliography