Pyrrhic War
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The Pyrrhic War (/ˈpɪrɪk/ PIRR-ik; 281–275 BC) was the first major conflict between the Roman Republic and one of the Hellenistic powers, in this case, Pyrrhus, the king of Epirus.^[1]

Prior to the war, the Romans had expanded for some decades into southern Italy by defeating a number of Italic tribes, most notably the Samnites. They also started to conclude alliances with the Greek city-states of Magna Graecia. The outbreak of a new conflict between one of those allies, Thurii, and a Samnite-led alliance led to Roman intervention. The Tarentines, seeking to prevent continued Roman intervention in southern Italy, attacked a Roman fleet sailing in their waters contrary to a previous treaty and marched on Thurii, deposing the pro-Roman government there. After rejection of a Roman ultimatum in early 281 BC, war was declared. Cognisant of their weakness in the field, the Tarentines sought foreign support in the form of Pyrrhus of Epirus, who landed at Tarentum with reinforcement in the winter of 281/80 BC.

Sources for the war are poor. The relevant portions of Livy's history are missing, though preserved in outline form in the Periochae, as are those of Appian, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Cassius Dio, and Diodorus Siculus.^[1]

Many of the depictions of the battles during the war are both vague and filled with mythical elements that suggest that the source authors had few authentic details available in their own time.^[2] It was characteristic of Roman annalists to introduce implausible anecdotes that sought to depict Rome favourably.^[3]

The later Roman sources are also somewhat sheepish about admitting Roman defeats, seeking to downplay defeats or, in some versions, simply to assert victory.^[4]

In the years prior to the Pyrrhic War, the Romans had steadily expanded south down the the Italian peninsula. The Samnites were defeated in the Third Samnite War (298–290 BC) along with their Italic allies.^[5] The Greek city of Thurii allied itself to Rome in 285 BC seeking protection from an invasion by Lucanians and a few years later, in 282, the city fell under siege by an allied force of Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians. A Roman army under the command of consul Gaius Fabricius Luscinus relived the city and probably followed up with an offensive into Samnium and Lucania with little successful opposition.^[6]

The Roman alliance with Thurii, along with the demonstrable Roman ability to operate deep in southern Italy, was highly concerning to the Greek city of Taras (later called Tarentum; modern Taranto). They had aligned themselves with the Lucanians to oppose Roman expansion, which now encroached into Tarentum's sphere of influence. The Thurian alliance with Rome not only challenged Tarentine leadership of the Greek cities of southern Italy but also encircled Taras itself with pro-Roman allies and colonies.^[7] Logistical demands also saw the Romans operate a fleet in the Gulf of Taranto to support a new Roman garrison at Thurii; such a fleet was possibly in contravention of a putative treaty between Rome and Taras signed probably some fifty years earlier restricting Romans from sailing past the Lacinian promontory.^[8][9] Regardless, the Romans' expansion into Tarentum's sphere of influence, along with the appearance of Roman warships in Tarentine waters, was threatening to Tarentine regional interests but also its democratic regime, which feared Roman intervention overthrowing its democracy for a pro-Roman oligarchy.^[10]

Lacinian promontory

Thurii

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The Lacinian promontory on a modern map of Calabria. The Romans would have controlled the western coast of what is now the Calabrian peninsula, with Tarentines asserting influence over the eastern side.

The inciting incident for the war was a Tarentine attack led by the politician Philocharis on a small Roman fleet of ten ships in Tarentum's harbour,^[11] probably late in 282 BC after the consul Fabricius had departed southern Italy with his men. Taras at the same time attacked the Roman ally Thurii and drove its pro-Roman government into exile, likely with the aid of pro-Tarentine supporters within the city.^[12] The attack resulted in a Roman ultimatum to the Tarentines, delivered early in 281 by Lucius Postumius Megellus, demanding the return of prisoners taken from the Roman fleet, the return of the pro-Roman Thruian exiles, the return of property taken in the sack of the city, and the surrender of the Tarentines responsible for the attacks. These Roman demands were extreme, especially relating to the surrender of Tarentine citizens, and the Tarentines refused (in Roman sources amid a stream of insults); the ultimatum rejected, the Romans declared war.^[13]

An army under the Roman consul Lucius Aemilius Barbula then invaded Tarentine territory directly, repeating Roman demands unchanged while ravaging the countryside.^[14] The Tarentines, realising their own military weakness – even with the support of the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians already fighting Rome – debated whether to accept Aemilius' demands or seek foreign assistance. Pyrrhus, king of Epirus (though he called himself king of the Molossians),^[15] was their only obvious source of aid and, after a debate during which the pro-Roman Tarentines were outvoted, resolved to issue an invitation to the king.^[16] Such interventions had been common in the past, though not always successful; the recent death of the king of Syracause, Agathocles, who had intervened for Tarentum in the past, also narrowed their options. Pyrrhus had by this time developed an international reputation as a highly competent commander.^[17]

Aemilius learnt of the invitation quickly. His raiding of Tarentine territory continued apace but he also spared Tarentine citizens who were released back to their city to signal Roman willingness to come to terms. Successful diplomatic missions also led to the Romans taking allies from Tarentum in the form of Locri, Croton, and Rhegium. Aemilius' campaign led to a change in Tarentine policy with the election of a new general, Agis, who sought to end the conflict as quickly possible. Pyrrhus' aims were likely to establish a hegemony over Magna Graecia – claims in later Roman sources such as Plutarch that he sought to invade Rome and most of the western Mediterranean are exaggerated^[18] – and, after hearing of the invitation, he concluded a peace on favourable terms with Macedon to freely turn west.^[19] Late in 281 BC, Epirote troops landed in Tarentum, removing pro-Roman politicians from the city such as Agis and causing Aemilius to withdraw to back to the Roman colony at Venusia for the winter. Amid claims from Tarentum and the various Italic peoples threatened by Rome that they support the Epirotes with some 350,000 soldiers with 20,000 cavalry, the Epirote League conducted a levy ostensibly to free the southern Italian Greeks from Roman hegemony.^[20] Early in 280, Pyrrhus received a favourable oracle at Dodona and crossed the Adriatic and was named supreme commander (strategos autocrator) of allied forces.^[21]

Heraclea

Capua

Rome

Anagnia

Asculum

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Major locations in Pyrrhus' campaign over 280–79 BC on a modern relief map of Italy

Publius Valerius Laevinus, one of the consuls for 280 BC, was assigned the southern theatre; the other consul, Tiberius Coruncanius, was dispatched north to continue the fight against the Etruscans.^[22] Aemilius, consul for the previous year, was also prorogued, keeping his forces near Venusia to contain the Samnites.^[23] The Romans also proceeded to consolidate their own military position, arresting anti-Roman politicians in allied communities and further garrisoning them to defend their supply lines into southern Italy.^[24]

Marching south with probably a standard consular army, Laevinius met Pyrrhus near Heraclea with rough numerical parity. No precise numbers are given for the size of the armies, but later sources exaggerate the size of the Roman's army to cast Pyrrhus as an Alexandrine military genius and to further embellish the eventual Roman victory.^[25] Patrick Kent, in A History of the Pyrrhic War, places both armies at slightly more than 20,000 men each.^[26] Seeking a delay, Pyrrhus attempted to engage in negotiations. Suggesting that he serve as a mediator between Tarentum and Rome, the suggestion was declined.^[27]

Details of the battle are not very trustworthy.^[28] Laevinius acted first and had his men ford the river Siris and attack Pyrrhus' forces. While the Roman infantry was thrown into some disorder by a contested crossing, Roman cavalry was able to ford the river at a different location, probably upstream. The main Roman infantry force engaged Pyrrhus' phalanx but was unable to break through. The Roman cavalry which had forded elsewhere may have attempted a flanking manoeuvre before being thrown back by Pyrrhus' war elephants. Taking the advantage in mobile forces, the Roman infantry was likely flanked and pushed into rout.^[29] The Roman sources also include a dramatic scene where one Ferentani cavalry officer named Oblacus Volsinius attempted a personal charge against Pyrrhus himself in an attempt to end the war before being felled by the king's bodyguards. The sources claim that after the charge, Pyrrhus swapped his royal armour with one of his companions before being forced again to expose himself when that companion fell and his men started to waver. It is unlikely the scene is historical.^[30]

Roman casualties on the field are also not clear. Many sources suggest that the Romans took heavy casualties while Pyrrhus had lost many of his best men.^[31] Pyrrhus, however, is reported to have cautioned against too eager a pursuit, since that would encourage the enemy to fight harder. In later negotiations he also attempted to seek a quick end to the war, even releasing Roman prisoners to build up goodwill; an eager pursuit would have been counterproductive to reaching a rapid negotiated settlement.^[32] The Romans then withdrew to Venusia.^[33] The Roman defeat triggered some of their allies to defect. When Pyrrhus appeared at Locri, the city threw open its gates and surrendered the small Roman garrison of around 200 men. Attempts at Rhegium, however, to throw out the Roman garrison were suppressed by force.^[34]

Pyrrhus marched north from Heraclea. Laevinius continued the retreat, moving from Venusia back to Capua before Pyrrhus' Samnite allies closed Roman lines of communication across the Apennines.^[35] Lacking siege equipment, Pyrrhus was unable to take Naples or Capua, which Laevinius had reinforced with troops quickly levied from Rome. Instead, he bypassed the cities and continued north into Latium along the Via Latina.^[36] He likely made it as far as Anagnia or possibly even Praeneste (the towns are respectively 38 and 20 miles south east of Rome) before turning back when the other consul, Coruncanius, defeated the Volsinii and Vulci in Etruria – precluding any alliance with the Etruscans – and redeployed south to defend Rome.^[37] Laevinius allowed Pyrrhus to leave Latium, not yet feeling confident in the disposition of his forces.^[38]

The winter of 280 and 279 BC saw a renewed set of peace negotiations.^[39] A Livian tradition indicates that three former consuls came to Pyrrhus, who wintered in Tarentum, seeking the return of prisoners of war. Impressed by one of the consulars, Gaius Fabricius Luscinus, had all the prisoners released and escorted to Rome by his envoy, Cineas. This envoy addressed the Senate and gave peace terms: Rome would recognise the freedom of the southern Italian Greeks; give up all of its conquests in Samnium, Lucania, and Brutium; and an bilateral alliance between Rome and Pyrrhus personally (rather than his kingdom).^[40] The tradition reports that the Senate was on the cusp of agreeing to the proposals – especially after Cineas went around to various senators with gifts, which later Romans labelled as bribes and insisted were rejected,^[41] – when the blind and aged censor Appius Claudius Caecus spoke resolutely against it and, according to the story, carried the house.^[42] It is more likely that the Senate seriously considered accepting terms but, in the end, felt that the cost to Rome's prestige and geopolitical position in Italy was too high.^[43] To bolster Roman morale, triumphs were also celebrated that winter for Coruncanius over the Etruscans and proconsul Aemilius over the Tarentines and Samnites.^[44]

The campaigning season for 279 BC saw both Roman consuls, Publius Sulpicius Saverrio and Publius Decius Mus, assigned to the fight against Pyrrhus with some 40,000 men (about half Romans and half allies).^[45] Pyrrhus faced this force again on roughly equal terms, centred on his 16,000 Macedonians and with an advantage in cavalry.^[46] The ancient narrative of the battle concentrates on a supposed devotio which the consul Publius Decius Mus was to perform. The ritual involved Decius sacrificing himself – as his father and grandfather had at the battles of Sentinum and Veseris in 295 and 340 BC – to chthonic deities in exchange for victory. It is said that Pyrrhus, when hearing of the fear that rumours that Decius would perform the ritual evoked in his men, ordered his men to ensure that Mus be captured alive. The episode is almost certainly unhistorical, being a product of a Roman historiographical tradition which assumed families had characteristic behavioural traits.^[47] Regardless, the testimony of Cicero and Ammianus Marcellinus that Decius died in the battle should be discounted as Dio records a Decius Mus who is likely the same man being active in 265 BC.^[48][49]

There are two main versions of the battle. Plutarch describes a two day battle where Pyrrhus attacked the Romans on the first day over rough terrain before on the second day Pyrrhus secured flat terrain which allowed his elephantry and cavalry to defeat the Romans. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and his latter day adherents Dio and Zonaras, instead depicts a battle over a single day. There, the Romans break through the Epirote centre and force an inconclusive battle that ended in the night. Plutarch's narrative is the more reliable.^[50] The specifics of Pyrrhus' victory on the second day at not recorded in Plutarch: it is possible that Pyrrhus' poor performance on the first day caused the Romans to be overconfident or that Pyrrhus lured Romans off the rough ground they had occupied.^[51] Either way, after the battle – the sources are not even themselves unanimous as to whether the Epirotes had won^[52] – Pyrrhus had lost 3,605 men while the Romans had lost some 6,000. While the Romans had lost more men, Pyrrhus is said to have exclaimed "Another such victory and we are lost!" due to the irreplaceability of his elite hoplites, which has given rise to the modern phrase Pyrrhic victory.^[53]

Syracuse

Lilybaeum

Mt Eryx

Messana

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Major locations in Pyrrhus' Sicilian expedition on a modern relief map of Sicily

At the end of the campaign in Italy, while Pyrrhus had lost some several thousand men, he had achieved his immediate goal of displacing the Romans in peninsular Magna Graecia and establishing his own hegemony over it.^[55] Carthage, which controlled western Sicily was expanding eastward on the island after the death of Agathocles of Syracuse in 289 BC, and in response, moved to renew its treaty of friendship with Rome. Late in the year, the Carthaginian admiral Mago came to Ostia, Rome's harbour at the mouth of the Tiber, at the head of 120 ships; the two countries then agreed not to make a separate peace and to offer each other military aid.^[56][57]

Shortly thereafter, Pyrrhus received an invitation from Syracuse to take command of its war against Carthage. While there was also the pressing matter of a Celtic invasion into Macedonia which again created an opportunity for Pyrrhus to seize that kingdom, he chose to move on Sicily, probably due to promises of Sicilian support and dim prospects in Macedon.^[58] The ongoing Carthaginian siege of Syracuse, if successful, would also have dealt a great blow to Pyrrhus' reputation, which was entwined with his stated war goal of freeing the western Greeks from barbarian domination.^[59] Getting to Sicily was, however, troublesome since the Romans and Carthaginians controlled the Messine strait along with the ports of Rhegium and Messana that flanked it.^[60][61] Evading the Carthaginian fleet, he crossed from Locri to Tauromenium, ruled by the tyrant Tyndarion, before marching to Syracuse. His approach forced the Carthaginians besieging the city to withdraw, allowing him to enter it late in 278 BC hailed as a liberator.^[62] He quickly reconciled the two Syracusan factional leaders Sosistratos and Theonon before buttressing his army with Sicilian allies to some 30,000 men and 2,500 horse.^[63]

The start of the campaigning season of 277 BC saw the Carthaginians withdraw west towards Lilybaeum while Pyrrhus took a substantial number of towns and cities in central Sicily,^[64] including the fortress at Mount Eryx on the northwestern coast of the island.^[65] Further victories were had over the Mamertines in the northeast, reducing the Carthaginian position on the island solely to Lilybaeum and its environs.^[66] The Carthaginians, fighting defensively, were unable to do much to check Pyrrhus' advance. When Pyrrhus besieged Lilybaeum itself, he shortly negotiated with the Carthaginians, who offered him money to leave.^[67] Declining the offer, Pyrrhus besieged Lilybaeum in autumn 277 or spring 276 but was unable to make any progress: the city was constantly resupplied by Carthage's essentially unchallenged navy and the defenders were able to repel his attempts at assault. After two months, Pyrrhus withdrew to build up naval forces for another attempt.^[68]

His attempts build up forces required him to assert political authority over the Sicilians. Such actions, however, alienated them. Redistributing the land that previously belonged to the tyrant Agathocles and his allies to supporters, Pyrrhus also appointed magistrates to administer justice and divert resources for his war effort. The later historian Justin claims that this was in effort to establish a permanent kingdom in Sicily for his dynasty.^[69] The Syracusan leaders who invited Pyrrhus to the island, Sosistratos and Theonon, are alleged to have conspired against Pyrrhus' attempts to make his hegemony over the island permanent; the former went into exile while the latter was executed.^[70] However, with the Carthaginians bringing reinforcements from Africa, capitalising on his exertions by turning a number of Pyrrhus's Sicilian allies, and the Romans advancing in Italy, Pyrrhus feared for his lines of communication from Syracuse up the Calabrian peninsula. Recognising that his position on the island was increasingly precarious due to his lack of support and improvement in the Carthaginian military position (both threatening his Sicilian territories and his ability to withdraw from the island by sea), he heeded calls for for aid from his Greek allies in Italy and withdrew from the island.^[71]

Pyrrhus' intervention in southern Italy revitalised the cause of the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians. In the decade between 282 and 272 BC, the Capitoline Fasti record some ten triumphs from the region. However, this was to be their last major struggle against Roman conquest, as Roman victories by arms were solidified by colonial projects in 273, 268, and 263 at Paestum, Beneventum, and Aesernia.^[72]

Tarentum fell to the Romans in 272 BC, the same year that Pyrrhus died.^[73]

Pyrrhus may also have cast the war against Rome as a new Trojan War, which strengthened Rome's commitment to its legend (if not created whole-cloth around this time) of descent from Trojan exiles.^[74]