Not to be confused with Syrian Resistance.

Syrian Popular Resistance (Arabic: المقاومة الشعبية السورية, romanized: al-Muqāwamah ash-Shaʻbīyah as-Sūrīyah) is a neo-Ba'athist insurgent group fighting against the Syrian transitional government.

History

The Syrian Popular Resistance (SPR) was established in December 2024 after the fall of Assad. On 30 December 2024, they released a statement on stating that they vowed to kill the leaders of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), soldiers of the "Zionist state", America, and NATO.[9] The group advocates violent opposition against the Syrian transitional government,[10] and regularly espouses sectarian narratives through its telegram channel.[11]

The Syrian Popular Resistance, through the help of Hezbollah, heavily solicit funds through various cryptocurrencies including Bitcoin and Ethereum.[12]

The group portrayed its threats to attack HTS and HTS-affiliated leaders as part of its response against the claimed extrajudicial killings of Christians, Shias, and Alawites after the fall of the Assad regime.[1] The group also denounced the Syrian transitional government as heretical, by labelling the HTS-led coalition as "Kharijite" (extremists).[1] ISW predicted that growing conflict between armed minority groups of this kind and HTS would increase sectarian tensions in Syria because the HTS would struggle to contain some of the more Salafi Jihadist and sectarian groups within its coalition. Iran may have attempted to exploit this sectarian violence aiming to destabilize the Syrian transitional government.[1][13] Two days after the formation of the group, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) released a statement advocating counter-revolutionary action in Syria.[1][14]

Iranian government has been engaged in efforts to foment sectarian conflict in Syria, as part of its attempts to reestablish its proxy network in Syria and destabilize the region.[15][16] SPR became a target from both Turkey and Turkish-backed militias, as well as the SDF.[17] SPR utilizes the use of sleeper cells across Syria in order to perpetrate its attacks.[18]

On 4 February 2025, the Syrian Popular Resistance issued a statement calling it the "Final Statement" which urges for operations from all sects of Islam in Syria to fight against the new Syrian government if "they oppose Zionism, America, and Wahhabism".[19]

Attacks

January 2025

On 6 January, the Syrian Popular Resistance ambushed HTS units in Latakia.[20]

On 10 January, the Syrian Popular Resistance attacked Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham personnel in the Talfita region in the countryside of the Rif Dimashq Governorate where a large number of people were killed and injured in the operation aimed at Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham.[21]

On 13 January, the Syrian Popular Resistance claimed to have attacked and killed 35 Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham fighters in western Homs near the Lebanon–Syria border in coordination with fighters from Hermel, Lebanon, who may have affiliation with Hezbollah, with members of the interim government not giving any comment on the situation.[22]

On 14 January, the Syrian Popular Resistance targeted Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham personnel in the Hamidiya police station in the Tartus Governorate with hand-made bombs in cooperation with Lebanese militant factions from the Beqaa Governorate and Hermel in the Baalbek-Hermel Governorate.[23]

On 16 January, the Syrian Popular Resistance announced there would be more attacks against Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and other affiliates.[24]

On 22 January, the Syrian Popular Resistance attacked a checkpoint controlled by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham which led to the death of 22 militants associated with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and injured several, including Ibrahim Abdulrahman Hajj, also known by the nom-de-guerre Ebu Mutaybin, who is one of the leading figures of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham.[25]

On 23 January, the Syrian Popular Resistance claimed responsibility through their Telegram channel for the assassination of the head of the Al-Sheykh Maskin police station in Daraa, Muhammad Khalid Al-Safadi (who also had associations to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham), who was shot several times in response to, what they call, the "brutal massacres committed by these terrorist groups against innocent civilians in various Syrian regions".[26]

On 25 January, members of the Syrian Popular Resistance assassinated a local leader of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, Ahmed al-Wazir Abu Akar, and wounding other men that were with him at the time of his death in the vicinity of the Dabousieh area in the Talkalakh District of Homs Governorate, and on the same day, Syrian Popular Resistance militants executed an ambush targeting a military vehicle belonging to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham which resulted in several deaths and injuries of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham militants, including a higher ranking militant by the name of Muhammad Abdul Qadir Khalil, also known by the nom-de-guerre Abu Abdo Talbiseh.[27]

On 31 January, the Syrian Popular Resistance shot at Israeli military personnel in the city of Tirangah in the countryside of Quneitra, southern Syria, they targeted Israeli forces with heavy machine guns which they claimed resulted in the injury of multiple Israeli soldiers.[28] They officially claimed responsibility on 1 February 2025 in a statement released on their Telegram channel, stating more attacks will continue,[29] The IDF acknowledged the incident, but said that they had suffered no injuries.[30] This would be the first time Israeli forces came under fire since their incursion.[31]

February 2025

On 1 February, the Syrian Popular Resistance claimed responsibility for an ambush on the Latakia-Aleppo highway near Al-Mukhtariyah in Latakia countryside, in which one member of Military Operations Command was killed, two others were injured and a fourth one went missing.[32][33]

On 6 February, previous members of the 25th Special Forces of the Syrian Arab Army, led by Muqdad Fatiha, established the Coastal Shield Brigade under the Syrian Popular Resistance.[34]

On 12 February, the Syrian popular resistance attacked a checkpoint belonging to HTS located in a former gas station in Tartous.[citation needed]

On 14 February, the Syrian Popular Resistance shot and killed 2 members of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham in village of Al-Qabbou, west of the Syrian city of Homs though the Syrian Ministry of Defense and Security deny this claim.[35][36] The two members were Mohammed Hamdi Alulu and Yahya Abdul Qader Kurdo from Idlib, they were kidnapped from Qalamoun where surveillance camera footage from a bakery on the victims' route showed that motorcycles were chasing the car they were driving, minutes before contact with them was lost. They were found in the towns of Hafir al-Fawqa and Hafir al-Tahta.[37]

March 2025

On March 5, 2025, the Director of the Public Security Department in Latakia Governorate, Major Mustafa Knefati, revealed in an official statement that a group of remnants of the defunct regime targeted two members of the Syrian Ministry of Defense through an armed ambush in the Al-Datour neighborhood in the city of Latakia, which led to their immediate death.[38]

On 7 March, The Syrian Popular Resistance stated that it had taken control of numerous villages in Jabal al Alawiyin and expanded the scope of its operations to Masyaf in the Hama countryside.[39]

See also

References

  1. ^ a b c d e Moore, Johanna; Reddy, Ria; Parry, Andie; Wells, Katherine; Moorman, Carolyn; Rezaei, Ben; Carl, Nicholas (31 December 2024). "Iran Update, December 31, 2024". Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 3 January 2025.
  2. ^ Dajani, Mohammad (23 February 2025). "سوريا بين أنياب الاحتلال: من قلعة المقاومة إلى مستعمرة وهابية صهيونية" سوريا بين أنياب الاحتلال: من قلعة المقاومة إلى مستعمرة وهابية صهيونية [Syria in the jaws of the occupation: from a fortress of resistance to a Wahhabi-Zionist colony]. TOFAN (in Arabic). Retrieved 27 February 2025.
  3. ^ Wells, Braverman, Kishore, Campa, Carter, Katherine, Alexandra, Siddhant, Kelly, Brian (5 January 2025). "Iran Update, January 5, 2025". isw. Archived from the original on 9 January 2025.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  4. ^ "سورية: تصاعد أعمال العنف ضد الطائفة الشيعية في ريف حمص" سورية: تصاعد أعمال العنف ضد الطائفة الشيعية في ريف حمص [Syria: Escalation of violence against the Shiite sect in the Homs countryside]. Dana Press (in Moroccan Arabic). 22 January 2025. Retrieved 24 January 2025.
  5. ^ "استمرار الفوضى في سوريا: الميليشيات العراقية والتمرد العلوي" استمرار الفوضى في سوريا: الميليشيات العراقية والتمرد العلوي [Continuing Chaos in Syria: Iraqi Militias and the Alawite Rebellion]. The Arab Center (in Arabic). 10 February 2025. Retrieved 23 February 2025.
  6. ^ "SDF extends deadline for Assad Regime Militants to surrender weapons". Kurdistan24. 25 January 2025. Retrieved 26 February 2025.
  7. ^ "اعتقال 79 مسلحاً بحملة ملاحقة فلول الأسد و«داعش» شمال شرقي سوريا" [79 militants arrested in campaign to pursue Assad and ISIS remnants in northeastern Syria]. As-Sharq Al-Awsat (in Arabic). 4 February 2025. Retrieved 26 February 2025.
  8. ^ https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-7-2025
  9. ^ Al-Marshahi, Emad (30 December 2024). "Syrian resistance movement releases first official statement against Al-Jolani administration". Hodhod Yemen News Agency. Retrieved 3 January 2025.
  10. ^ "(Chatter) Formation of the 'Syrian Popular Resistance' Opposing Hayy'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) Rule, Syria". TRAC. 29 December 2024. Retrieved 3 January 2025.
  11. ^ Wells, Braverman, Kishore, Campa, Carter, Katherine, Alexandra, Siddhant, Kelly, Brian (5 January 2025). "Iran Update, January 5, 2025". isw. Archived from the original on 9 January 2025.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  12. ^ "'Syrian Popular Resistance' Solicits Funds Via Cryptocurrency, Announces It Will Soon Open Recruitment". Middle East Media Research Institute. 23 January 2025. Retrieved 24 January 2025.
  13. ^ Moore, Johanna (28 December 2024). "Iran Update, December 28, 2024" (Journal). understanding war. ISW. Retrieved 6 January 2025. HTS's response to the current violence is fueling accusations of sectarianism and arbitrary targeting, which could in turn trigger further violence. .... Syrian opposition fighters continue to target the Alawite community fueling distrust and accusations that arrests conducted by the HTS-led security forces are driven by sectarianism and not in pursuit of justice for crimes committed under the former regime.
  14. ^ "پنج دلیل مهم که جوانان غیور سوری را وادار به قیام خواهد کرد" پنج دلیل مهم که جوانان غیور سوری را وادار به قیام خواهد کرد [Five important reasons that will compel the zealous Syrian youth to revolt]. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps News Agency (in Persian). 31 December 2024. Retrieved 6 January 2025.
  15. ^ Wells, Braverman, Kishore, Campa, Carter, Katherine, Alexandra, Siddhant, Kelly, Brian (5 January 2025). "Iran Update, January 5, 2025". isw. Archived from the original on 9 January 2025.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  16. ^ Wells, Ganzeveld, Moorman, Campa, Borens, Carl, Katherine, Annika, Carolyn, Kelly, Avery, Nicholas (30 December 2024). "Iran Update, December 30, 2024". isw. Archived from the original on 14 January 2025.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  17. ^ "Suriye Türkmenleri Şam'daki yeni yönetimden rahatsız: "El-Şara'nın bizimle görüşmemesi manidar, atamalarda yokuz"" [Syrian Turkmens are disturbed by the new administration in Damascus: “It is significant that Al-Shara did not meet with us, we are not included in the appointments”]. VOA Türkçe (in Turkish). 8 January 2025. Retrieved 21 January 2025.
  18. ^ "من أدوات قمع إلى "مقاومة شعبية".. ما مصير شبيحة الأسد بعد سقوط نظا" من أدوات قمع إلى “مقاومة شعبية”.. ما مصير شبيحة الأسد بعد سقوط نظا [From tools of suppression to “popular resistance”.. What is the fate of Assad’s thugs after the fall of the regime?]. Opinion News (in Arabic). 7 February 2025. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
  19. ^ "'Syrian Popular Resistance' Issues Cryptic 'Final Statement' Urging Operatives To Continue Fighting New Syrian Administration; Insists On Embracing Syrians Of All Sects Who Oppose 'Wahhabism, Zionists, America'". Middle East Media Research Institute. 4 February 2025. Retrieved 5 February 2025.
  20. ^ "مجاهدو المقاومة الشعبية السورية ينفذون كميناً ناجحاً في اللاذقية ..اخبار محلية" مجاهدو المقاومة الشعبية السورية ينفذون كميناً ناجحاً في اللاذقية ..اخبار محلية [Syrian Popular Resistance Mujahideen Carry Out Successful Ambush in Latakia..Local News]. Press Bee (in Arabic). 6 January 2025. Retrieved 21 January 2025.
  21. ^ "Suriye Halk Direnişi Grubu'ndan HTŞ'ye operasyon" [Operation against HTS by Syrian Popular Resistance Group]. Yakın Doğu Haber (in Turkish). 10 January 2025. Retrieved 21 January 2025.
  22. ^ Kishore, Siddhant; Parry, Andie; Campa, Kelly; Moorman, Carolyn; Braverman, Alexandra; Reddy, Ria; Wells, Katherine; Ganzeveld, Annika; Borens, Avery; Carl, Nicholas (14 January 2025). "Iran Update, January 14, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 24 January 2025.
  23. ^ "حصري.. المقاومة الشعبية السورية تستهدف هيئة تحرير الشام في مدينة طرطوس وتصدر بيانا بالمناسبة" حصري.. المقاومة الشعبية السورية تستهدف هيئة تحرير الشام في مدينة طرطوس وتصدر بيانا بالمناسبة [Exclusive: The Syrian Popular Resistance targets Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham in the city of Tartous and issues a statement on the occasion]. Dana Press (in Levantine Arabic). 14 January 2025. Retrieved 21 January 2025.
  24. ^ "بعد اعتقال عدد من قوات الجولاني: طرطوس مسرح للاشتباكات والمواجهات" بعد اعتقال عدد من قوات الجولاني: طرطوس مسرح للاشتباكات والمواجهات [After the arrest of a number of Al-Julani's forces: Tartous is the scene of clashes and confrontations]. Al-Chourouk (in Tunisian Arabic). 16 January 2025. Retrieved 21 January 2025.
  25. ^ Arslan, Ali (25 January 2025). "Suriye Halk Direnişi'nden Şam Kurtuluş Heyeti'ne Ağır Darbe!" [Heavy Blow from the Syrian Popular Resistance to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham!]. Sovtna Gazetesi (in Turkish). Retrieved 27 January 2025.
  26. ^ "سوريا: مقتل مسؤول أمني محلي... و"المقاومة الشعبية" تتبنّى" سوريا: مقتل مسؤول أمني محلي... و«المقاومة الشعبية» تتبنّى [Syria: A local security official was killed ... And the "Popular Resistance" took responsibility]. Al Akhbar (in Levantine Arabic). 23 January 2025. Retrieved 23 January 2025.
  27. ^ Abbasi, Nawal (25 January 2025). "بيان عسكري صادر عن المقاومة الشعبية السورية" بيان عسكري صادر عن المقاومة الشعبية السورية [Military statement issued by the Syrian Popular Resistance]. Sword of Jerusalem Youth Forum (in Arabic). Retrieved 26 January 2025.
  28. ^ "المقاومة السورية تعلن بدء عملياتها ضد الاحتلال الإسرائيلي" المقاومة السورية تعلن بدء عملياتها ضد الاحتلال الإسرائيلي [The Syrian resistance announces the start of its operations against the Israeli occupation]. Al-Alam News Network. 1 February 2025. Retrieved 1 February 2025.
  29. ^ "المقاومة الشعبية السورية لإسرائيل: هذه ضربة ارتجالية، فكيف ستكون الضربة القادمة؟" المقاومة الشعبية السورية لإسرائيل: هذه ضربة ارتجالية، فكيف ستكون الضربة القادمة؟ [Syrian popular resistance to Israel: This is an impromptu blow, so what will be the next blow?]. alkhanadeq.com (in Arabic). 1 February 2025. Retrieved 1 February 2025.
  30. ^ "IDF troops operating in Syria buffer zone come under fire in 1st such incident". The Times of Israel. 1 February 2025. Retrieved 1 February 2025.
  31. ^ "Israeli forces come under fire in Syria in first since invasion". The New Arab. 1 February 2025. Archived from the original on 1 February 2025. Retrieved 1 February 2025.
  32. ^ "المقاومة الشعبية السورية". Telegram. Retrieved 1 February 2025.
  33. ^ "Ambushed by unknown gunmen | Three members of Military Operations Administration killed and wounded in Latakia countryside". Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. 1 February 2025. Retrieved 6 February 2025.
  34. ^ "بقيادة "مقداد فتيحة".. عصابة إجرامية من فلول النظام تشكل ميليشيا "درع الساحل" لاستهداف" بقيادة "مقداد فتيحة".. عصابة إجرامية من فلول النظام تشكل ميليشيا "درع الساحل" لاستهداف [Led by "Muqdad Fatiha", a criminal gang from the remnants of the regime forms the "Coastal Shield" militia to target]. Shaam.org (in Arabic). 6 February 2025. Retrieved 6 February 2025.
  35. ^ "سوريا استنفار امني بعد هجوم مسلح ومقتل عنصرين بوزارة الدفاع - قناة العالم الاخبارية" سوريا استنفار امني بعد هجوم مسلح ومقتل عنصرين بوزارة الدفاع - قناة العالم الاخبارية [Syria: Security alert after armed attack and killing of two members of the Ministry of Defense - Al-Alam News Channel]. Al-Alam News Network. 14 February 2025. Archived from the original on 15 February 2025. Retrieved 18 February 2025.
  36. ^ "عملية خطف وجريمة منظّمة.. مقتل اثنين من عناصر وزارة الدفاع في القلمون" عملية خطف وجريمة منظّمة.. مقتل اثنين من عناصر وزارة الدفاع في القلمون [Kidnapping and organized crime. Two members of the Ministry of Defense were killed in Qalamoun]. Syria TV (in Arabic). 14 February 2025. Retrieved 18 February 2025.
  37. ^ "العثور على جثماني عنصرين من وزارة الدفاع السورية بعد اختطافهما في القلمون" العثور على جثماني عنصرين من وزارة الدفاع السورية بعد اختطافهما في القلمون [The bodies of two members of the Syrian Ministry of Defense were found after they were kidnapped in Qalamoun]. Syria Monitor (in Levantine Arabic). 14 February 2025. Retrieved 28 February 2025.
  38. ^ ""الأمن العام" يكشف مجريات حملة ضد فلول النظام في حي الدعتور باللاذقية" “الأمن العام” يكشف مجريات حملة ضد فلول النظام في حي الدعتور باللاذقية ["General Security" reveals the course of a campaign against the remnants of the regime in the Al-Datour neighborhood in Latakia]. Shaam.org (in Levantine Arabic). Retrieved 5 March 2025.
  39. ^ https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-7-2025
Allikas: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_Popular_Resistance
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