The Pankisi Gorge crisis was a 2002 geopolitical dispute that arose as a direct result of the Second Chechen War, and which was shaped by the U.S. Global War on Terror and pre-existing tensions between Russia and Georgia.^[2]

At the centre of the crisis was a group of armed rebels who had sought shelter from Russian forces in the Pankisi Gorge area of Georgia, 25 miles south of Chechnya in the Russian Federation.^[2] Among the rebels were some non-Chechen fighters, mostly Arabs.^[3] Russia wanted Georgia to suppress or expel the rebels, which Georgia was reluctant to do. The United States became involved upon learning that some militants in the Gorge had links to Al-Qaeda and Musab al-Zarqawi, whose network was supposedly involved in a plot to conduct attacks in Europe using the lethal nerve agent ricin.

Following U.S. and Russian pressure, the rebels began to leave Georgian territory in Autumn 2003, ultimately ending the standoff with Russia.^[3] However, the episode had subsequent ramifications, as the notion of an Al-Qaeda ricin plot running through the Pankisi gorge was woven into the U.S.'s public case for the 2003 invasion of Iraq.^[2]

Georgian-Russian relations were strained by Russia's support for two statelets that had seceded from Georgia in wars following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The wars were two among a series of armed conflicts that afflicted the Caucasus during the 1990s and early 2000s. In 2002, roughly one fifth of Georgia's internationally-recognised territory was held by Russian-backed forces.

During the South Ossetia war (1991–1992), Georgian forces were beaten back by local fighters backed by "irregulars from the Russian Federation, and stranded ex-Soviet soldiers who found themselves stuck in the middle of someone else's civil war and chose to fight on behalf of the secessionists."^[4] During the War in Abkhazia (1992–1993), Russia both intervened directly and recruited North Caucasian volunteers to fight alongside the Abkhaz separatists. The volunteers, organised under the banner of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, included the Chechen fighter Ruslan Gelayev.^[5] But Gelayev and many other Chechen volunteers soon turned on Russia, fighting for the separatists in the First Chechen War.

In February 2000, Grozny, capital of the breakaway Chechen Republic of Ichkeria since 1991, fell to Russian forces. Separatist Chechen fighters fled, amongst them a force of around a thousand men under the command of Ruslan Gelayev. Gelayev's men sought shelter in the southern Chechen mountains, but were ambushed, and retreated to Gelayev's home village of Komsomolskoye. The Chechens suffered another heavy defeat, and Gelayev decided to lead his men to take shelter in the Pankisi Gorge, 25 miles south of the Russian-Georgian border. Rumours that Gelayev had made his base there begun around October 2000.^[6] By June 2001, at the latest, Gelayev's camp was receiving new volunteers.^[7]

Pankisi had been the principal destination for Chechen migration to Georgia since the 19th Century. The Chechen-descended people who lived there became known as the Kists, and retained a strong Chechen identity. By 1989 less than half of Pankisi residents were of Chechen descent, but refugees from the Chechen wars since 1991 had swelled their population once more.^[8]

Armed Chechen separatists had been growing closer to the transnational jihadist movement since the mid-1990s, in particular through the mostly-Arab volunteers who gathered in the Mujahideen in Chechnya organisation. Its leader at the beginning of 2002, Ibn al-Khattab, had met Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, and had taken a group of Chechen militants to a training camp there in 1994. As of 1998, Arab mujahideen were training separatists inside Chechnya.^[7] The separatist Chechen Republic of Ichkeria had an indigenous Salafist current. Gelayev was not himself part of it, but his subordinate officer in the Gorge, Abdul-Malik Mezhidov, was.

The September 11 attacks led the U.S. to make the fight against transnational jihadism a priority. The George W. Bush administration sometimes found it useful to frame unrelated objectives, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, as part of a single Global War on Terror. Russia, among other states, recognised a political opportunity, and sought to use the issue of terrorism to advance its own interests in relations with the Bush administration.^[2]

As part of what he later called the Freedom Agenda, President Bush was also broadly inclined to support democratic states, such as Georgia, against undemocratic ones, such as Russia.^[9]

On 4 October 2001 fighters under the command of Gelayev crossed from part of Abkhazia that was then still controlled by the Georgian government^[a] into separatist territory. The force attacked the village of Giorgievskoe, less than 30km from the separatist capital, Sukhumi.^[6]

Abkhazia had achieved de facto independence from Georgia in 1992, in no small part due to the intervention of volunteers like Gelayev, and retained the support of Moscow.^[10] Gelayev's group continued fighting until at least 12 October,^[11] when he and his band were eventually repelled by Abkhaz troops and Russian airstrikes.^[12]

Gelayev's force would have had to have crossed more than 250km of Georgian territory from Pankisi before entering Abkhazia, which gave rise to the belief that the operation had been sponsored by the Georgian government. Russian media reported that Chechens captured by Abkhaz forces had claimed that Prime Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had personally approved the operation.^[6] Others suggested, albeit without evidence, that the transmission of the force from Pankisi to Abkhazia may have been independently expedited by interior minister Kakha Targamadze, with the aim of escalating a confrontation that would allow Russia to intervene.^[6] Russia demanded Gelayev's extradition from Georgia in November 2001.^[13] Throughout the ensuing year's crisis, Georgia continued to claim that it was willing to extradite Gelayev, but was unable to locate him.

On 9 February 2002, Georgia's Security Minister told the cabinet that a number of Jordanian and Saudi nationals had been arrested in the Pankisi Gorge, after plotting attacks in Russia.^[14] Two days later, U.S. charge d'affaires Philip Remler said that fighters from Afghanistan had arrived in Pankisi, and were in contact with Ibn al-Khattab, a Saudi Islamist who was leading fighters against Russia in Chechnya, and who had links to Bin Laden.

Russia's Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov claimed on 15 February 2002 that Osama Bin Laden might be hiding in the Akhmeta Municipality, the administrative district that contained the Gorge.^[14] Georgian officials dismissed the claim.

In mid-January, the government launched a police operation in the Pankisi area, and claimed to have arrested a number of drug traffickers.^[14] But two policemen were kidnapped and held for two days shortly afterward, raising doubts about the authorities' real level of control.^[14] Russia's defence minister Sergei Ivanov then chipped in, suggesting that Pankisi was turning into a mini-Afghanistan, and raising the prospect of a joint Russian-Georgian operation to clear it out.^[14] Georgian officials immediately dismissed that notion, too, but said that Georgia was open to collaborating with the U.S., which the Shevardnadze government saw as an ally and bulwark against Russian pressure.

On 11 March 2002, US President George W. Bush stated that "terrorists working closely with al Qaeda operate in the Pankisi Gorge".^[1]

On 28 April 2002 a small Georgian anti-terror unit, led by their U.S. commander, ambushed a group of insurgents. It was falsely believed that prominent Ibn al-Khattab was among the dead, according to allegations that Omar Mohammed Ali Al Rammah reportedly witnessed him die in that incident. This was due to his real identity remaining a mystery until after his demise. The quick and violent nature of the operation reportedly sparked fear among Chechen militants in the area, who went into hiding.^[15]

On 27 July, 50 to 60 Chechen fighters launched an attack near Itum-Kale in Russia, 15 miles north of Georgia, killing eight soldiers.^[16] Russian officials claimed that the attack had been launched from inside Georgia. Georgia initially denied the claim, but then on 3 and 5 August announced that it had captured 13 Chechens who had survived the fighting at Itum-Kale as they tried to cross back into Georgia. On those days, Russian aircraft also bombed locations two miles inside Georgia, killing only sheep.^[16] Russia demanded the extradition of the 13 captured fighters, which Georgia refused.

On 30 July and 7 August Russian aircraft bombed the Pankisi area.^[17]

On 12 August Sergei Ivanov suggested that the only way to resolve the situation was for Russian special troops to enter the area, as Russian diplomats sought to gather support for an intervention in force.^[18]

On 23 August 2002, Russian aircraft bombed the Pankisi village of Matani, leaving an elderly man dead and wounding seven other people.^[19]

On 25 August, the Georgian authorities announced the second crackdown in Pankisi that year, following the operation in mid-January.^[19] Up to 1,000 troops under the command of the Interior Ministry entered the area in armoured vehicles, and set up a number of checkpoints.

On 15 September, a Russian official later claimed, around 200 fighters crossed the border from Georgia into Ingushetia.^[20] They were commanded by Gelayev, Abdul-Malik Mezhidov and Muslim Atayev, and accompanied by Roddy Scott, a British photojournalist.^[21][20]

On 26 September, Gelayev's force in Ingushetia was identified and engaged by Russian forces at the Battle of Galashki. Gelayev and Mezhidov lost 30 to 80 men, and the Russians 18.^[22] Gelayev himself was wounded, and his unit dispersed into Kabardino-Balkaria and Ingushetia.^[5]

On 27 September, the Interior Minister announced that the military phase of the operation that had begun just over a month earlier had ended, and that there were no longer any Chechen guerrillas in the Gorge or the surrounding area.^[23] However, two hostages remained held in the Gorge.

The third large security operation of the year was initiated in late October, with 1,000 officers once again sent to the area to set up checkpoints, amidst vows to impose order.^[24]

By October 20, 2002, Georgia had netted about a dozen Arab militants.^[25]

Georgian officials also said they planned to increase the number of border troops near Chechnya and Ingushetia, another Russian republic. Russia accused Georgia of allowing Chechen fighters to raid across the border. On June 15, 2003, 15 more Chechen militants entered the area and took refuge in a two-story house. Georgian officials said that more than 30 militants were detained.^[3]

On September 3, 2003, President Eduard Shevardnadze said that the Georgian security forces had established full control over the gorge.^{[citation needed]}

In October 2002, the South Ossetian government viewed the operations in the Pankisi Gorge as a threat to their breakaway state, calling up the separatist reservists for a potential all out conflict with Georgia.^[26] The tension peaked when Georgian president Shevardnadze said it would "be reasonable" to expand the security sweep operation in the Pankisi Gorge into South Ossetia. Specifically, the Georgian government cited a massive increase in crime in South Ossetia, claiming that the separatists did not have a functioning security service to protect its residents.^[26] Konstantin Kochiev, a South Ossetian diplomat, stated that in an effort to placate the Georgian government's concerns, that South Ossetia would undergo extensive police reform.^[26] The suggestion for an expanded operation zone was quickly shot down by the National Security Council stating that any operation in South Ossetia would result in armed conflict with the separatists.^[26] There was also heightened concern among the separatists that the cooperation between Georgia and Russia in the Pankisi Gorge could result in Russian support for the Georgian government's restoration in South Ossetia.^[26]

On 5 January 2003 police in London arrested a number of men of North African descent over what was known at the time as the Wood Green ricin plot. Shortly afterward, 21 further men of North African descent, with reported links to both the alleged British cell and Salafi-jihadist groups in North Africa, were arrested in Italy and Spain.^[27] Explosive and chemical materials were reportedly recovered. There were further arrests in Britain, for a total of 20.^[28]

British investigators rapidly ascertained that no ricin had, in fact, been discovered, but this fact was not made public until 2005. (One of the men arrested in Britain was ultimately convicted of conspiracy to cause a public nuisance by spreading ricin; the other accused men were found not guilty.)

In Colin Powell's presentation to the United Nations Security Council on 5 February 2003, the Secretary of State claimed to know that associates of the Al-Qaeda leader Musab al-Zarqawi had

been active in the Pankisi Gorge, Georgia and in Chechnya, Russia. The plotting to which they are linked is not mere chatter. Members of Zarqawi's network say their goal was to kill Russians with toxins.^[29]

Powell showed a slide that depicted a purported Al-Qaeda network under the command of al-Zarqawi, including a bearded man named Abu 'Atiya located in Pankisi, Georgia.^[30] Abu Atiya was the nom de guerre of a Jordanian mujahed named Adnan Mohammed Sadiq.^[31]

Days later, at the Munich Security Conference, Sergei Ivanov claimed that "makeshift ricin laboratories" had been found in Pankisi.^[32] He added that the situation in the valley was "unchanged," despite Georgia's operations the previous year, and it continued to shelter "terrorist bases."^[33] No evidence has been produced to support either claim.

On 12 February Powell told the House International Relations Committee that, "The ricin that is bouncing around Europe now originated in Iraq - not in the part of Iraq that is under Saddam Hussein's control, but his security forces know all about it."^[34] European intelligence officers who spoke to CNN at the time said that the ricin samples discovered in Britain had been manufactured domestically, rather than in Iraq,^[34] but in reality no ricin had been found at all.

The same CNN report said that alleged terrorist operatives arrested in Europe were had been trained in biological and chemical weapons techniques in either the Pankisi Gorge or Chechnya.^[34]

Abu 'Atiya was reportedly arrested in Azerbaijan on 12 August 2003, and deported to Jordan.^[35]

On May 14, 2004, France arrested two Algerians allegedly working with chemical and biological weapons.^[36] Georgia announced the end of the Pankisi operation and withdrew its Internal Troops from the region by January 21, 2005.^[37]

In 2008, the valley was reported to be peaceful despite the nearby Russo-Georgian war, and substantial numbers of refugees from Chechnya remained living there ^[38][39]

In April 2013, one Chechen fighter who had lived in the Pankisi estimated that around one hundred Kists and Chechens from the Gorge were then fighting in Syria against the government of Bashar al-Assad.^[40]

The former senior Islamic State leader Tarkan Batirashvili, otherwise known as "Omar the Chechen," grew up in Pankisi, which was still home to some of his family as of 2014.^[41] In 2014, Batirashvilii reportedly threatened to return to the area to lead a Muslim attack on Russian Chechnya.^[42] However, the threat never came into fruition, and Batirashvili was killed during a battle in the Iraqi town of Al-Shirqat in 2016.^[43]

In 2016, a man by the name of Jakolo, styling himself the representative of the Islamic State in Georgia, gave an interview to a journalist in the Pankisi village of Jokolo.^[44] He also claimed to supply information to Georgian intelligence.

• 2012 Lopota Gorge hostage crisis