The Gestapo (Template:IPA-de; abbreviation of Geheime Staatspolizei, Secret State Police) was the official secret police of Nazi Germany. Beginning on 20 April 1934, it was under the administration of the SS leader Heinrich Himmler in his position as Chief of German Police (Chef der Deutschen Polizei).^[2] From September 1939 forward it was administered by the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) ("Reich Main Security Office") and was considered a sister organization of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) ("Security Service") and also a suboffice of the Sicherheitspolizei (SiPo) ("security police").^[3]

As part of the deal in which Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, Hermann Göring (future commander of the Luftwaffe and an influential Nazi Party official) was named as Interior Minister of Prussia. This gave him command of the largest police force in Germany. Soon afterward, Göring detached the political and intelligence departments from the police and filled their ranks with Nazis. On 26 April 1933 Göring merged the two units as the Gestapo. He originally wanted to name it the Secret Police Office (Template:Lang-de), but discovered the German initials "GPA" would be too similar to the Soviet GPU.^[4]

Its first commander was Rudolf Diels, a protégé of Göring. Diels was best known as the primary interrogator of Marinus van der Lubbe after the Reichstag fire. The Reich Interior Minister, Wilhelm Frick, wanted to integrate all the police forces of the German states in late 1933. Göring outflanked him by removing the Prussian political and intelligence departments from the state interior ministry. Göring himself took over the Gestapo in 1934 and urged Hitler to extend the agency's authority throughout Germany. This represented a radical departure from German tradition, which held that law enforcement was (mostly) a Land (state) and local matter. In this, he ran into conflict with Heinrich Himmler, who was police chief of the second most powerful German state, Bavaria. Frick did not have the muscle to take on Göring himself so he allied with Himmler and Heydrich. With Frick's support, Himmler (pushed on by his right hand man, Heydrich) took over the political police of state after state. Soon only Prussia was left.

On 20 April 1934 Göring and Himmler agreed to put aside their differences (largely because of mutual hatred and growing dread of the Sturmabteilung) and Göring transferred full authority over the Gestapo to Himmler, who was at that time also named chief of all German police forces outside Prussia. Himmler named Heydrich the head of the Gestapo on 22 April 1934.^[5] Himmler was later named the chief of all German police on 17 June 1936.^[6] At that point, the Gestapo became a national state agency rather than a Prussian state agency. It was incorporated together with the Kripo or Kriminalpolizei (Criminal Police) into the SiPo or Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police), and considered a complementary organization to the SS Security Service, the Sicherheitsdienst (SD).^[3] Reinhard Heydrich was head of both the SiPo (Gestapo & Kripo) and SD.^[3] Heinrich Müller, was the chief of operations of the Gestapo. He answered to Heydrich; Heydrich answered only to Himmler; Himmler answered only to Hitler. The joint command of the SS and Gestapo effectively removed it from the oversight of Frick, who as interior minister would have normally been Himmler's superior.

The Gestapo had the authority to investigate cases of treason, espionage, sabotage and criminal attacks on the Nazi Party and Germany. The basic Gestapo law passed by the government in 1936 gave the Gestapo carte blanche to operate without judicial oversight. The Gestapo was specifically exempted from responsibility to administrative courts, where citizens normally could sue the state to conform to laws. As early as 1935, however, a Prussian administrative court had ruled that the Gestapo's actions were not subject to judicial review. The SS officer Werner Best, onetime head of legal affairs in the Gestapo,^[7] summed up this policy by saying, "As long as the police carries out the will of the leadership, it is acting legally."^[4] A further law passed later in the year gave the Gestapo responsibility for setting up and administering concentration camps.

In September 1939 the security and police agencies of Nazi Germany (with the exception of the Orpo) were consolidated into the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA), headed by Heydrich.^[2] The Gestapo became Amt IV (Department IV) of RSHA and Müller became the Gestapo Chief, with Heydrich as his immediate superior.^[8] After Heydrich's 1942 assassination, Himmler assumed the leadership of the RSHA, but in January 1943 Ernst Kaltenbrunner was appointed Chief of the RSHA. Müller remained the Gestapo Chief, a position he occupied until the end of the war.^[8] Adolf Eichmann was Müller's direct subordinate and head of Department IV, Section B4, which dealt with Jews.

The power of the Gestapo most open to misuse was called Schutzhaft – "protective custody", a euphemism for the power to imprison people without judicial proceedings. An oddity of the system was that the prisoner had to sign his own Schutzhaftbefehl, an order declaring that the person had requested imprisonment – presumably out of fear of personal harm (which, in a way, was true). In addition, thousands of political prisoners throughout Germany – and from 1941, throughout the occupied territories under the Night and Fog Decree – simply disappeared while in Gestapo custody.

During World War II, the Gestapo was expanded to around 46,000 members.

By February and March, 1942, student protests were calling for an end to the Nazi regime. These included the non-violent resistance of Hans and Sophie Scholl, two leaders of the White Rose student group. However, resistance groups and those who were in moral or political opposition to the Nazis were stalled by the fear of reprisals from the Gestapo. In fact, reprisals did come in response to the protests. Fearful of an internal overthrow, the forces of Himmler and the Gestapo were unleashed on the opposition. The first five months of 1943 witnessed thousands of arrests and executions as the Gestapo exercised their powers over the German public. Student opposition leaders were executed in late February, and a major opposition organization, the Oster Circle, was destroyed in April, 1943.

The German opposition was in an unenviable position by the late spring and early summer of 1943. On one hand, it was next to impossible for them to overthrow Hitler and the party; on the other, the Allied demand for an unconditional surrender meant no opportunity for a compromise peace, which left the people no option (in their eyes) other than continuing the military struggle.

Nevertheless, some Germans did speak out and show signs of protest during the summer of 1943. Despite fear of the Gestapo after the mass arrests and executions of the spring, the opposition still plotted and planned. Some Germans were convinced that it was their duty to apply all possible expedients to end the war as quickly as possible; that is, to further the German defeat by all available means. The Gestapo cracked down ruthlessly on the dissidents in Germany, just as they did everywhere else.

During June, July and August, the Gestapo continued to move swiftly against the opposition, rendering any organized opposition impossible. Arrests and executions were common. Terror against the people had become a way of life. A second major reason was that the opposition's peace feelers to the Western Allies did not meet with success.

This was part because of the aftermath of the Venlo incident of 1939, when SD and Gestapo agents posing as anti-Nazis in the Netherlands kidnapped two British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) officers lured to a meeting to discuss peace terms. That prompted Winston Churchill to ban any further contact with the German opposition. In addition, the British and Americans did not want to deal with anti-Nazis because they were fearful that the Soviet Union would believe they were attempting to make deals behind the Soviets' back.^{[citation needed]}

Between 14 November 1945 and 3 October 1946, the Allies established an International Military Tribunal (IMT) to try 22 of 24 major Nazi war criminals and six groups for crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 19 of the 22 were convicted and 9 of them were given the death penalty; others got a life term. At this time the Gestapo was condemned as a criminal organization.

Leaders, organisers, investigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit the crimes specified were declared responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan. The official positions of defendants as heads of state or holders of high government offices were not to free them from responsibility or mitigate their punishment; nor was the fact that a defendant acted pursuant to an order of a superior to excuse him from responsibility, although it might be considered by the IMT in mitigation of punishment.

At the trial of any individual member of any group or organisation, the IMT was authorised to declare (in connection with any act of which the individual was convicted) that the group or organisation to which he belonged was a criminal organization. When a group or organization was thus declared criminal, the competent national authority of any signatory had the right to bring persons to trial for membership in that organisation, with the criminal nature of the group or organisation assumed proved.

These groups – the Nazi party and government leadership, the German General Staff and High Command (OKW); the Sturmabteilung (SA); the Schutzstaffel (SS), including the Sicherheitsdienst (SD); and the Gestapo – had an aggregate membership exceeding two million, making a large number of their members liable to trial if the organisations were convicted.

The trials began in November 1945. On 1 October 1946, the IMT rendered its judgement on 21 top officials of the Third Reich: 18 were sentenced to death or to long prison terms, and three acquitted. The IMT also convicted three of the groups: the Nazi leadership corps, the SS (including the SD) and the Gestapo. Gestapo members Hermann Göring and Arthur Seyss-Inquart were individually convicted.

Three groups were acquitted of collective war crimes charges, but this did not relieve individual members of those groups from conviction and punishment under the denazification programme. Members of the three convicted groups were subject to apprehension by Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and France. Moreover, even though individual members of the convicted groups might be acquitted of war crimes, they still remained subject to trial under the denazification programme.

In 1997 Cologne transformed the former regional Gestapo headquarters in Cologne – the EL-DE Haus – into a museum to document the Gestapo's actions.

From its conception the Gestapo was a well established bureaucratic mechanism, having been created from the Prussian Secret Police. In 1936 the Gestapo was transferred from the Prussian Interior Ministry to the Reich Interior Ministry and was combined with the Kripo to form the SiPo, Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police). However, it was only nominally under the control of the Interior Ministry with actual control by the SS.

Over the next five years the Gestapo underwent considerable expansion, and in the autumn of 1939 the SiPo together with the SD were placed under the authority of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA), the Reich Main Security Office, all under Heydrich until his death in 1942 and then under Ernst Kaltenbrunner.^[8] Within the RSHA the Gestapo was known as Amt IV ("Dept. or Office IV") with Müller the Chief.^[8] The internal organisation of the group is outlined below.

The Central Command Office of the Gestapo, formed in 1941. Before 1939 the Gestapo command was under the authority of the office of the Sicherheitspolizei (SiPo). The Sicherheitsdienst (SS Security Service) or SD envied the power of the Gestapo and the Gestapo did not care for what it saw as interference from SD agents. Later after September 1939 the Gestapo was run directly through the overall command of the RSHA. However, after Heydrich's death in June 1942, and as the war progressed, Müller's power and the independence grew substantially. This trickled down the chain of his subordinates, such as the commanding general of this office. It led to much more independence of action.

• Communists (A1)
• Counter sabotage (A2)
• Reactionaries and Liberals (A3)
• Assassinations (A4)

• Catholics (B1)
• Protestants (B2)
• Freemasons (B3)
• Jews (B4)

The central administrative office of the Gestapo, responsible for card files of all personnel including all officials.

A repeat of departments A and B for use outside the Reich.

• Opponents of the Regime (D1)
• Churches and Sects (D2)

• In the Reich (E1)
• Policy Formation (E2)
• In the West (E3)
• In Scandinavia (E4)
• In the East (E5)
• In the South (E6)

The local offices of the Gestapo, known as Stapostellen and Stapoleitstellen, answered to a local commander known as the Inspekteur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD ("inspector of the security police and security services") who, in turn, was under the dual command of Referat N of the Gestapo and also his local SS and Police Leader. The classic image of the Gestapo officer, dressed in trench coat and hat, can be attributed to Gestapo offices in German cities and larger towns. This image seems to have been popularized by the assassination of the former Chancellor General Kurt von Schleicher in 1934. General von Schleicher and his wife were gunned down in their Berlin home by three men dressed in black trench coats and wearing black fedoras. The killers of General von Schleicher were widely believed to have been Gestapo men. At a press conference held later the same day Hermann Göring was asked by foreign correspondents to respond to a hot rumour that General von Schleicher had been murdered in his home. Göring stated that the Gestapo had attempted to arrest Schleicher, but that he had been "shot while attempting to escape".

The Gestapo also maintained offices at all Nazi concentration camps, held an office on the staff of the SS and Police Leaders, and supplied personnel as needed to formations such as the Einsatzgruppen. Personnel assigned to these auxiliary duties were often removed from the Gestapo chain of command and fell under the authority of branches of the SS.

The Gestapo maintained police detective ranks which were used for all officers, both those who were and who were not concurrently SS members.^[9]

In 1933, there was no purge of the German police forces^[10]. The vast majority of Gestapo officers came from the police forces of the Weimar Republic, and there were very cases of members of the SS, the SA, and the NSDAP joining the Gestapo^[11]. In 1939, only 3, 000 out of the total of 20, 000 Gestapo men held SS ranks, and in most cases, these were purely honorary^[12]. One man who served in the Prussian Gestapo in 1933 recalled that most of his co-workers "were by no means were Nazis. For the most part they were young professional civil service officers..."^[13]. The Nazis valued police competence more than politics, so in general in 1933, almost all of the men who served in the various state police forces under the Weimar Republic stayed on in their jobs^[14]. In Würzburg, which is one of the few places in Germany where the most of the Gestapo records survived, every member of the Gestapo was a career policemen or had a police background of some sort^[15]. The Canadian historian Robert Gellately wrote that most Gestapo men were not Nazis, but at the same time were in no way opposed to the Nazi regime, which they were willing to serve in whatever task they called upon to perform^[16].

Before their 1939 amalgamation into the RSHA, the Gestapo and Kripo were plainclothes police agencies and had no uniforms. Although individual Gestapo officers could and did join the Allgemeine-SS or other Party organizations, those uniforms would not have been worn on duty. From June 1936 a concerted effort was made to recruit policemen of the SiPo into the SS, and SS members into the Kripo and especially the Gestapo. With the formation of RSHA in September 1939, Gestapo officers who were also SS members began to wear the wartime grey SS uniform when on duty in the Hauptamt or regional headquarters (Abschnitte). Hollywood notwithstanding, after 1939 the sinister black uniform was only worn by Allgemeine-SS reservists; it was abolished in 1942. Outside the central offices Gestapo agents working out of the Stapostellen and Stapoleitstellen continued to wear civilian suits in keeping with the secret, plainclothes nature of their work.

There were in fact very strict protocols protecting the identity of Gestapo field personnel. In most cases, when asked for identification, an operative was only required to present his warrant disc. This identified the operative as Gestapo without revealing personal identity and agents, except when ordered to do so by an authorized official, were not required to show picture identification, something all non-Gestapo people were expected to do.

Beginning in 1940 the grey SS uniform was worn by Gestapo in occupied countries, even those who were not actually SS members, because agents in civilian clothes had been shot by members of the Wehrmacht thinking that they were partisans.

Unlike the rest of the SS, the right-side collar patch of the RSHA was plain black without insignia, as was the uniform cuffband. Gestapo agents in uniform did not wear SS shoulderboards, but rather police-pattern shoulderboards piped or underlaid in "poison green". A diamond-shaped black patch with "SD" in white was worn on the lower left sleeve even by SiPo men who were not actually in the SD. Sometimes this Raute was piped in white; there is some debate over whether this may or may not have indicated Gestapo personnel.

Contrary to popular belief, the Gestapo was not an omnipotent agency that had agents in every nook and cranny of German society. "V-men", as undercover Gestapo agents were known, were used to infiltrate Social Democratic and Communist opposition groups, but this was the exception, not the rule.^[17] The District Office in Nuremberg, which had the responsibility for all of northern Bavaria employed a total of 80–100 full-term informers in the years 1943–1945.^[17] The Gestapo office in Saarbrücken had at its service 50 full-term informers in 1939.^[17] The vast majority of Gestapo informers were not full-term informers working undercover, but were rather ordinary people who for whatever reason chose to denounce those they knew to the Gestapo^[18].

As the Canadian historian Robert Gellately's analysis of the local offices established, the Gestapo was for the most part made up of bureaucrats and clerical workers who depended upon denunciations by ordinary Germans for their information.^[19] Gellately argued that because of the widespread willingness of Germans to inform on each other to the Gestapo that Germany between 1933-45 was a prime example of Panopticism^[20]. Indeed, the Gestapo was overwhelmed with denunciations and spent most of its time sorting out the credible from the less credible denunciations.^[21] Far from being an all-powerful agency that knew everything about what was happening in German society, the local offices were understaffed and overworked, struggling with the paper load caused by so many denunciations.^[22] Such was the level of overwork and under-staffing that in many German towns, Gestapo officials who chaired one referate (desk) were also in charge of another referate; for an example in Koblenz the head of the Jewish referate also headed at the same time the Free Mason referate^[23]. Gellately wrote that the Gestapo was not an "instrument of domination" as traditionally portrayed as an all-powerful force crushing Germans into submission^[24]. Instead, Gellately suggested that the Gestapo was "a reactive organization" that "...which was constructed within German society and whose functioning was structurally dependent on the continuing co-operation of German citizens"^[25].

The ratio of Gestapo officers to the population of the areas they were responsible for was extremely low; for example, for Lower Franconia, with a population of about one million in the 1930s, there was only one Gestapo office with 28 staff, half of whom were clerical workers.^[19] Before World War II, in the cities of Stettin and Frankfurt am Main, Gestapo personnel totalled 41 for both cities.^[26] The city of Hanover had only 42 Gestapo personnel, Bielefeld 18, Braunschweig 26, Bremen 44, and Dortmund 76.^[26] In Düsseldorf, the local Gestapo office, which had the responsibility for the entire Lower Rhine region, which comprised 4 million people had 281 employees.^[26] After 1939, when many Gestapo personnel were called up for war-related work such as service with the Einsatzgruppen, the level of overwork and understaffing at the local offices was much increased.^[22] Furthermore, for information about what was happening in German society, the Gestapo were mostly dependent upon these denunciations.^[27] 80% of all Gestapo investigations were started in response to information provided by denunciations by ordinary Germans; while 10% were started in response in to information provided by other branches of the German government and another 10% started in response to information that the Gestapo itself unearthed.^[21]

Thus, it was ordinary Germans by their willingness to denounce one another who supplied the Gestapo with the information that determined whom the Gestapo arrested.^[27] The popular picture of the Gestapo with its spies everywhere terrorizing German society has been firmly rejected by most historians as a myth invented after the war as a cover for German society's widespread complicity in allowing the Gestapo to work.^[27][28] Work done by social historians such as Detlev Peukert, Robert Gellately, Reinhard Mann, Inge Marssolek, René Otto, Klaus-Michael Mallamann and Paul Gerhard, which by focusing on what the local offices were doing has shown the Gestapo's almost total dependence on denunciations from ordinary Germans, and very much discredited the older "Big Brother" picture with the Gestapo having its eyes and ears everywhere.^[29] Gellately wrote that the Gestapo could never had succeded in its aims without massive social co-operation provided by ordinary people denouncing each other to the Gestapo^[30]. Of the 84 cases in Würzburg of rassenschande (race defilement) as sex with Jews were known under the Nuremberg Laws, 45 (54%) were started in response to denunciations by ordinary people, 2 (2%) by information provided by other branches of the government, 20 (24%) via information gained during interrogations of people relating to other matters, 4 (5%) from information from N.S.D.A.P organizations, 2 (2%) during "political evaluations" and 11 (13%) have no source listed while none were started by Gestapo's own "observations" of the people of Würzburg^[31].

Typical of how the Gestapo worked concerned the investigation of a young woman in Würzburg named Ilse Totzke who because of a motorcycle accident suffered brain damage, and was given to odd behaviour^[32]. The eccentric Totzke was very much disliked by her neighbours who besides for ostracising her took to denouncing her to the Gestapo out of the hope of seeing her go to a concentration camp^[33]. Starting in 1936, a regular stream of letters went to the Gestapo office in Würzburg accusing Totzke of various things^[34]. The first person to denounce Totzke was a cousin who told the Gestapo that Totzke had too many Jewish friends and knew more than what a woman should about military matters^[35] In response, the Gestapo asked all of her neighbours to keep them informed of what Totzke was up to^[36]. The Gestapo records indicate that all of Totzke's neighbours fullfilled the Gestapo's requests to spy on Totzke^[37]. In April 1939 an university professor who lived on the same street as Totzke denounced her to the Gestapo for "suspicious behaviour" and suggested she was a spy as he had seen her near the rail-roads several times^[38]. In July 1940, another neighbour named Maria Kraus told the Gestapo that Totzke was having a lesbian affair with an unnamed Jewish women, refused to return the "German greeting" (as the Nazi salute was officially known) when she offered it to her, didn't cheer when Germany defeated France that spring, supported the Jews and made her dog bark at her whenever she went out (Kraus suggested that this was a sign that Totzke was an anti-Nazi)^[39]. When being interviewed for the 1997 TV series The Nazis: A Warning from History, Kraus repeated the traditional view of the Gestapo being all-powerful with ordinary people such as herself as helpless by-standers, denied denouncing Totzke or anybody else, and when confronted with her signed statement from 1940 denouncing Totzke claimed not to know how that document came into existence^[40]. The British historian Laurence Rees wrote that Kraus was a perfect example of how the legend of the all-powerful Gestapo was used by ordinary people in Germany to avoid taking responsibility for their denuciations of others^[41]. In January 1941, the Gestapo received an anonymous letter accusing Totzke having a lesbian relationship with another unnamed Jewish women^[42]. Finally in August 1941, Totzke was arrested and during her interrogation denied the claim of a lesbian relationship, but admitted to having several Jewish friends and stated "The action against the Jews, however, I believe is not right"^[43]. Totzke was released and warned to stay away from her Jewish friends^[44]. In October 1941, following further denuciations for maintaining friendships with Jews, Totzke was again arrested and warned to sever her friendships^[45]. Finally in December 1942 a warrant was issued for Totzke's arrest after the Gestapo received reports that Totzkee was seen with her Jewish friend Ruth Basinsky^[46]. Totzke and Basinsky attempted to flee Germany, but were caught by Swiss border guards who handed the two women over to the German authorities^[47]. Basinsky was sent to a death camp where she was gassed while Totzke was sent to Ravensbrück concentration camp where she died in 1943^[48] There was much rejoicing on the street where Totzke lived when her "good neighbours" learned she had been sent to Ravensbrück^[49]. Gellately wrote that through the Gestapo arrested and sent Totzke to Ravensbrück, it was her neighbours who brought about her destruction by denouncing time after time to the Gestapo^[50].

An examination of 213 denunciations in Düsseldorf showed that 37% were motivated by personal conflicts, no motive could be established in 39%, and 24% were motivated by support for the Nazi regime^[51]. The Gestapo always showed a special interest in denunciations concerning sexual matters, especially cases concerning rassenschande with Jews or between Germans and Polish slave workers^[52]. As time went back, anonymous denunciations to the Gestapo caused much trouble to various NSDAP officials, who often found themselves being investigated by the Gestapo^[53].

A study of the 825 cases drawn at random from the 70, 000 files of the Gestapo in Düsseldorf shown at between 1933 and 1945, investigations were opened for the following reasons:

• Membership of outlawed organizations
  • Membership of an illegal political party 204
  • Membership of an outlawed religious group 15
  • Membership of an illegal youth group 26

Total 245

• Non-conformist behaviour
  • Non-conformist verbal statements 203
  • Non-conformist work/leisure 38

Total 241

• Other non-conformity
  • Owning illegal books 37
  • Listening to radio broadcasts from abroad 20
  • Being politically passive 7
  • Other 75

Total 139

Conventional criminality 96

Administrative control 104

Total 825^[54].

Of the political cases, 61 people were investigated for suspicion of belonging to the KPD, 44 for the SPD and 69 for other political parties^[55]. Most of the political investigations took place between 1933-35 with the all time high of 57 cases in 1935^[56]. After that year, political investigations declined with only 18 investigations in 1938, 13 in 1939, 2 in 1941, 7 in 1942, 4 in 1943 and 1 in 1944^[57]. The "other" category assoicated with non-conformity included everything from a man who drew a caricature of Hitler to a Catholic teacher suspected of being lukewarm about teaching National Socialism in his classroom^[58]. The "administrative control" category concerned whose were breaking the law concerning residency in the city^[59]. The "conventional criminality" category concerned economic crimes such as money laundering, smuggling and homosexuality^[60]. Reflecting the Gestapo's obsesssion with sexual matters, denunciations of homosexuality were always followed with special vigour^[61]. In Würzburg, which is the other only place besides Düsseldorf where the local Gestapo records survive, investigations were usually concerned more with Jews and Catholicism^[62].

Normal methods of investigation included various forms of blackmail, threats and extortion to secure "confessions"^[63]. Beyond that, sleep deprivation and various forms of harassment were used as investigative methods^[64]. Failing that, torture and planting evidence were common methods of resolving a case, especially if the case concerned someone Jewish^[65].

From the Autumn of 1939, Soviet secret police (NKVD) and Gestapo closely collaborated in the aftermath of the partition of Poland. Several conferences took place (see: Gestapo-NKVD Conferences). Exchanges of prisoners took place as early as December 1939. In March 1940 representatives of the NKVD and Gestapo met for the third time in the best known of these conferences which lasted for one week in Zakopane, to coordinate the pacification of resistance in Poland. The Soviet Union delivered hundreds of German and Austrian communists to the Gestapo, as unwanted foreigners, together with relevant documents. The Soviet-Nazi cooperation continued up to the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.^{[citation needed]}

The Polish government in exile in London during World War II received sensitive military information about Nazi Germany from agents and informants throughout Europe. After Germany conquered Poland in the autumn of 1939, Gestapo officials believed that they had neutralized Polish intelligence activities.

Some of the Polish information about the movement of German police and SS units to the East during the German invasion of the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1941 was similar to information British intelligence secretly got through intercepting and decoding German police and SS messages sent by radio telegraphy.^{[citation needed]}

In 1942, the Gestapo discovered a cache of Polish intelligence documents in Prague and were surprised to see that Polish agents and informants had been gathering detailed military information and smuggling it out to London, via Budapest and Istanbul. The Poles identified and tracked German military trains to the Eastern front and identified four Ordnungspolizei ("order police") battalions sent to conquered areas of the Soviet Union in October 1941 and engaged in war crimes and mass murder.^{[citation needed]}

Polish agents also gathered detailed information about the morale of German soldiers in the East. After uncovering a sample of the information the Poles had reported, Gestapo officials concluded that Polish intelligence activity represented a very serious danger to Germany. As late as June 6, 1944, Heinrich Müller, concerned about the leakage of information to the Allies, set up a special unit called Sonderkommando Jerzy that was meant to root out the Polish intelligence network in western and southwestern Europe.^{[citation needed]}

• C.O.T.SS - Children of the SS
• Glossary of Nazi Germany
• Organization for Vigilance and Repression of Anti-Fascism – Fascist Italy's civilian intelligence service.
• Tokkō – may be thought of as Japan's version of the Gestapo / NKVD.

Sometimes the word Gestapo is used colloquially for other organizations which are felt to be disciplinarian: see Nazism in popular culture. An example is in the book version of the Tron movie, where while inexpertly destructively driving a big vehicle a character says "This kind of romp is going to annoy the local gestapo."

• Crew, David F., ed. (1994). Nazism and German Society, 1933–1945. London; New York: Routledge.
• Lumsden, Robin (2001). A Collector's Guide To: The Allgemeine – SS, Ian Allan Publishing, Inc. ISBN 0-7110-2905-9.
• McNab, Chris (2009). The SS: 1923–1945, Amber Books Ltd. ISBN 978-1-906626-49-5.
• Padfield, Peter (1990). Himmler: Reichsfuhrer-SS. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
• Rees, Laurence (1997). The Nazis: A Warning From History. New York: New Press.
• Shirer, William (1960). The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. New York City: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-671-72868-7.
• Williams, Max (2001). Reinhard Heydrich: The Biography: Volumes 1, Ulric Publishing, ISBN 0-9537577-5-7.
• Editors of Time-Life Books (1988). The SS: The Third Reich Series. Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books.

• Mallmann, Klaus-Michael & Paul, Gerhard. (1993). "Allwissend, allmächtig, allgegenwärtig? : Gestapo, Gesellschaft und Widerstand". Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 1993 (in German). 41 (11): 984–999.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) (translated as Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipresent? Gestapo, Society and Resistance, and included in Crew, Nazism and German Society, 1994)