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This recent glossy NZ publication (2018) republishes various published and unpublished works on the Royalist including part of the wiki article in its 2017 state Wrights editorial view is the Royalist was an ill advised and poor investment given its poor hull condition and cramped crew conditions which had hardly been improved from WW2. Wright claims that there no other ships using the RN DP 5.25 gun, although the RN still had 5 battleships in reserve when Royalist recommissioned in 1956 and it was the following years 1957 Sandys defense review which led to the RN deciding to scrap the last four Dido cruisers it had in reserve HMS Euralyus, Cleopatra, Dido and Bellona and the final RN shore emplacement 5.25 battery remained operational until 1980 with four new single 5.25 mounts for AA and anti ship action being installed as late as 1955 Gibraltar. On 25 March 1955, NZ National MP, Sid Holland was considering purchasing HMS Royalist or HMS Diadem (which was instead sold to Pakistan and transferred after in Mid 1957). Diadem renamed, Babur was given a 18mth refit which far exceeded the estimated cost of 1.5 million dollars (1 million dollars provided by Pakistan and 0.25 million by the UK and 0.25 million US from the MPDA) The huge actual cost of the refit enraged opposition parties in Pakistan . Diadem received a thorough overhaul, a new bridge and light 40mm Mk 5 (3x2) and Mk 7 (8 X1) armament and served in a number of wars with India 1962, 1965 and 1971 the third encounter providing an interesting alternative view to the Falklands and Gulf of how 1950s UK frigates, cruisers and RAF and RN carrier borne aircraft would fare in conflict. It is generally recorded that Diadem was reduced to a training ship in 1961. However Mountbatten (Record Society), RAN CNS correspondence with First Sea Lord) fought with everything to have Diadem enter IPN service as a surface counter to the UK reconstructed Mysore (HMS Nigeria rebuilt to the std if Newfoundland 1952). The Dido AD cruisers were something of the first 'hot' ships and could not really be turned off and like the Royalist could only be briefly refitted and and it had to be half manned, in 1958-61 untilreturned to service as an operational warship. Retired Australian Admiral James Goldrick wrote extensively about the Diadem in his book on the Indian, Pakistan, Ceylon and Bengal Navies and the In terms of warship raiders, it appears the post war Soviet Chapevs and Sverdlovs were partly intended to play a similar role to the WW2 Kreigsmarine, battlecruisers and armoured cruisers like Graf Spee, given the Sverdlov were near 20,000 displacement and had 6 inch armour on their 6 inch triple turrets and belt, no cruiser may have been the answer. The RN view post war however was the expected standard of the Soviet fleet would be low and a pair of 4.5 gunned Daring Destroyers or even a pair of Type 41 diesels with two twin 4.5 inch would have been adequate. Part of the justification for the Royalist was actually that it might be more of a counter to the Sverdlov transferred to Indonesia , INS Irain than British destroyers or the County GMD unarmoured and with only 4.5 guns. The Indonesians did not seem interested in maintaining the Sverdlov in combat capable condition, but it known that in 1964 the Russian Navy did take the cruiser back to Russia for a refit. Royalists modernisation was only expected to cover a lifespan of 6 years. A RN reconstruction, entailed a high grade short remaining life reequipping to fight in WW3 in 1956-1963 with area defence, AA and surface fighting capability. Reconstruction did not necessarily involve reboilering, new drive train and engines, if the existing boilers, hull and engine would last to the ships, planned 20 year life. A 'Life extension extended refit' was a renewal and replacement of a cruisers worn out or obsolete power and weapon systems, and might involve a physical life extension of 5-20 years for lower level patrol and colonial duties, but without more than point defence AA weapons for the ships own self defence. with L60 twin water cooled bofor, effective with 262 radar to 2 miles. The expected lifespan of a war built Dido or Colony cruiser was no more than 20 years the usual age of their withdrawal and it was to be expected the accuracy of the AA gun alignment in Royalists Mk 6 275 directors would deteriorate from mid 1963 as they did. The real question would have to be why the Holyoake government did not take out another interim lease of a Daring destroyer known to have been recently refitted. Royalist at least looked like a cruiser and was safer than a long low Daring, with an excessive turning circle.

The triple Mk 6 inch and twin 4 inch cruiser weapons used by other RN cruisers in the 1950s saw only a few more years service in the RN. The 5.25 turrets were more modern and accurate and required 60 crew per turret cf with 90 for a Mk 23 triple 6. The twin 4inch X1X was obsolete and inaccurate

The Royalist and Dido conversions were considered prototype cruiser destroyers by the RN in 1949 and the late 1940s view in Britain was that anti sub frigates and minesweepers should be all the Navy required. Given the immediate requirements of the Korean war and the UK Treasury restricting any cruiser to 370O ton dimensions of he USS Mitcher the HMS Royalist conversion was a rare major surface warship that could go forward after the success of the similar update of USS Juneau in a unique and rather too succesful USN conversion in 1951 with modern AA radar for 12 5inch guns and 14 twin 3/50 the Juneau outshooting the USS Worchester and early Terrier ships. The decade of problems with Sea Slug and Terrier/Tartar in the USA meant the AA success on test against Jet drones of the Royalist/ Juneau made them a very unwanted development which the RN & USN wanted out of the way. The Royalist was successful against multiple meteor jet drones while Seaslug managed comparable performance tests against slower Firefly drones. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 210.48.175.44 (talk) 00:09, 2 October 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Suggest you break it down into short specific issues with room to discuss each. GraemeLeggett (talk) 20:06, 10 October 2021 (UTC)[reply]

This article has essentially been written by me since 2011.

The issue over the Royalist in NZ is was a cruiser capability obsolete in 1955. And if relevant was Britain just using NZ to pay for supplementary RN capability. The Navy board which viewed the RNZN as a cruiser navy as it had been a cruiser station for its 20C role as a RN division. A cruiser by definition was a significant, sustainable multi channel warship capable of surveillance, interception and destruction of surface, shore and air targets, for long range patrol and presence off SE Asia and around the South Pacific. Captain Phipps, diplomats like Frank Corner and numerous critics argued the Type 12 frigate was the obvious replacement for cruisers in 1955. However The T12 frigates had not been tried or tested in 1955 and were too prove, woefully lacking in range. There usefulness as convoy or fleet escorts of aircraft carriers seemed questionable as it seemed highly unlikely that in the age of deterrence , war would last long enough for military, fuel or food supply convoys, too get through or be useful. RN plans to build new aircraft carriers was rejected in 1954 and Hms Hermes was expected to be the last carrier, completed in 1959. Tiger was expected to be the last cruiser. The need for new units faster than HMAS Melbourne or HMCS Bonaventure was unclear in 1955. Cruiser capability did not require a 5.25 gunned cruiser. The major problems with the Royalist, lack of space and overmanning could have been partially overcome if the NZ Government and RNZN insisted on modification in March 1955, the rebuilt cruiser had been delivered in 1956 with 3 rather than 4 main turrets and more bunk accommodation, recreation and staff rooms fitted in the removed turret (req, 60/70 men and 210 ton removed). Mathew Wright in his book on the RNZN notes that Black Prince and Bellona were already so overweight by 1946 to be marginal in terms of acceptability stability and 1945/46 RN consideration of more Dido class cruisers considered the alternative effectiveness of 3 twin 5.25 and 4 Mk 6 4.5 turrets and considered the 4.5 fit more effective against 1946 targets. The cruiser capability could also have been provided by 3 Type 15 converted destroyers and 3 refitted Battle class destroyers as for Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. 6 Destroyer refits, 6 x 0.7m = 4.2m, equivalent to the Royalist's reconstruction cost and give 15 years lifespan ^[1] The RNZN have questioned my competence and qualifications to write NZ naval history. WW2 made clear that the Tasman and Sth pacific could only be covered by the RNZAF and RAAF from the air. I have always supported the RNZAF Orion and P-8 MPA strike reconnaissance and and a/s squadron as the first requirement for NZ defense and contributing to protecting Pacific shipping and communications. I opposed the Collins submarine project which the RNZN was party to in 1983-5 in the project definition stage. The RAN Collins was a disarmament project which made dosen't contribute to the defence of Pacific trade, air lanes and cables. I played a role in opposing the RNZN and RAN Collins project with commentary. The ANU and AFJ advice of Hugh White and Toohey; former Government advisors of Australian sec of Defense, Arthur Tange,

and Prime Ministers, Fraser, Hawke and Beazley. that Australia should rely on 12 diesel submarines and the good faith of China, not tactical nuclear weapons use. This policy precluded effective defense and deterrence. In essence the Anzac frigates, were gold plated coastguard cutters to meet the institutional needs of the RNZN,  like the County class DDG allowing the RN to preserve the command structure of the Town and Colony class. The official record and wikipedia article Anzac frigates which says the Anzacs allowed the RAN/RNZN to replace and replicate the capabilities of the Type 12  and Leander class was clearly nonsense as the Anzacs were not effective cold water global operable anti submarine frigates. Although he Anzacs did continue the communication intercept, electronic warfare and  surveillance capability of the Dido cruisers and Leander. My main work on the Anzac frigate debate, 4 articles for NBR in 1989 for which I was paid  is largely unrecorded in most 21C databases see P. Greener work on the Anzac frigate, and  A-4/F-16 decision, which cites only a 1983 NBR article and obscure booklet.[2] . Greener degrades me to a 'impassioned' advocate of the RN Castle class OPV. I actually suggested the USCG Bear cutter in  1983/85 NBR articles and later the French Navy, Nivose class, Tahiti based OPVs with 100mm gun. I also mentioned the Irish P31 design in several NZIIA International Reviews articles. I did not  support the OPV version of the M class or a Type 21 second hand purchase in 1989-91, ' Rogernomics' trade credits for a Dutch M OPV would not have been arranged by Treasury or continued by a following National Government and the Type 21 (probably the only realistic alternative balancing costs, politics and the RNZN view) was ridiculed by  RN Admirals as incapable of modernisation and having less redundancy than any post war RN frigate, with only (2) 50km range  radars, 1006/992  and exposed wiring hubs.   I I have relevant academic qualifications, publications and  two post graduate degrees. A Canterbury 2/2  MA awarded in 1982, BA (Hons) 2011; a BCom in accountancy and  academic publications on the RNZN for NZ International Review under the editorship of Ian McGibbon,National Business Review under Colin James and Fran O Sullivan and as a leader writer for the Timaru Herald working at their office, ie I was more than a contract employee in 1984-5 and wrote leaders on the Anzus, nuclear ship and political issues and other issues under the guidance of M.Vance and B.Appelby who had been journalists for the leading Sydney and London papers 

I decided in 2011 to counter this complete destruction of historical truth. Essentially the Key government, with a freeze on officer pay and halved RNZN fuel allocation, violated the basic requirement, post ANZUS to maintain a serious officer core to allow resumption of a credible defense relationship with the USA.

I attended TBHS 1970-74, Otago and Victoria University 1975-8 and worked for the post office 1975-6, Waterside Commission 77-8, Waimate CC and OUP 1982 (on the planning of the proposed hydro scheme) and as largely full time editorial writer, at the Timaru Herald 1984-5. I have wrote on RNZN issues for the NZIIA under Ian McGibbon and was interviewed for several MOD A0 positions, 1980/84. Met RNZN planning officers Ian Bradley, Robert Martin, Dick Ryan and was interviewed, in 1984 by MOD. I entered journalism after getting a 2/2 MA (1982 Cant) concerned over the state of the railways and the lack of a defense policy under Muldoon. I was opposed to the Navy and Railways being used as an employment sink for the unemployable and regarded anarchy and lack of discipline in the Navy as a defence problem in 1983. Reducing crew numbers from 250 on a T12 Leander to 170 on an Anzac or Type 21, did not resolve the problem.

My father Alan Miles and Fred Miles, were normal Kiwis and Australians of their generation, Cpt FF Miles (Gloucester Regiment) slandered beyond belief in SJ Harper, book. A tall sportsman, non military he served 4 yrs in France and Salonika. Both actually attended Balliol in 1913-13,19-20 and 49-50 and served as officers in WW1 and WW2 in the Gloucester Regiment and in Alan Miles case presumably as a RNZN/RN War service Reserve Officer on HMS Kledive, Hunt destroyers and in New York on prep planning of the Sth France invasion. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 115.188.67.34 (talk) 00:43, 12 October 2021 (UTC) In terms of my family. It is not difficult to confirm that Alan Miles was at Balliol in 1949-50 was nominated for a Rhodes Scholarship (1946) and a lecturer, Vic Uni, Wellington, 1948-49. My mother was one of his Hons students. On my fathers death in 1981, I examined his papers, re the offer of a permanent commission in the RNZN and the offer of Balliol in 1950, to return to the college for 3 weeks to compile a bibl, to complete a B.Lit.[reply]

I did leave a note on the IP editors talk page User talk:115.188.67.34 offering solutions to any issues they had with my editing. GraemeLeggett (talk) 08:40, 12 October 2021 (UTC)[reply]

To the IP editor, this talk page relates to the ship. Much of what is on this talk page relates to unrelated defence policy, procurement and your personal credentials. None of this goes towards improving the article. Zawed (talk) 10:01, 10 August 2022 (UTC)[reply]

IP editor, you need to read Wikipedia:Talk page guidelines. Especially taking note of instructions against editing other users comments.

Also Wikipedia:No legal threats to make sure you don't misrepresent your intent. GraemeLeggett (talk) 22:55, 15 November 2021 (UTC)[reply]

IP read wp:or wp:v wp:npa and wp:bludgeon. Slatersteven (talk) 11:49, 30 May 2022 (UTC)[reply]

I've had a look at the article, edit history and our colleagues talk page. I think he (?) is going to take a lot of coaxing to follow wiki conventions. I think it is worth the effort because I think he (?) could become rather good at this once he calms down. Keith-264 (talk) 14:40, 30 May 2022 (UTC)[reply]

Unfortunately, much of the time when the IP editor in question does give sources that can be verified, if you check the edit, then the source does not back up the claims they place on the citation. Their edits need to be individually checked in detail to see whether they are backed up by the sources if the sources are verifiable, to remove the sweeping original research which they are prone to, to remove undue digressions and to turn them into coherent and succinct writing. The article is in an extremely poor condition owing to the efforts of this editor, and I suspect WP:TNT is probably the way forward here.Nigel Ish (talk) 18:37, 30 May 2022 (UTC)[reply]

And they are accusing other editors (i.e. me) of slander in the long post above. This does not seem to indicate that they are interested in collaboration with others in "their wiki articles".Nigel Ish (talk) 18:51, 30 May 2022 (UTC)[reply]

Slander violates wp:nlt, maybe this now needs to go to wp:ani. Slatersteven (talk) 10:46, 31 May 2022 (UTC)[reply]

You're welcome to try, but there will be a lot of sub-editing along the way- if only to deal with the overloading of the text with commas. I personally disagree on the article quality - everything up to Post war reconstruction is good enough. And I'm prepared to reconstruct the reconstruction section. GraemeLeggett (talk) 21:41, 30 May 2022 (UTC)[reply]

Pretty poor conduct by the IP (spouting off about having four degrees to justify why their opinion should trump others is very telling, let alone the name calling). This seems to be a very clear case of WP:OWN to me. Zawed (talk) 10:41, 31 May 2022 (UTC)[reply]

There is more wall of text on the talk archive page. In fairness the IP editor has indicated in some edit summaries that they have accessibility issues " I am technically blind", "draft reflected time and very poor eyesight et al". GraemeLeggett (talk) 11:27, 31 May 2022 (UTC)[reply]

Problem is they seem to be shifting IP's, so they may not have seen any of it. Slatersteven (talk) 11:47, 30 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]

I do not think HMS Royalist can be reduced to a second rate enthusiast naval enthusiast type article about WW2 cruisers with a brief afterlife At the very least it represents like the 1946 USS Juneau a interim ' cruiser destroyer ' and in Royalist case a part chain including the 1951 Mk 3 Dido 4.5 design and the 1962 County GMD Like USS Juneau as re-equipped in 1951-2 , Royalist represents the last comprehensive gun AA ship that works. My view is that the rebuilt Royalist was seen as an AA flak ship as were the 3 Tiger class cruisers not as conventional or flagship cruisers The late WW2 RN conception of aircraft carriers and battleships was very much as AA flak ships and in many ways their heavy 4.5/5.25 AA guns were their greatest value rather than the battleship guns or rather ineffective Sea Venom, Sea Fury, Wyvern, Attacker or even Scimitar strike aircraft. In 1957 the Sandys report justified the Tigers as intermim, AA fleet escorts until the County class and other new GM destroyers were developed. The French De Grasse, US Worchester and Mitcher ckass DL class were AA escorts. It could be argued that the article on HMS Royalist should be three articles. HMS Royalist development as a RN Bellona cruiser and its conversion as a AW/AD ship for the RN in 1944 and its reconstruction in 1955-56 for the role (2) The transfer to the RNZN and its controversial and ambiguous role in the lead up and actual, Suez war in 1956 and the ambiguous role of NZ, Australia, UK, France and Israel in Operation Musketeer. Australia had RAN officers and men aboard key RN warships during the invasion and gun actions of HMS Newfoundland. Robert Menzies like NZ PM Holland instructed Australian diplomats to vote with the UK, FR and Israel against the UN call for a ceasefire at the start of the invasion of Port Said and the canal area. The only 5 votes in dissent. (3) The Royalists controversial post Suez service in the RNZN 1957-1966 which involved a whole series of deployments in support of UK/RN interventions, port visits with many incidents without any real direct supervision and control from Wellington, MOD or the NZ Government. The Royalist service career indicative that direction of the ship in peace and war outside NZ was delegated to New Zealand's allies and indicated Wellington lacked much genuine strategic planning command or control.

In terms of sourcing I would make a number of points. I am well aware that military and naval writing is governed by the rejection of synthesis the creation of new unreleased facts by logical deduction from known facts, numerical details or other info. The question of when what is known, obvious or data becomes synthesis or when small run, private, enthusiast, museum or retired officer publication becomes more than self publication and usable secondary sources are all arguable and depends on context and the national source. NZ being particularly unusual combining major military and naval activity with a small book market. . I do not see the critique of my work as entirely in good faith as in NZ a small country if that, there is always an excessive interest in confining debate and qualification to the narrow trade or profession. To comment critically on Rugby if one is not an All Black is heresy and to comment on the RNZN if not a naval architect or naval officer is seen as proof of ignorance, irrelevant, time wasting and probably communist sympathies. To bear the surname, 'Miles' has I discovered when I was about 40 various connotations in Australasia based on some Australian communist party leader of 80 years ago. Strangely I only realised in the last few years that was why everybody in Auckland and the NZ Army assumed I was far left. I thought most of the Miles, Fancourt, Heywood, Harris and McDonald names were fairly right wing business and political names, but apparently maternal ancestors count for little in the NZ heartland 101.98.49.10 (talk) 14:44, 4 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]

forgive me but none of this is a reason for us to make the changes you want, and reads very much like a wp:forum post. I would also add that is hard to follow this wall of text as it seems to have an odd...syntax. Slatersteven (talk) 14:50, 4 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]

I agree. This isn't reason for the changes. Your comment "My view is that the rebuilt Royalist was seen as an AA flak ship ..." is a giveaway that want you want to add is original research. Wikipedia is not the place for this, you need a reliable secondary source. That is the way Wikipedia works; critiquing contributions is not the same as censorship. Zawed (talk) 08:58, 5 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]

Who the hell is C bell? Slatersteven (talk) 10:04, 27 June 2022 (UTC) Christopher Bell is a major Anglo Canadian naval historian whose book on Churchill and Seapower (2013) OUP. Oxford is a major somewhat revisionist work on Churchills long controversial influence on the Royal Navy as first civilian sea lord and Britsh PM in 1940-45 and 1951-55. In terms of the period HMs Royalist was under reconstruction in 1953-56 and the earlier development of the view of Churchill and the British Treasury and MOD that the post war RN would have to be reduced to the least important of the British services, Bell strongly reviews the case. 'Churchill and Seapower' comprehensively reviews the strong advocacy of cabinet minister Sandys, Swinton and Brooke often supported by Churchill which led to the Radical defense reviews of 1953/4 and the transfer of Royalist to the RNZN. It was strongly argued Britain should reduce the 2 new large carriers Ark Royal and Eagle to reserve or downgrade to defensive, escort, carriers with only a/s aircraft and Sea Vixen fighters and abandon the nuclear strike tactical and strategic role which the Supermarine Scimitar and Blackburn Buccaneer aircraft were being developed. Churchill and most of his cabinet judged the cost and risk of these projects and that of building new aircraft carriers and indeed new cruisers was too high. Bell outlines the strong and coherent arguments, Churchill repeatedly made against the new carriers and the RNs strike aircraft projects. The new ships were hopelessly vulnerable to the emerging new guided missiles and jet aircraft bombers and like the cruisers represented a concentrated vulnerability and perfect bullseye for the enemy that would be taken by shore based aircraft in one shot. This is confirmed by other witness's like Lord Hailsham first lord in 1956. In fact Bell is rather too generous to Churchill from the RN perspective who was even more strongly opposed to the carriers and the RN in 1954, than Bell admits. On Guy Fawkes day 1954, WSJ Churchill, in his last performance in 6 hours effectively scuttled the plans for 2 new 35,000 ton carriers and 4 Minotaur 17,000 ton carriers substituting the completion and reconstruction of, two small medium carriers, Hms Hermes and Victorious and the 3 ageing Tiger class cruisers and furthur delayed any major frigate construction. While the Ark Royal was allowed to enter service as a full strike carrier, in 2/1955 Churchill had so delayed the project hat the Ark Royal basically had to be rebuilt with half its parts replaced before effectively entering service in 1962 and was never really satisfactory. The Scimitar was the disaster he suspected and while the Buccaneer was successfully developed by the time the effective S2 version appeared in 1967 the carriers were being scrapped or converted into commando carriers[reply]

YOu might make your case easier if you did not insist on walls of text that seem to contain a lot of irrelevant information not related to the topic. I assume you mean this person https://www.dal.ca/faculty/arts/history/faculty-staff/our-faculty/christopher-bell.html, yes I think he is an RS. But you need to read wp:cite, and wp:undue. Slatersteven (talk) 10:25, 30 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]

It's not helpful that the IP editor edits their previous posts, rather than adding in response. Is this a case where refactoring is acceptable? GraemeLeggett (talk) 10:15, 4 July 2022 (UTC)[reply]