HMS Royalist was a Bellona-class (improved Dido-class) light cruiser of the Royal Navy during the Second World War.

After commissioning in 1943, Royalist was modified with extra facilities and crew for operating as a flagship for aircraft carrier operations.

Royalist was in the Far East at the end of the war. It was then put into reserve until transferred to the Royal New Zealand Navy in 1956. After ten years with RNZN Royalist was returned to UK control for scrapping.

The Royal Navy (RN) intended in late 1943 to use the Bellona class as flagships for escort carrier and cruiser groups for the projected invasion of Normandy and of southern France and for operations with the United States Navy and with the RN fleet in the Pacific. Royalist was a class of one from the start being fitted out - within months of commissioning - with further modifications. These modifications gave it two extra rooms for additional communications with aircraft carriers and Fleet Air Arm aircraft and one of the first implementations of an "Action Information Office" (AIO) – an early operations room for plotting and display of the tactical position and associated mechanical computers to make it more effective. Intended to enhance the vessel's role as a command ship in northern Atlantic waters for operations against the German capital ships Tirpitz and Scharnhorst, the extra equipment took the ship to the limit leaving minimal comfort and sleeping provision for crew.^[1] The wartime development of radar and the requirement to equip Royalist as a "Carrier Flagship"^[2] fitted with AIO increased the crew complement from 484 to 600, adding to the problem.

Royalist was built by Scotts Shipbuilding and Engineering Company of Greenock laying down the keel on 21 March 1940. She was launched on 30 May 1942 and commissioned on 10 September 1943. She returned to the dockyard for alterations in November which were not complete until February 1944. Her motto, Surtout Loyal, translates to "Loyal above all".^[2]

Following her commissioning, Royalist spent several months working up, during which time she underwent repairs for trial defects and for alterations and additions. These included modifications for service as a carrier flagship.^[2] In March 1944 Royalist joined the Home Fleet and served for a short period in the Arctic theatre. In this capacity she took part in Operation Tungsten, the carrier raid in April 1944 against the German battleship Tirpitz at anchor in a fjord in Norway.

Royalist was then ordered to the Mediterranean to support the Operation Dragoon landings in the south of France in August 1944, as flagship to the five escort carriers in British Carrier Group TF88.1 under the United States Navy's Task Force 88.

After Dragoon, Royalist joined the Aegean Force preventing enemy evacuation from the islands in the Aegean Sea. On 15 September, accompanied by the destroyer HMS Teazer, she sank the transports KT4 and KT26 off Cape Spatha. She was then stationed in the Aegean until late 1944, when she was ordered to the East Indies.

By April 1945 she was with the 21st Aircraft Carrier Squadron as flagship, supporting the Rangoon landings of Operation Dracula.

From 10 May Royalist was covering a search group of carriers in Operation Mitre looking for Japanese warships carrying out evacuations in the area of Nicobar and Andaman Islands.^[a] For the remainder of the war she covered the carrier raids against targets in the East Indies and Sumatra.

Scottish author Alistair MacLean served on Royalist during the Second World War, and used his experiences as background for his acclaimed first novel HMS Ulysses (1955) as well as for some of his subsequent works.

Royalist was withdrawn from the East Indies after the conclusion of hostilities, and returned home to be mothballed and dehumidified in 1946.

The modernisation of four Dido-class cruisers including Royalist was approved by the Admiralty board on 30 March 1950 and 6 April 1950.^[b][3] Royalist was planned to be the first of five Dido- and Bellona-class cruisers to be modernised under the programme, with work planned to begin in January 1953.^[4]

The reconstruction of Royalist from deep preservation with new superstructure and advanced interim fire control fitted involved major work but was intended to extend the cruiser's life by only six years. Diadem was better preserved and was offered to the RNZN as an alternative in 1955. Royalist and Diadem were complex warships even as built in 1944. After refit and rewiring in 1956 they could never be further updated and to be kept running needed 200 men aboard even for short periods in reserve and refit; difficult for small navies such as the RNZN.

In March 1953 the reconstruction of Royalist was started ^[5] The works included new superstructure and electronics, but retained the old engines. The reconstruction of the Dido-class cruisers was intended to upgrade them for six years service to cover possible war in 1956-1962 which was considered the period of maximum danger and threat from the USSR. However the newly elected Prime Minister, Churchill, favoured the RAF, as his main advisor CDS Air Marshall, J C.Slessor was even more in favour of a restricted role for the RN and the 1952 Navy Estimates (budget) was reduced.For a year in 1953-4 after Churchill suffered a massive stroke UK defence policy was on hold with Churchill's 2 son in laws Sandy's and Soames both in the Cabinet, acting as non official regents for a gentocracy. ^[6] The massive Korean war defence budget expansion by the Attlee government which allowed the Dido/ Town reconstruction programme to be fully designed was clearly too expensive given the remaining hull lives of the Dido cruisers by 1952 and the Type 275 Mk 6 radar with flyplane (which could have allowed immediate fitting of the in-service cruisers HMS Phoebe, Diadem, Cleopatra and Euryalus to give long range AA capability to the 5.25 DP guns) was delayed by the obsolete nature of the British electronic industry which unionism, demarcation, outdated tools, lack of precision machinery for fine work and outdated Optics meant 1940s US or Dutch AA fire control could not even be copied in Britain till the mid 1950s and the new 275 UK fireplace, fire control capable of engaging Mach 2 aircraft, did not appear on record or photographed RN warships until first Type 12 Hms Torquay and reconstructed Royalist commissioned in 1956 ^{[7][failed verification]} and there was only the left over remaining stock of earlier 26 equivalent sets (supplied under lend lease in 1945) to fit the carriers HMS Eagle and Ark Royal carriers, HMS Vanguard and 8 Battle class Destroyers. The original US agreement to supply 42 sets for Vanguard, 3 Eagle class Audacious class carriers and up 26 1943 Battles under lend lease being terminated by VJ day in 9/1945 and the following UK/RN budget and shipbuilding cuts ^[8][9]

The delays in equipment made completion of the Tiger class by 1954 impossible and an alternative plan to reconstruct the larger Town-class light cruisers, HMS Liverpool and HMS Glasgow with STAAG 2 anti-aircraft guns, Type 960M Air Warning radar, High lattice mounted and AIO was cancelled in 1952.^[10] This made the equipment and resources allocated to Liverpool and the first two British Mk 275 Flyplane Dual Purpose Directors available for Royalist instead.

The RAF had priority and the Royal Navy view - that development should centre on frigates and large carriers - was not liked by Churchill; the cruiser reconstruction program was suspended for three years. The programme was also delayed by the immediate and changing priorities of the Korean War and the great difficulty and expense of developing compact steam propulsion with adequate range and speed and good close-in defence for the destroyers and frigates. The radical defence review in June 1953 saw heavy cuts to the navy but Royalist's modernisation continued under a revised defence White paper in February 1954 which restored the RN programme and plans to complete the aircraft carrier Hermes^[c] and the Tiger-class cruisers, but rejected starting further Dido/Bellona conversions as they lacked the "dual war and peace, cold war capabilities required for the RN".^{[11][12][page needed] [d]}

This might have been more relevant in Suez and Indonesia-Malayan confrontation like scenarios than the substituted five-year life extension refits that were for the Colony-class cruisers Bermuda and Gambia, at half the cost,^[17] and more substantial ten-year life extension of the Town class cruisers, HMS Sheffield and HMS Belfast, which were put into reserve for eight years in 1959 and 1963 respectively, shortly after modernisation and the two Swiftsure-class cruiser rebuilds cancelled in mid 1959 with HMS Swiftsure almost completely reconstructed.^{[citation needed]} These final cruiser refits were intended only for use as flagships, NATO command and shore bombardment.

Under the 1950 Naval Plan the Colony-class cruisers (completed in 1940–43) were scheduled for scrapping by 1955^[18] as they were as cramped as the Didos and lacked DP armament. After modern operations rooms and AIO were added post war, the Colony-class had no space for the gun crews needed for the 6-inch turrets (unless the Royal Marine detachment and 4-inch gun crews were used).^{[citation needed]} The older Town-class had space and compartments allowing fitting of modern weapon systems and were comfortable East of Suez. By 1954 it was obvious that extended refits of the newer, smaller Colony class was more possible than the Dido class.^{[citation needed]}

The postwar RN programme envisaged that Soviet bombers would be improved Tupolev Tu-4s^[e] or Lincolns^{[clarification needed]} flying at 320 mph (510 km/h) at 4.4 mi (7.1 km) height, however, as part of the 1954 May Day parade, the new Soviet Tupolev Tu-16 "Badger" and Myasishchev M-4 "Bison" jet bombers were first shown to the public and the West. Flying 7 mi (11 km) high at 600 mph (970 km/h); it would take 20 seconds for 5.25-inch shells to reach that height. An updated 5.25 cruiser was a possible solution and deterrent to the new Soviet threat, which could not be countered a frigate with a single Mk 6 4.5-inch turret.^{[19][page needed]} But Royalist was suspended and reviewed in the 1955 Defence White Paper which decided on a scaled down cruiser programme.^{[20][failed verification]}

The New Zealand Prime Minister Sid Holland decided to accept the offer of Royalist, paying £4 million for the reconditioning, in March 1955 after a seven-week visit to the US and UK where he met the American vice president Richard Nixon, secretary of state John Foster Dulles, and Churchill who stressed the reality of hydrogen bombs. Holland was more influenced by the advice of the British Minister of Defence Harold Macmillan,^[21] to refocus NZ defence on the Pacific and shorter lines of communication to South East Asia^[22] rather than Middle East. The British First Sea Lord and Admiralty minister stressed the availability of 'Royalist' and that an order of two or three anti-submarine frigates would probably proceed,^[23] the Type 12 frigate was untested and unproven, and the RN viewed it was desirable to wait for new types of frigates suitable for NZ conditions with more gunpower and anti-submarine capability.^[23]

The cost of Royalist's reconstruction reached £4.5 million.^[24] (the same as the cost of two new 2,500-ton frigates). A minority of RNZN opinion, including Captain Peter Phipps, saw it as a policy reversal stopping the RNZN maintaining six frigates, good training conditions and commonality with new RN frigates.^{[citation needed]} However Royalist, with massive assistance from the RN and US Navy, was operational, post refit, for nine and half year. After Suez in 1956 the Royal Navy transferred the bulk of the fleet to the Indian and Pacific oceans from 1957 to 1967. As a result, Royalist could be deployed with the RN carrier fleet.

The ship was handed over to the Royal New Zealand Navy on 9 July 1956. When Captain Phipps went to take command of Royalist in 1955, New Zealand diplomat Frank Corner showed his own view, when he noted that Phipps agreed that the ship was a white elephant, unsuitable for use in the Pacific. However The RNZN had operated the Bellona and Black Prince (the same class as Royalist) since 1946 as part of NZ Defence contribution in 1946–54.^[25] Phipps claimed the cruiser's range was limited and it could not even reach Panama without refuelling. However Phipps also stated when the cruiser reached Auckland, that it was updated, as a most modern warship, with the capability to take "three targets simultaneously, and shoot down air targets with reasonable frequency often on the first salvo"^[26]

The Type 12 (Whitby-class) anti-submarine frigates proved in use to have only 2/3rds of the projected endurance of 4000 nm at 15 knots. By comparison the longer-range diesel version Type 41 Leopard-class anti-aircraft frigates, with two twin 4.5 turrets, would have countered the problem of unreliability with single turret of the Otago-class. The Type 41 (and Type 61 Salisbury-class aircraft direction frigate) original radar and fire control fit was similar to Royalist and the Type 12 ^[27][28] except the frigates had AC electrics.

The New Zealand Navy Board, of which three members were RN officers, argued the RN view that the RNZN needed a cruiser in the South Pacific and to support the RAN/RN. The point of Royalist from the RN viewpoint was a powerful interim late 1950s medium range AA platform with 30 rpm on two channels from four twin 5.25-inch guns. The space and comfort problems were only minimally altered by any economy in the AIO suite or 40 mm light AA and reducing to three main turrets destroyed the cruiser's primary AA value.^{[citation needed]} The cruiser was a RN cruiser on loan, and not renamed "HMNZS New Zealand". The UK did not regard the RNZN as an independent force compared to the RAN and RCN. Phipps demanded some improvements and refused on 6 April 1956, in front of the dockyard superintendent and 40 assembled dockyard and Royalist RN/RNZN officers to sign the standard RN D448 release form for accepting the Royalist refit was completed to specified standard,^[29][30] while in command of HMS Bellona as an accommodation ship. Phipps finally accepted the cruiser three weeks later after the minimum of adjustments; four showers added; the officers' baths removed and minor ventilation improvements.^{[citation needed]}

The Royal Navy saw Phipps' action as a disruption of the Suez naval preparations by a colonial upstart and an action unfitting of a serious RN senior officer and gentleman.^[29] Post-Suez the RNZN view of Phipps, the RNZN, its officers, and men, was unchanged. New Zealand was viewed as having zero capability for strategic assessment^[31] and the RN requested confirmation from the New Zealand government that in 1957 the RN East Asian staff would have authority of Royalist.^{[citation needed]}

Royalist lacked the pre-wetting, ABC spraydown equipment, specifically requested by the RNZN in 1955.^[32] The Devonport UK dockyard noted that installing spraydown to wash nuclear fallout was possible, providing a copy of the plan of the pre-wetting system under installation in HMS Sheffield, and suggested the New Zealand dockyard could do the job. In 1957, Royalist like the other Dido-class cruisers had beds only for 47 officers, in a standard cabin; the ratings had only a hammock. Royalist lacked even the single extra room with a sofa for senior rates on other Dido cruisers but did offer speed and extra communications systems and an Action Information Office (AIO) fitted late 1943. The other Dido-class cruiser fitted with AIO, HMS Scylla, was also seen as valuable post war. Scylla had detonated a mine on 23 June 1944 off Arromanches. It was deemed uneconomic to return her to wartime service. But reconstruction at Chatham began in 1945 with a new fit of two twin Mk 6 3-inch/70 mounts and Type 992 radar approved.^{[33][page needed][34]} In 1947, after £350,000 of work, defence cuts and delays, the cruiser was written off.^[35] AIO-fitted cruisers (usually late Colony class and Minotaur class^[36]) doubled the effectiveness of armament in RN postwar assessment,.^[37]

The concern of New Zealand naval servicemen and Phipps was on living conditions, recruitment, ammunition resupply in the Pacific and an affordable schedule of new frigates. The New Zealand Department of External Affairs viewed the British Treasury as getting rid of a odd cruiser and getting New Zealand to pay for the warships refit.^[38][39] However, as with Bellona and Black Prince in 1946, transferring Royalist was supplementing Australian defence. By 1955 the RAN had only light 4.5-inch gun, Battle-class and Daring-class destroyers (building) and light carriers, HMAS Melbourne and Sydney, with obsolete^{[citation needed]} Sea Venom fighters. Royalist could join an RAN task force with Melbourne and Sydney and the cruisers 82 lb (37 kg) shells, offered AA and some deterrence to Sverdlov cruisers. Royalist, had modern two-channel fire control for its guns and radar processing and communications with the RN/ RAN Fleet air arms.^[40] The Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies was dubious that RN policy in the age of nuclear deterrence, was "minor fleet to the Far East in peacetime only" and no real counter to piecemeal communist erosion in Southeast Asia.^[41][42] The UK defence review released on 10 July 1953, argued that new hydrogen bombs reduced the likelihood of 'long' broken-backed war requiring trans-Atlantic convoys and maintaining cruisers. The RN could not afford new AA gun models to supplement expensive missile developments like the Seaslug missile.^[43] Mountbatten publicly defended Royalist as the most modern British cruiser in Auckland when it arrived in December 1956^{[44][verification needed]} and regarded Phipps as inexperienced and unsuitable.^[45] Mountbatten viewed New Zealand's cabinet and officials as out of touch with the Cold War need to maintain ready, broad-based naval and defence capabilities and frequently visited New Zealand to make appeals.^[46]

Royalist was fitted with a powerful combination of the standard fit of mid 1950s new RN warships radar, fire control and (three) STAAG 2 close in anti-aircraft systems firing RN 40 mm ammunition. STAAG was a maintenance nightmare^[47] withdrawn from the RN in 1959-60.^[48] The 5.25-inch DP guns, which were also fitted to Vanguard and at Gibraltar to control the narrow straights, were accurate unlike the 4-inch AA on the Colony class. Royalist's modernization for AA/AW and particularly air defence support of RN carrier fighters and strike aircraft would prove useful for Suez, the Malaysian Emergency and the confrontation with Indonesia.^{[citation needed]}

Royalist could escort convoys across the whole distance at a speed of 19 knots (35 km/h; 22 mph), compared with the Type 12's ability to make the long leg from Suva to Honolulu at 10/15. It was arguable that the traditional cruiser role in trade defence against Soviet cruisers and raiders was relevant,^[49] as was contributing effective AW/AD to RN/ RAN carrier task forces.^[50]

After refitting, Royalist was re-equipped with new equipment as an AA and AD picket for carriers. The cruiser retained 5.25-inch guns, upgraded to RP20 as more powerful high level AA and surface weapons, than Mk6 4.5 turrets seriously considered for the Dido refit . The refit was to prepare it for all-out hot wars and high-level gun engagement of shadowers.^[51] Except for Royalist, this modernisation was cancelled in 1953 on cost grounds.^[52] Defence review and RAF assessments that the Sverdlov and Russian air threat in the 1955–58 period, was exaggerated. The RAF estimated 300 Badger jet bombers in 1956 - the actual number was 500. The delay in the cruiser programme meant most war legacy cruisers had reached 12 years in service, doubling the cost of structural modernisation and reducing the programme. Only Royalist's update and a ten-year life extension of HMS Ceylon was approved in 1953.^[53]

In transferring Royalist to New Zealand, the Royal Navy assumed the RNZN as an extension of the RN and the junior New Zealand service and government followed British command. Around 25% of the officers on Royalist were RN officers on loan or exchange, as were many of the specialist ratings. The RNZN officers on the cruiser were usually of junior experience and had lengthy training with the RN in the UK. Even on the cruiser's final deployment in 1965 on Confrontation patrols in southeast Asia, many RN and RAN officers occupied higher-ranking officer positions on board.^[54]

After working up in UK waters, Royalist was operational with the British fleet in the Mediterranean. From August 1956, NZ Prime Minister Sidney Holland was persuaded by Anthony Eden to maintain Royalist on station in the Mediterranean as an invaluable, 'strategic deployment' and 'deterrent'^[55] against Egyptian or Israeli aggression; Eden assured Holland that it was purely precautionary move.^[56] At the same time Eden and the RN continued the dual strategy^{[57][full citation needed]} while both negotiating with Egypt and preparing with war, and attempting to lock Royalist into the strategy through persuasion by the First Sea Lord (and Chief of Naval Staff) Lord Mountbatten and the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Hailsham. The fleet awaited the possibility of action against Egyptian air force during the Suez crisis. Royalist was intended to be mainly a radar picket and aircraft direction ship for the RAF English Electric Canberra bombers and RN carrier-based Hawker Sea Hawk and de Havilland Sea Venom aircraft. Royalist had the standard RN long-range air warning Type 960 radar as carried by other British cruisers and carriers in the area, but Royalist was somewhat better equipped for aircraft direction than its other counterparts in the area.

After hostilities with Egypt commenced, the lack of prior consultation with the rest of the Commonwealth, the international opposition, and the possibility of being held responsible alongside Britain and France put the Prime Minister Sidney Holland in the position of wanting both to "stand by the UK" despite their misgivings while not jeopardising its relationship with the US.^[58] Calling ^{[clarification needed]} for Captain Phipps to withdraw from operations against Egypt. At that point the only other immediately available replacement cruiser was HMS Jamaica, which lacked modern AA systems and the equipment to process air-warning radar data and "multiple communication channels" with Fleet Air Arm aircraft. Royalist continued for some time as the primary coastal AD ship - possibly for 24 hours - until HMS Ceylon transferred from shore bombardment duty off Port Said and the risk from Egypt's Gloster Meteors, MiGs and Tupolev Tu-16 'Badger' bombers was suppressed. After about a day, HMNZS Royalist also withdrew from a scheduled bombardment mission in support of a RN destroyer squadron, moved further offshore away from the main body of the RN fleet (changing identity to the undefined, RNZN cruiser "Black Swan" according to some British published accounts^{[citation needed]}) continuing to assist the RN fleet in its primary passive soft air warning and communications role. Holland had officially ordered a withdrawal from operations but allowed the cruiser to stay with the Operation Musketeer fleet.^{[citation needed]} In a lengthy meeting the NZ cabinet had "decided not to decide" and while NZ did not want to embarrass Britain by withdrawing Royalist "there was insufficient time for a decision not to withdraw".^[58] Much of the Soviet-supplied Tupolev Tu-16 and MiGs of the Egyptian Air Force remained a threat to the RN fleet and Royalist was crucial to fleet defence.^[59] The reality of the pro-Musketeer sentiments^{[clarification needed]} of the RNZN/RN crew in which most of the key officer and senior rating positions were RN officers and many of the RNZN officers were also essentially professional RN career officers on the return voyage to New Zealand via South Africa. Captain Phipps told the crew they deserved the recognition given to RN personnel for their involvement in the incident.^[60] In the 2000s the New Zealand Labour Government and the RNZN awarded these personnel battle honours for war service in the Mediterranean. The cruiser's log for the crucial days of the Suez War was destroyed at the time meaning the full account of her Suez service will never be known.^{[citation needed]}

In early 1957 Royalist was involved in exercises with the Australian aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne.^[61] The cruiser made two shore bombardment missions in 1957–1958 during the Malayan Emergency against suspected terrorist areas in south east Johore, firing about 240 5.25-inch rounds.^[62] In AA exercises with the British Far East Fleet in 1956–57, Royalist outperformed the (pre-war) RN Town-class cruisers, shooting down five Gloster Meteor unmanned targets and many towed targets immediately on opening fire.^[63]

In 1960 Royalist had a major five-month refit. It was expected the cruiser would only serve another two and a half years; the New Zealand navy board was seeking loan of a third Whitby-class frigate (Type 12) from the Royal Navy^[64] However the RN was only just introducing and trialling the improved Rothesay-class (Type 12M) frigates and was short of effective frigates and cruisers. In February 1964 after HMAS Voyager was lost after it collided with the aircraft carrier Melbourne, the UK offered Australia the Daring-class destroyers, Duchess (available immediately) and Defender then in mid-life refit with new MRS3 fire control.^[65]Defender was available to replace Royalist from February 1965.^{[citation needed]}

In 1962 Royalist suffered permanent damage in rough weather in the Tasman Sea with the keel twisted out of alignment. The RAN captain, determined to make Auckland for a Rugby Union test between the Wallabies and All Blacks at Eden Park, had been running the ship at excess speed into a head sea.^[66] The back of the cruiser was technically broken and it could have been assessed as a 'constructive loss' and, as uneconomic to repair, scrapped.^{[citation needed]} It would never be possible again for the cruiser's gun directors to determine the cruisers datum centreline necessary for accurate targeting.^[67]

The cruiser operated with the British Far East Fleet, in three tours of duty in 1963, 1964 and 1965, during the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation the crews being belatedly awarded General Service Medals for the 1963–64 tours and Operational Service Medals for active service in combat zones in 1956, 1957–1958 and 1965, finally recognised by the New Zealand government in 2000. From mid-1963, reports by the captain of Royalist noted that one of the two Mk 6/275 HALADCTs were often unserviceable, often one or two STAAGs were, while the ship's hull and lower structure was marginal requiring constant work and frequent painting, requiring an extra Asian workforce due to the construction of the cruiser out of "low quality wartime steel", and the ship's below-deck humidity and constant temperature at a minimum of 85 °F (29 °C). The ship's modernisation had provided only for a lifespan of six years, so these conditions were expected. Effective modernisation of the ship after acquisition from the Royal Navy only amounted to several ECM/ESM updates.^{[citation needed]}

By May 1964 the Indonesian Confrontation had escalated with Indonesian forces conducting cross-border raids in Kalimantan and landings in Borneo. The British Minister of Defence Peter Thorneycroft and Mountbatten requested the use of carriers and major units to conduct provocative passages,^[68] to encourage a revolt against Sukarno and his generals. After rest and recreation in Singapore, Royalist took on 580 tons of fuel oil on 14 July 1964 and the following morning took ammunition on from lighters.^[69] It left Singapore in the afternoon returning to Auckland from Singapore via the Cairns races in Queensland, transited the Carmat Straits on 15 July, Sapud on 16 July (at ABC state Yankee^[jargon], at 2130 raised to condition X Ray at 2230)^[70] as it was in the Java Sea between Jakarta and southwest Kalimantan and then ran along the coast of Java thru the night to arrive off Bail at sunrise about 6.00 am and through the Lombok Strait on 17 July 1964^{[71][non-primary source needed]} on what was described as "routine passage" in the highly confidential communication to Canberra.

The two transits of the straits made the task group led by the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious, a month apart that followed were both also described as routine passage only the second was even notified with a note from the RN naval attaché at the British embassy to the Indonesian Navy, which was a concession the track would be through Lombok not Djakarta and the major Indonesian military bases. During the transit of the straits, the guns were fully manned with the crews closed up; if the cruiser had been "buzzed" by Indonesia aircraft or patrol craft, the captain was instructed to take "precautionary measures" and not train or elevate the guns or test fire them again during the deployment, a "diplomatic artifact"^{[citation needed]} given a scenario of undetectable possible threat of surprise long-range air-launched Kh-20 (NATO reporting name "Kangaroo") cruise missile attack from Indonesia bombers^{[clarification needed][72]} and full ABC protection at X Ray state 9^{[further explanation needed][73]}

The task force led by Victorious on 19 September 1964, with two^{[clarification needed]} County-class guided missile destroyers (including HMS Hampshire, which replaced the cruiser HMS Lion) and the frigates HMS Dido and HMS Berwick. Victorious's assertion of the right of innocent passage by a carrier caused mass panic in Java,^[74] but proved effective in establishing rights for naval passage and that Indonesia's assertion was unlikely to be outright war to stop Malaysian independence.^{[citation needed][relevant?]}

There was considerable doubt among RNZN staff whether Royalist, which had not had a major refit since 1956, could deploy again in 1965.^{[citation needed]} It managed to deploy again after a seven-week refit working round the clock in Devonport dockyard and work up in the Hauraki Gulf, where it managed 27 knots (50 km/h; 31 mph) at half power. The cruiser was still visually impressive, and provided the appearance of capability and ability to operate. It was judged that the fire control systems needed either a year's refit or $140,000^{[clarification needed]} of new parts,^{[75][non-primary source needed]} one of the two STAAG CIWS mounts was refitted with a worn spare, and the two UA3 ESM systems were playing up.^[76] It was hoped the worn steam turbines could last 15 months to allow a final 1966 visit to all the New Zealand ports if "hope prevailed over fear".^{[citation needed]}

Against most RNZN staff advice it was decided not to inform the Commander of the British Far East Fleet, of the situation as "Commander Far East has enough trouble fitting Royalist in his operational plans now with limitations on his main capability in the Confrontation War."^{[77][non-primary source needed]} The Royal Navy was desperately overstretched during the confrontation, and keeping one carrier fully operational in the theatre at all times was difficult^[78] to provide nuclear deterrence to Jakarta with the threat of potential aerial nuclear strike.^{[citation needed]} The high-maintenance Tiger-class cruisers required far too much human and technical resources to be operated East of Suez in a complimentary role for GFS and carrier escort with the Far East Fleet; HMS Lion was withdrawn after a boiler explosion on anti-infiltration patrol, and HMS Blake was put into reserve from December 1963 due to crew shortages in the RN.^{[citation needed]} HMS Royalist was still perceived by the RN as useful and needed in Singapore, even if it could not run at the 25+ knots needed when a carrier group was launching aircraft as an escort for amphibious carriers like HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark and it was decided Royalist would proceed to Pearl Harbor for a second workup, rather than a longer refit in the Devonport dockyard, before deploying to Hong Kong and Singapore in support of RN forces.

During Royalist stay at Pearl Harbor the USN Staff and naval dockyard provided substantial assistance in alleviating some of the cruiser's faults and adjustments to allow the fire control system to be aligned for brief periods. During the subsequent workup Royalist achieved "E Excellent" for Efficiency, meaning maximum efficiency within system capability though, like all peacetime naval or weapon tests, actual effectiveness was not measured.^{[citation needed]} During a brief spell on station at Singapore in 1965, Royalist conducted anti-infiltration patrols, boarding boats, deployed shore patrols, and participated in Exercise Guardrail as the simulated "enemy Sverdlov cruiser"^[79] and provided extra men, potential heavy gunfire support, and AD support for Bulwark on a vulnerable deployment transferring a new helicopter squadron to Borneo.^[80] For the 1965 Far East tour, the crew were awarded Operational Service Medals. This reflects the general build up in tension with Indonesia, the probable use of weapons by landing parties, the higher grade of main munition preparation and the political support for the mission, but the earlier deployments of Royalist when its system were more effective were much more important in the tactical and even strategic sense.^{[citation needed]}

The 1965 deployment was somewhat marred^{[citation needed]} by the refusal by the New Zealand Ministry of External Affairs and British ambassadors to allow Royalist to dock with RN ships at Tokyo or Yokohama.^[81] According to the Royal Navy attaché in Tokyo, the RNZN sailors "could not afford the one pound per minute price in the Ginza nightclubs and bars."^[82] The captain of Royalist, J.P. Vallant replied to the Deputy Secretary of Defence in Wellington, "..find it quaint that ... the New Zealand navy is persona non grata in the Tokyo Bay area."^[83] Royalist was confined to Japanese provincial ports with New Zealand diplomats persuading the local police chiefs against a curfew and to keep bars open 24 hours.^[84] After further shore leave in Bangkok, Singapore, and Subic Bay, Royalist returned to New Zealand, after a valiant repair of a milking boiler and turbine en route. It was unable to make its final scheduled 1966 visit for Waitangi Day (6 February) and tour of the New Zealand ports, and was effectively paid off five months early.

Royalist was paid off on 4 June 1966 and, after eleven years in the RNZN, Royalist reverted to Royal Navy control in 1967. She was sold for scrap to the Nissho Co, Japan, in November 1967 and was towed from Auckland to Osaka on 31 December 1967.

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• Media related to HMS Royalist (ship, 1942) at Wikimedia Commons
• HMS Royalist at navalhistory.net