Hafizullah Amin (Dari/Pashto: حفيظ الله امين; 1 August 1929  27 December 1979) was an Afghan revolutionary and communist head of state, who served in that position for a little over three months, from September 1979 until his assassination. He organized the Saur Revolution of 1978 and co-founded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), ruling Afghanistan as General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party.[4]

Born in the town of Paghman in Kabul Province, Amin studied at Kabul University and started his career as a teacher before he twice went to the United States to study. During this time, Amin became attracted to Marxism and became involved in radical student movements at the University of Wisconsin.[5] Upon his return to Afghanistan, he used his teaching position to spread socialist ideologies to students,[6] and he later joined the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a new far-left organization co-founded by Nur Muhammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal. He ran as a candidate in the 1965 parliamentary election but failed to secure a seat, but in 1969 became the only Khalqist elected to parliament, increasing his standing within the party.

Amin was the main organizer of the April 1978 Saur Revolution, which overthrew the government of Mohammad Daoud Khan and formed a pro-Soviet state based on socialist ideals.[5] Being second in chief of the Democratic Republic, Amin soon became the regime's strongman,[7] the main architect of the state's programs including mass persecution of those deemed counter-revolutionary.[8] A growing personal struggle with General Secretary Taraki eventually led to Amin wrestling power away then successfully deposing him and later ordering his execution; on 16 September 1979, Amin named himself Chairman of the Council of Ministers (head of government), Chairman of the Revolutionary Council (head of state), and General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee (supreme leader).[9]

Amin's short-lived leadership featured controversies from beginning to end. His government failed to solve the problem of the population revolting against the regime[10] as the situation rapidly worsened[8] and army desertions and defections continued. He tried to change things with friendly overtures to the United States, although his reputation in Washington was severely tarnished by his role in the assassination of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs.[11] Many Afghans, especially those from rural areas, held Amin responsible for the regime's harshest measures,[12][13] such as ordering thousands of executions.[12][14] Thousands of people disappeared without a trace during his time in office.[15] The Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev was dissatisfied with and mistrusted Amin after he conducted a series of purges against the Parcham; they intervened in Afghanistan, invoking the 1978 Twenty-Year Treaty of Friendship between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Soviet operatives assassinated Amin at the Tajbeg Palace on 27 December 1979 as part of Operation Storm-333, kickstarting the decade-long Soviet–Afghan War.

Early life and career

Hafizullah Amin was born to a Kharoti Ghilzai Pashtun family in the Qazi Khel village in Paghman[16] on 1 August 1929.[17][18] His father, a civil servant, died in 1937 when he was 8. Thanks to his brother Abdullah, a primary school teacher, Amin was able to attend both primary and secondary school, which in turn allowed him to attend Kabul University (KU). After studying mathematics there, he also graduated from the Darul Mualimeen Teachers College in Kabul, and became a teacher. Amin later became vice-principal of the Darul Mualimeen College, and then principal of the prestigious Avesina High School.

In 1957, Amin left Afghanistan for Columbia University in New York City, where he earned MA in education.[16] It was at Columbia that Amin became attracted to Marxism, and in 1958 he became a member of the university's Socialist Progressive Club.[19] When he returned to Afghanistan, Amin became a teacher at Kabul University, and later, for the second time, the principal of Avesina High School.[20] During this period Amin became acquainted with Nur Muhammad Taraki, a communist. Around this time, Amin quit his position as principal of Avesina High School to become principal of the Darul Mualimeen College.[21]

It is alleged that Amin became radicalised during his second stay in the United States in 1962, when he enrolled in a work-study group at the University of Wisconsin. Amin studied in the doctoral programme at the Teachers College of Columbia University, but started to neglect his studies in favor of politics and in 1963 he became head of the Afghan students' association at the college. The association was funded by the Asia Foundation, known to be a CIA pass-through group, or front.[22] When he returned to Afghanistan in the mid-1960s, he supposedly flew first to Moscow where he met the Afghan ambassador to the Soviet Union, his old friend Ali Ahmad Popel, a previous Afghan Minister of Education. During his short stay, Amin became even more radicalised.[21] According to others, Nabi Misdaq for instance, Amin did not return by way of Moscow, but rather West Germany and Lebanon.[19]

By the time he had returned to Afghanistan, the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) had already held its founding congress, which was in 1965. Amin ran as a candidate for the PDPA in the 1965 parliamentary election, and lost by a margin of fewer than fifty votes.[21] In 1966, when the PDPA Central Committee was expanded, Amin was elected as a non-voting member, and in the spring of 1967 he gained full membership. Amin's standing in the Khalq faction of the PDPA increased when he was the only Khalqist elected to parliament in the 1969 parliamentary election.[21]

When the PDPA split along factional lines in 1967, between Khalqists led by Nur and Parchamites led by Babrak Karmal, Amin joined the Khalqists. As a member of parliament, Amin tried to win over support from the Pashtun people in the armed forces.[23] According to a biography about Amin, he used his position as member of parliament to fight against imperialism, feudalism, and reactionary tendencies, and fought against the "rotten" regime, the monarchy. Amin himself said that he used his membership in parliament to pursue the class struggle against the bourgeoisie.[24] Relations between Khalqists and Parchamites deteriorated during this period. Amin, the only Khalq member of parliament, and Babrak Karmal, the only Parcham member of parliament, did not cooperate with each other. Amin would later, during his short stint in power, mention these events with bitterness.[25] Following the arrest of fellow PDPA members Dastagir Panjsheri and Saleh Mohammad Zeary in 1969, Amin became one of the party's leading members,[26] and was still a pre-eminent party member by the time of their release in 1973.[27]

The Daoud era

From 1973 until the PDPA unification in 1977, Amin was second only to Taraki in the Khalqist PDPA. When the PDPA ruled Afghanistan, their relationship was referred to as a disciple (Amin) following his mentor (Taraki). This official portrayal of the situation was perhaps misleading, their relationship having more to do with pragmatic calculations. Taraki needed Amin's "tactical and strategic talents" and, while Amin's motivations are more uncertain, it is commonly believed that he associated with Taraki to protect his own position. Amin had attracted many enemies during his career, the most notable being Karmal. According to the official version of events, Taraki protected Amin from party members or others who wanted to damage the PDPA and the country.[28]

When Mohammad Daoud Khan ousted the monarchy in 1973, and established the Republic of Afghanistan, the Khalqist PDPA offered its support for the new regime if it established a National Front which presumably included the Khalqist PDPA itself. The Parchamite PDPA had already established an alliance with Daoud at the beginning of his regime, and Karmal called for the dissolution of the Khalqist PDPA. Karmal's call for dissolution only worsened relations between the Khalqist and Parchamite PDPA.[29] Fortunately for Taraki and Amin, Karmal's alliance actually hurt the Parchamites' standing in Afghan politics. Some communists in the armed forces, disillusioned with the government of Daoud, turned to the Khalqist PDPA because of its apparent independence. Parchamite association with the Daoud government indirectly led to the Khalqist-led PDPA coup of 1978, popularly referred to as the Saur Revolution.

From 1973 until the 1978 coup, Amin was responsible for organising party work in the Afghan armed forces.[30] According to the official version, Amin "met patriotic liaison officers day or night, in the desert or the mountains, in the fields or the forests, enlightening them on the basis of the principles of the working class ideology." Amin's success in recruiting military officers lay in the fact that Daoud "betrayed the left" soon after taking power.[31] When Amin began recruiting military officers for the PDPA, it was not difficult for him to find disgruntled military officers.

In the meantime, relations between the Parchamite and Khalqist PDPA deteriorated, In 1973 it was rumoured that Major Zia Mohammadzai, a Parchamite and head of the Republican Guard, planned to assassinate the entire Khalqist leadership. The alleged plot failed because the Khalqists found out about it.[32] The assassination attempt proved to be a further blow to relations between the Parchamites and Khalqists. The Parchamites deny that they ever planned to assassinate the Khalqist leadership, but historian Beverley Male argues that Karmal's subsequent activities give credence to the Khalqist view of events. Because of the Parchamite assassination attempt, Amin pressed the Khalqist PDPA to seize power in 1976 by ousting Daoud.[32] The majority of the PDPA leadership voted against such a move.[33] The following year, in 1977, the Parchamites and Khalqists officially reconciled. The Parchamite and Khalqist PDPAs, which had separate general secretaries, politburos, central committees and other organisational structures, were officially unified in the summer of 1977.[34] One reason for unification was that the international communist movement, represented by the Communist Party of India, Iraqi Communist Party and the Communist Party of Australia, called for party unification.[35]

Saur Revolution

On 18 April 1978 Mir Akbar Khyber, the chief ideologue of the Parcham faction, was killed, presumably by the Daoud government. Khyber's assassination initiated a chain of events which led to the PDPA taking power eleven days later, on 27 April.[36] The assassin was never caught, but Anahita Ratebzad, a Parchamite, believed that Amin had ordered the assassination.[32]

Khyber's funeral evolved into a large anti-government demonstration. Daoud, who did not understand the significance of the events, began a mass arrest of PDPA members seven days after Khyber's funeral. Amin, who organised the subsequent revolution against Daoud, was one of the last Central Committee members to be arrested by the authorities. His late arrest can be considered as proof of the regime's lack of information since Amin was the leading revolutionary party organiser. The government's lack of awareness was proven by the arrest of Taraki as it was the pre-arranged signal for the revolution to commence.[36] When Amin found out that Taraki had been arrested, he ordered the revolution to begin at 9 am on 27 April. Amin, in contrast to Taraki, was not imprisoned, but instead put under house arrest. His son, Abdur Rahman, was still allowed freedom of movement. The revolution was successful thanks to overwhelming support from the Afghan military, including the Defence Minister, Ghulam Haidar Rasuli; the commander of the Afghan Army, Aslam Watanjar; and the Chief of Staff of the Afghan Air Force, Abdul Qadir.[37] Daoud, his family, and high ranking loyalists were executed.

PDPA rule

Khalq–Parcham break

After the Saur revolution, Taraki was appointed Chairman of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and retained his post as PDPA general secretary. Taraki initially formed a government which consisted of both Khalqists and Parchamites.[38] Karmal became Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Council,[39] while Amin became Minister of Foreign Affairs[38] and a Deputy Prime Minister,[40] and Mohammad Aslam Watanjar became a Deputy Prime Minister. The two Parchamites Abdul Qadir and Mohammad Rafi became Minister of National Defence and Minister of Public Works respectively.[41] According to Angel Rasanayagam, the appointment of Amin, Karmal and Watanjar as Deputy Prime Ministers led to the establishment of three cabinets; the Khalqists were answerable to Amin, the Parchamites were answerable to Karmal, and the military officers (who were Parchamites) were answerable to Watanjar.[42]

The first conflict between the Khalqists and Parchamites arose when the Khalqists wanted to give PDPA Central Committee membership to the military officers who participated in the Saur Revolution. Amin, who had previously opposed the appointment of military officers to the PDPA leadership, switched sides, supporting their elevation. The PDPA Politburo voted in favor of giving membership to the military officers. The victorious Khalqists portrayed the Parchamites as opportunists who had ridden the revolutionary wave without actually participating in the revolution. To make matters worse for the Parchamites, the term Parcham was, according to Taraki, a word synonymous with factionalism.[43]

On 27 June 1978, three months after the revolution, Amin managed to outmaneuver the Parchamites at a Central Committee meeting.[45] The meeting decided that the Khalqists had exclusive rights to formulate and decide policy, a policy which left the Parchamites impotent. Karmal was exiled, but was able to establish a network with the remaining Parchamites in government. A coup to overthrow Amin was planned for September. Its leading members in Afghanistan were Qadir, the defence minister, and Army Chief of Staff General Shahpur Ahmedzai. The coup was planned for 4 September, the day of the festival of Eid, because soldiers and officers would be off duty. The conspiracy failed when the Afghan ambassador to India told the Afghan leadership about the plan. A purge was initiated, and Parchamite ambassadors were recalled; few returned, for example Karmal and Mohammad Najibullah both preferred to stay in their assigned countries.[46]