The war against Japan continued for the duration of the caretaker ministry.^[37] Even before the defeat of Germany, Churchill had told the Americans that he wanted the Royal Navy to play a prominent role in the defeat of Japan and the liberation of Britain's Asian colonies, especially Singapore. The Americans were unenthusiastic, suspecting that Churchill's intentions were primarily imperialist. Neither Franklin Roosevelt nor Harry Truman had any intention of helping to sustain the British Empire.^[38] In their successful campaigns of 1944 and the early months of 1945, the British Army and its allies had mostly cleared Burma of Japanese forces by May 1945. Rangoon had fallen to the Allies on 2 May following the Battle of Elephant Point.^[38]

The Battle of Okinawa (1 April until 22 June) raged throughout the time period of this government, with the fierce Japanese resistance boding ill for the Allied invasion of Japan scheduled for the end of 1945, and in which the British hoped to play a role.^[39] The Pacific War would end sooner than expected after the atomic attack on Hiroshima (6 August), the Soviet invasion of Manchuria (8 August) as agreed with the western Allies at the Yalta Conference, and the atomic attack on Nagasaki (9 August).^[40] Japan surrendered on 15 August, three weeks after Churchill's resignation.^[41] While Churchill had hoped for a triumphant re-entry to Singapore,^[38] its recovery was logistically difficult and it would remain under Japanese control until 12 September when it was finally recovered, following the Japanese surrender, by British forces in Operation Tiderace.^[42]

Trieste and Istria was the main ongoing problem as the European war ended. On 15 May Churchill, with President Truman’s approval, had telegraphed Stalin stating that Tito’s Yugoslav Partisans must not be allowed to occupy the whole of Istria, whose future must not be decided by military conquest. Churchill also telegraphed Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean, that day that he was concerned at Alexander’s recent worries about the low morale of his forces, including US troops. He had told Alexander that he had obtained a “magnificent” message of support from Truman on 12 May and that Trieste and Istria would be a flashpoint for the western Allies standing up to Soviet-backed incursion. Alexander had replied, the same day, that his troops would obey orders but without the same enthusiasm with which they had fought “the hated Germans”. Churchill had forwarded the message on to Eden, who was then in San Francisco negotiating the foundation of the United Nations, commenting that in Greece British troops had “soon warm[ed] up” when sent into action in similar circumstances (he was referring to the Dekemvriana in December 1944 when British troops had prevented ELAS guerrillas from seizing Athens, so as to ensure the setting-up of a pro-British monarchist regime in Greece).^[43]

On 11 June Tito agreed to remain behind the line laid down by Field Marshal Alexander and to vacate the port of Pola at the tip of Istria; also on the same day the French agreed after strong British pressure to withdraw from North West Italy, which they appeared to have been contemplating annexing.^[f][44]

The Istria issue would eventually be resolved at the peace treaty in 1947 which also set up the short-lived Free Territory of Trieste.

President Truman, after initially being tough with the Soviets over Trieste and having a terse meeting with Molotov, had reverted to Roosevelt’s policy of keeping a certain distance from Britain and maintaining relations with the Soviets, sending Harry Hopkins on a mission to Moscow and Joseph E. Davies to London.^[45] Hopkins had six conversations with Stalin between 26 May and 6 June. He said that the US wanted a Poland “friendly” to, but not completely controlled by, the USSR. Apparent progress was made regarding involvement of non Lublin Poles in the pro-Soviet Polish Government (the "Lublin Poles") and the issue of how Security Council vetoes should work at the new United Nations.^[46] Stalin favoured a Three Power (UK-US-USSR) peace conference (which would become the Potsdam Conference).^[46] Stalin made the offer to Churchill on 27 May and Churchill accepted two days later.^[47] Stalin told Hopkins (31 May) that “Churchill had misled the Americans” and wanted Britain to “control” Poland.^[46]

On 26 May Churchill met Davies after dinner and they talked until 3.45am.^[48] To Churchill’s dismay Davies, who was pro Soviet, suggested that there should be a prior Truman-Stalin summit meeting before Britain was invited to join the talks. Historian John Charmley describes these as the “most unsettling” talks Churchill ever had with an American. According to Davies own account Churchill launched a fierce attack on the Soviets, and Tito and de Gaulle for their ingratitude. Davies also claimed that Churchill was opposed to the policy of Unconditional Surrender and would have preferred to have allowed Germany to make a negotiated peace. Davies claimed to have told Churchill that his compromise peace stance was similar to the proposals with which Hitler and Joseph Goebbels had sought to split the Allies. Truman did not want to leave US troops in Europe.^[49]

Churchill met Davies again before lunch on 27 May.^[48] According to Churchill's account in his war memoirs he strongly rejected any idea that any disagreements were solely between Britain and Russia. Asked on 28 May whether Davies should be allowed to see "Bevin & Co" Churchill ordered: “certainly not, repeat not (both italics in original), nor anyone else”.^[48] In a note of the conversation written for Eden on 28 May Churchill stated that there was “no equality between right and wrong” and that he could not “readily bring himself to accept the idea” of US equidistance between Britain and the USSR. Davies was worried about Churchill’s state of mind, especially about Poland which Churchill regarded as a “matter of honour” because she had been the reason for Britain going to war in 1939. Charmley regards Churchill's position as typical of his lack of realism about Anglo-American friendship.^[50]

In his war memoirs Churchill reproduced his draft note of the Davies talks which he claimed to have sent to Truman, but in fact he did not do so.^[g][51] On 29 May Churchill accepted Stalin’s offer of Three Power talks. On the same day he urged the British chiefs of staff not to be too hasty in demobilising.^[47] Also on 29 May Churchill sent a telegram to Truman opposing the proposed prior US-Soviet bilateral, stating that he would have preferred London for Stalin's proposed Three Power Summit but accepting Potsdam as a location. In a second telegram (31 May) he claimed to have had “agreeable talks” with Davies. This was a white lie as he disliked Davies; he told others that “after his talk with Davies he needed a bath to get rid of the ooze and the slime”.(R. H. Bruce Lockhart Diary 3 June).^[51]

On 4 June Churchill telegraphed Truman objecting to US troops withdrawing, before a final peace settlement had been agreed, from Czechoslovakia and from the River Elbe (which, for operational clarity, had been the agreed boundary between western troops and the Red Army during the collapse of Germany) and out of the Soviet Zone (which would eventually form postwar East Germany).^[52] US troop withdrawals from eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia began on 20 June.^[53]

On 31 May, Churchill and Eden intervened in the so-called Levant Crisis which had been initiated by French General Charles de Gaulle. Acting as head of the French Provisional Government, de Gaulle had ordered French forces to establish an air base in Syria and a naval base in Lebanon. The action provoked a nationalist outbreak in both countries and France responded with an armed retaliation, leading to many civilian deaths.^[54] French shelling on 29-30 May killed 400 civilians.^[55]

With the situation escalating out of control, Churchill gave de Gaulle an ultimatum to desist (31 May). This was ignored and on 1 June British forces from neighbouring Transjordan were mobilised to restore order. The French, heavily outnumbered, had no option but to return to their bases. A diplomatic row broke out and Churchill reportedly told a colleague that de Gaulle was "a great danger to peace and for Great Britain".^[54]

On 5 June Churchill had to answer a Private Members Question in the House of Commons on Syria.^[55]

The Conservative Party withered during the war and Churchill’s speeches to the Party Conference in 1941 and 1942 had been lacklustre.^[56]

By early 1943 (after the Second Battle of El Alamein, the Torch landings, the Casablanca Conference and the Battle of Stalingrad) the Allies were clearly winning the war and public opinion began to shift towards an interest in post war planning, especially after the publication of the Beveridge Report in November 1942. Churchill thought Beveridge “an awful windbag and a dreamer” and the Beveridge Report too costly to implement in full. In February 1943 a major House of Commons rebellion by Labour MPs demanded full implementation of the Beveridge Report.^[56]

Churchill gave a broadcast speech on the Government’s Four Years Plan (21 March 1943). The speech floated the possibility that he might remain as Prime Minister after the war, and was a rare example of him speaking about post war plans. Churchill, still preoccupied with war matters, dictated the draft during a car journey. His secretary’s notes were illegible so she reconstructed the speech by consulting his adviser Lord Cherwell and his police bodyguard Commander Thompson, Churchill complained that the speech was not what he had dictated but “at least the words made sense”. The speech went through another three weeks of drafting, which included contributions by the economist Lord Keynes. The War Cabinet approved the speech in advance and Herbert Morrison obtained a commitment to legislative planning before the end of the war and stating that there was room for greater state ownership, especially of monopolies.^[h] This was Churchill’s only major speech on postwar planning – to some extent he was avoiding any immediate commitment but it later formed the basis of his 1945 manifesto. The speech claimed that William Beveridge had been a “friend” since, as President of the Board of Trade (1908-10), Churchill had enlisted his help in setting up Labour Exchanges. In discussing the plans to provide free milk for the under-fives, it contained the memorable line that “there is no finer investment for any community than putting milk into babies”.^[57]

Opinion polling started in June 1943 and showed Labour in a consistent lead, which they would maintain until 1945.^[58] As early as August 1943 Mass Observation surveys found that although Churchill was widely respected, around a third of people thought he would be a poor peace leader.^[59]

People disliked and were suspicious of the Conservative Party, whose "National" coalition was perceived as having presided over poverty and mass unemployment in the 1930s, and to have appeased German and Italian aggression. In the runup to and during the election Labour ran a very effective campaign which focused on the peacetime issues foremost in the minds of the voters and which Labour were trusted to resolve: full employment, improved housing and the provision of free medical services.^[60] Robert Blake wrote that, by contrast, the Tory message, which made similar promises, “did not lack content, but it lacked credibility”.^[61] Churchill’s 1945 manifesto, Mr. Churchill's Declaration to the Voters, did not specifically endorse any party.^[24] It began by stating that he had formed "a new National Government".^[i][62] Churchill was very keen to distance himself from the unpopular Conservative Party and to appeal to Liberal voters. However, his attempt to do so in his "Gestapo" Speech, by stressing Labour’s supposed threat to civil liberties, would backfire badly. His use of the “National” title also backfired as Labour had always treated the name as a fraud in the 1930s and it was particularly discredited after the war coalition had been formed in 1940.^[63]

Churchill mishandled the election campaign by his partisan attacks on the Labour Party.^[64] He committed a serious political gaffe in a broadcast on 4 June by saying in a radio broadcast that a Labour government would require "some form of Gestapo" to enforce its agenda:^[65][60][66] Churchill's ill-judged phrase may, in the view of Richard Toye, have been inspired by an old speech which he had given on 14 April 1905. Churchill, who had then recently defected from the Conservatives to the Liberals, had accused his old party of wanting to bring in US-style tariffs, a German military system (the Balfour Government had been reforming the Army, whereas the Liberals were initially committed to military retrenchment) and an Aliens Act enforced by a Tsarist-style Okhrana.^[67]

"The Times" reported Churchill’s message in the speech as “VOTE NATIONAL – NOT PARTY”.^[24] Churchill spoke at length about how he and his government were “Conservative and National” (he stood under that label in his own seat at Woodford). He was particularly critical of the Liberals, his own former party, for not joining his government. His criticism of Labour and the Liberals’ refusal to serve in his new government was a deliberate echo of Stanley Baldwin’s claim during the 1931 General Election that the Labour ministers had run away from their responsibilities rather than join the National Government, while his criticism of Labour's plans to nationalise the Bank of England (which in the event would prove relatively uncontroversial) were an attempt to repeat the 1931 scare that Labour would nationalise or even confiscate people's Post Office Savings.^[68]

However, in a passage which became notorious, he declared:

No Socialist Government conducting the entire life and industry of the country could afford to allow free, sharp, or violently-worded expressions of public discontent. They would have to fall back on some form of Gestapo, no doubt very humanely directed in the first instance.

Gilbert describes the speech's references to socialism as "hostile and injudicious", and it backfired badly.^[52] Labour reacted to the broadcast with ridicule rather than outrage. Herbert Morrison called it “Churchill’s Crazy Broadcast” (article in 5 June Daily Herald).^[69] Attlee made political capital by saying in his reply broadcast on 5 June: "The voice we heard last night was that of Mr Churchill, but the mind was that of Lord Beaverbrook". Roy Jenkins says this broadcast was "the making of Attlee".^[70] Attlee claimed that the speech had been inspired by The Road to Serfdom which he dismissed as “theoretical stuff” by “an Austrian professor Friedrich August von Hayek” (subtly stressing his foreign origins).^[71] Attlee observed that left-wing governments had been elected in Scandinavia, Australia and New Zealand without causing tyranny. His contrast of Churchill the great war leader with Churchill the partisan party leader was a deliberate rebuttal of Churchill’s attempt to wrap himself in the “National” label, and after the election was the subject of a famous cartoon by Low.^[j][71]

Richard Toye wrote in 2010 that the Gestapo speech had retained all of the notoriety it gained at the time of delivery.^[73] Labour’s rhetoric was often just as extreme - the Labour Party Speaker’s Handbook actively encouraged speakers to link the Tories to fascism and appeasement.^[74] However, Churchill’s gaffe made it hard for the Conservatives to take the moral high ground or to reply in kind. A Leeds shopkeeper told Mass Observation that Churchill’s speech was like listening to the soapbox oratory of forty years previously.^[75] A national leader was expected to behave differently from a party leader during an election and Churchill failed to strike the right balance, causing him to lose credibility.^[76]

Many of Churchill's colleagues and supporters were appalled by the speech, including Leo Amery who praised Attlee's "adroit reply to Winston's rhodomontade".^[73] Harold Macmillan tactfully wrote to Churchill (8 June) calling the anti-Labour message “splendid” but urging him to direct his subsequent broadcasts to “the floating (and non-party) vote”.^[77] The Gestapo speech was well liked in the USA but caused anger in Australia and New Zealand.^[78]

The Liberal Lord Samuel (9 June), apparently echoing the previous comments by Labour’s Herbert Morrison, claimed that the Conservatives, like the Nazis and Italian Fascists, were claiming the right to rule in perpetuity. AV Alexander (12 June) mentioned that housewives in the 1930s had been tormented by “the Gestapo of the Means Test”.^[79]

Although the Gestapo speech created a negative response, Churchill personally retained a very high approval rating in opinion polls and was still expected to win the election.^[60] Although the Conservative Party was unpopular, many electors appear to have wanted Churchill to continue as prime minister whatever the outcome, or to have wrongly believed this would be possible.^[80]

Churchill's second broadcast (13 June) briefly mentioned the Government's Four Year Plan, and Churchill mentioned that he was the “oldest living champion of National Insurance” in the House of Commons and mentioned his “friend” David Lloyd George who had died a few months earlier.^[77] Churchill had stressed to his colleagues that a Conservative government must be constructive, and he announced his commitment to addressing the housing shortage broadcast in the 13 June broadcast but, as with the Gestapo speech on 4 June, he ruined the effect by again insisting that Labour would deploy some form of "political police" to control the nation.^[81][77]

Stafford Cripps, speaking in Glasgow (16 June), criticised the Cult of Personality of Churchill’s campaign: he drew attention to Churchill’s failure to mention the word “Conservative” in his manifesto and stated that he had seen a candidate in Cumberland describe himself as a “Churchill candidate”. Philip Noel-Baker argued in an official Labour broadcast (17 June) that the Tories had aided Germany by allowing her to rearm with the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement.^[79]

Churchill's third broadcast (21 June) discussed the issue of Harold Laski, who had claimed, to Attlee's irritation, that as chairman of the Labour party organisation he could dictate to an elected Labour Government.^[77] Some Conservative candidates talked of “Gauleiter Laski”.^[82] Churchill's fourth broadcast (30 June) expressed his relief that this “strange, unnatural election”, which had set recent colleagues against one another, was “now, to everybody’s relief, drawing to its close”.^[77] He was still referring to his government as “the National Government” in the draft of that broadcast.^[83] When he addressed an audience in the Labour stronghold of Walthamstow on the evening of 3 July, he was almost forced to abandon the event because of booing and heckling.^[34]

Many commentators felt that Churchill's election speeches lacked "vim" and there is a view that he was much more interested in what was happening in eastern Europe, his primary concern at Yalta and Potsdam, than in Great Britain.^[84] Vita Sackville-West wrote to her husband Harold Nicolson (22 June) that, as an admirer of Churchill, she was “dreadfully distressed by the badness” of his speeches which were “confused, woolly, unconstructive and so wordy” that they would put off “wobbler” voters.^[85] Churchill’s doctor Lord Moran later claimed in his controversial memoirs that Churchill had told him in the middle of the campaign that “I am worried about this damned election. I have no message for them”.^[86]

Polling day was on 5 July, with the count delayed, as agreed, for three weeks for collection of the overseas service votes.^[18]