Neoauthoritarianism was a political current in 1980's-1990's China that advocated a powerful state to facilitate market reform, and with it ultimately political reform,^[1] stirring hot debate in the late 1980's.^[2] A central figure is Wu Jiaxiang, a June 4th democrat and advisor to Premier Zhao Ziyang,^[3] the latter being a major architect of the Deng Xiaoping reforms.^[4] Wu apparently restated some ideas of Marxist scholar Rong Jian and through him Samuel Huntington. A rejection of the prevalent, more optimistic modernization theories,^[5] Samuel had advised the post-communist east European elite take a gradualist approach to market economics and multiparty reform, hence "new authoritarianism." Nonetheless offering faster reform than market socialism, policy makers close to Zhao would be taken by the idea.^[6] In early March 1989 Zhao presented Wu's idea of "Neo-authoritarianism" as a foreign idea in the development of a backward country, to Deng Xiaoping, who compared it to his own ideology.^[7] However, Deng seemingly moderated it in favor of continued state control over the economy.^[8] Neoauthoritarianism, and Zhao Ziyang with it, lost their influence after the June 4th incident in favour of continued market socialism, though elements persisted.

Li Cheng and Lynn T. White regard the neoauthoritarians as resonating with technocracy, emerging in the 1980's as a result of "dramatic" policy shifts in 1978 that promoted such to top posts, while Canadian Sociologist Yuezhi Zhao considers them as having attempted to avoid an economic reform crisis through dictatorship.^[9] However, despite criticism in favour of multiparty reform, the Chinese themselves seem to regard the current as reformative in intention, and it attracted many supporters among the intelligentsia during the June 4th incident.^[10]

Samuel Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies rejected economic development or modernization as transferrable to the political sphere as a mere variable of the former. He preconditioned democracy on institutionalization and stability, with democracy and economic change undermining or putting strain on political stability in poor circumstances. He considered the measure of a political system to be its ability to keep order. Writing in the 1960s, he lauded the U.S. and Soviet Union equally. What the Soviet Union lacked in social justice it made up for in strong controls.^[11]

By the late 1980s many elements of Maoism had been abandoned in China and a complete transition to capitalism seemed possible to many given past performance. Though needing restating by Wu Jiaxiang to receive attention, Marxist scholar Rong Jian proposed a "neoauthoritarianism" requiring a strong state and reform-minded elite, or "benevolent dictatorship", to facilitate market reform and with it democracy. Chinese theory does not generally advocate repression, and despite its dictatorial program neoauthoritarianism seems to be viewed, even by its more-progressive opponents among the Chinese, to have democracy as a long-term goal, through building markets – with which democracy is ultimately co-dependent (and may have been rejected as too radical partly for this reason). It is differentiated from both Maoism and Huntington by holding economic change to be a condition for political change, while late Maoism considered either as being able to facilitate the other. The idea that superstructural development was necessary to facilitate economic growth seemed vain to Chinese leadership given the explosion of the market, giving credence to the idea.^[12]

Wu Jiaxiang considered the market an inseparable condition for democracy. The market reduces the number of public decisions, and therefore the number of people seeking political rights and the "cost" of political action. The separation of the political and economic spheres lays a foundation for a further separation of powers, thereby negating autocracy, despite the centralizing tendency of the state. The market also defines interests, increasing "responsibility" and thereby decreasing the possibility of bribery in preparation for democratic politics. On the other hand, political actions become excessive without a market, or with a mixed market, because a large number of people will seek political posts, raising the "cost" of political action and making effective consultation difficult. To avoid this problem, a country without a developed market has to maintain strongman politics and a high degree of centralism.^[13]

With "neoauthoritarianism" emerging to scholarly debate, Rong Jian opposed his old idea as regressive, favoring the multiparty faction, and would become famous for a news article on the matter.^[14] Henry He considers the main criticism of neoauthoritarianism to be it's advocacy of an "old" type of establishment, relying on charistmatic leaders. His view is corroborated by Yan Yining and Li Wei, with the addition that for Yan what is needed is law, or Li democracy, administrative efficiency and scientific government. Li points out that previous crisis in the PRC were not due to popular participation, but power struggles and corruption, and that an authoritarian state does not usually separate powers.^[15] A criticism by Zhou Wenzhang is that neo-authoritarianism only considers problems of authority from the angle of centralization, also considering the main problem of authority to be whether or not it is exercised scientifically.^[16]

"Neoauthoritarianism" lost favor after the June 4th incident. Henry He considers that, while June 4th halted the movement for democracy, because neoauthoritarianism avoids the issue of popular involvement, it would therefore be a downfall for it and Zhao Ziyang as well. He considers it to have transformed into a kind of "neo-conservatism" after that.^[17] With the failure of democracy in Russia and the performance of Singapore, it would seem to continue to infiltrate the upper echelons of the Communist party. Most associated with Shanghai intellectuals, Wang Huning, a leading advocate in the 1980's, would go on to become a close advisor to Jiang Zemin in the 1990's. The Neo-conservatives would enjoy Jiang's patronage.^[18]

Still considering Democracy a long term goal, the events of June 4th confirmed their belief in a strong state, considering China's autocratic model to actually be weak and ineffectual. They also consider a strong state important in economic growth along the lines of Asian "tiger" economies, and continued to draw ideas from Samuel Huntington, particularly his book Political Order in Changing Societies. Whatever his use as a foreigner who advocated limiting the scope of democracy, his ideas seemed to have merit on their own.^[19]

Though China's Lenininstic, or NEP type model had been abandoned by 1980, there wasn't initially any attempt at privatization. Dictating that nothing short of market socialism ought to command industry, the neoauthoritarian programme for rapid industrialization lead to privatization in the countryside and the encouraging of commerce, but decollectivization was very slow. The agricultural system remained largely unchanged following the program for family farming that had been begun in the 1970's, which was finished by late 1983.

Though the market performed very well, privatization, even while maintaining a mixed economy, would require a massive programme, and given the problems in Eastern Europe it would appear that the CCP took a more realistic route than Neoauthoritarianism suggested. Despite Jiang Zemin's rapprochement with Dengist reformism, reception of free-trade remained shallow, with a higher level of state ownership than any of the other East-Asian economies. With price liberalization appearing much more feasible, the CCP took on a massive program in 1996, but the ideological vision followed for the 1990's continued to be market socialism, of a sort advocated by the conservative Chen Yun and which might be compared to John Roemer. Market Socialism was seen as doing away with the informational problems of the planned economy while possibly avoiding the inequalities of share ownership.^[20]

Meanwhile the old Leninist or NEP model had continued to attract "Old Left" intellectuals. The 1990's also saw the emergence of the "New" Left of Wang Shaoguang and Cui Zhiyuan against market socialism, with Wang providing powerful arguments against decentralization and inequality, and Cui for workplace democracy based on Mao's Angang Constitution. On the other hand the nationalistic He Xin portrayed the attempts by the World Bank to impose neoliberalism as cultural imperialism if not suicide, gaining him many allies.^[21] More generally Chinese leadership saw parliamentarism, independent judiciary and a free media as key components to private property if China was to develop a market, decreasing it's appeal.^[22]