Bab-el-Mandeb

"Gate of Grief" redirects here. For the album by White Ring, see Gate of Grief (album).
Bab-el-Mandeb
Bab-el-Mandeb as seen from space
locator map of the strait
LocationBetween Northeast Africa and West Asia
Coordinates12°35′N 43°20′E / 12.583°N 43.333°E / 12.583; 43.333
Basin countriesDjibouti, Eritrea and Yemen
Max. length31 mi (50 km)
Min. width16 mi (26 km)
Average depth609 ft (186 m)
IslandsSeven Brothers, Doumeira, Perim
Map
Interactive map of Bab-el-Mandeb

The Bab-el-Mandeb (Arabic: باب المندب, lit. 'Gate of Grief/Tears'[1]) is a strait between Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula and Djibouti and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa, connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and by extension the Indian Ocean.

Etymology

Satellite photo of Bab-el-Mandeb (with labels)

In Bab-el-Mandeb, Bab means "gate" while Mandeb means "lamentation" or "grief". The strait derives its name from the dangers attending its navigation or, according to an Arab legend, from the numbers who were drowned by an earthquake that separated the Arabian Peninsula from the Horn of Africa.[2]

History

Flows of petroleum products and liquefied natural gas through the strait, 2014–2018

Paleo-environmental and tectonic events in the Miocene epoch created the Danakil Isthmus, a land bridge forming a broad connection between Yemen and Ethiopia.[3] During the last 100,000 years, eustatic sea level fluctuations have led to alternate opening and closing of the straits.[4] According to the recent single origin hypothesis, the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb were probably witness to the earliest migrations of modern humans. It is presumed that the oceans were then much lower and the straits were much shallower or dry, which allowed a series of emigrations along the southern coast of Asia.

In Arab tradition it is reported that in ancient times Asia and Africa were joined together, until they were split at the Bab-el-Mandeb. Yaqut al-Hamawi associates the name Bab-el-Mandeb with the 6th century crossing of the Aksumites over the sea to Yemen. Two Sabaean inscriptions of the early 6th century mention silsilat al-Mandab in connection with the conflict between Dhu Nuwas and the Aksumites.[5]

The British East India Company unilaterally seized the island of Perim in 1799 on behalf of its Indian empire. The government of Britain asserted its ownership in 1857 and erected a lighthouse there in 1861, using it to command the Red Sea and the trade routes through the Suez Canal.[2] It was used as a coaling station to refuel steamships until 1935 when the reduced use of coal as fuel rendered the operation unprofitable.[6]

The British presence continued until 1967 when the island became part of the People's Republic of South Yemen. Before the handover, the British government had put forward before the United Nations a proposal for the island to be internationalized[7][8] as a way to ensure the continued security of passage and navigation in the Bab-el-Mandeb, but this was refused.

In 2008 a company owned by Tarek bin Laden unveiled plans to build a bridge named Bridge of the Horns across the strait, linking Yemen with Djibouti.[9] Middle East Development LLC issued a notice to construct a bridge passing across the Red Sea that would be the longest suspended passing in the world.[10] The project was assigned to two Danish companies: engineering company COWI in collaboration with architect studio Dissing+Weitling. However, the announced delay to Phase 1 in 2010 and the lack of any further updates since makes this a defunct project.

Significance in the maritime trade route

The Bab-el-Mandeb acts as a strategic link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Most exports of petroleum and natural gas from the Persian Gulf that transit the Suez Canal or the SUMED Pipeline pass through both the Bab el-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz.[11] While the narrow width of the strait requires vessels to travel through the territorial sea of adjacent states, under the purview of Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the legal concept of transit passage applies to Bab el-Mandeb, although Eritrea (unlike the rest of coastal countries) is not a party to the convention.[12]

Chokepoints are narrow channels along widely used global sea routes that are critical to global energy security. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is 26 kilometres (14 nautical miles) wide at its narrowest point, limiting tanker traffic to two 2-mile-wide channels for inbound and outbound shipments.[11][2]

Closure of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait could keep tankers originating in the Persian Gulf from transiting the Suez Canal or reaching the SUMED Pipeline, forcing them to divert around the southern tip of Africa, which would increase transit time and shipping costs.

In 2006, an estimated 3.3 million barrels (520,000 m3) of oil passed through the strait per day, out of a world total of about 43 million barrels per day (6,800,000 m3/d) moved by tankers.[13] This rose by 2014 to 5.1 million barrels per day (b/d) of crude oil, condensate and refined petroleum products headed toward Europe, the United States, and Asia, then an estimated 6.2 million b/d by 2018. Total petroleum flows through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait accounted for about 9% of total seaborne-traded petroleum (crude oil and refined petroleum products) in 2017. About 3.6 million b/d moved north toward Europe; another 2.6 million b/d flowed in the opposite direction mainly to Asian markets such as Singapore, China, and India.[11]

Significance for (maritime) security and geopolitics

The Bab-el-Mandeb is widely regarded to play a key role in international, regional and maritime security in the Middle East, East Africa, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden[14]. The strait is only 26 kilometres wide at its narrowest point and is considered a choke point, which makes the Bab-el-Mandeb not only of economic interest, but also of military strategic interest[15][16]. The Bab-el-Mandeb is also an important corridor for geostrategic cables underneath the narrow strait passage at the Bab-el-Mandeb, including power cables and fibre-optic cables used for communication, which in turn makes them used by intelligence services for surveillance[17]. Although the Bab-el-Mandeb, legally, is an international strait and a transit passage, its strategic position has made command of the sea over the strait key to military influence in the region[16]. The Bab-el-Mandeb is often discussed alongside other major maritime chokepoints, such as Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz, due to their shared importance for (maritime) security in the region [18][19][20][21].

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 made the Bab-el-Mandeb a strategic choke point. Since then, the strait has been subject to claims of control both via land-based positions and naval presence. This has been evident between present-day Yemen and the island of Perim on the side of the Arabian Peninsula and Djibouti, Eritrea and the Seven Brothers Islands at the Horn of Africa site, and from sea the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea[14][22].

On the site of the Arabian Peninsula the British Empire was present in Yemen and at Perim from 1799 until 1967, where the island came under control of People's Democratic Republic of Yemen after its independence from the Aden Protectorate. In the following period from 1967 until 1986 there was a strong Soviet presence at Perim and by the Bab-el-Mandeb. This presence, however, slowly faded out until, the end of the Cold War after which the USSR withdrew their forces[14][23]. Today the Yemeni civil war (2014–present) influences the security of the Yemen site, however, the Iran-backed Houthis and the Yemeni National forces are the key land-based security actors around the Bab-el-Mandeb [24][25], with regional powers as among others Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates trying to influence the conflict [26][27].

On the Eastern African site of the strait in present-day Djibouti the French colonial empire was present at the Bab-el-Mandeb 1862-1967 as French Somaliland and later from 1967-1977 as French Territory of the Afars and the Issas, at which point Djibouti voted for its own independence. Other countries were also present in colonies such as British Somaliland, Italian Eritrea among others [28][29].Since 1977 France has committed to the independence and territorial integrity of Djibouti[30], renewed in 2014 [31] and again in 2024 [32]. Today, however, not only France is at place on the eastern site of the Bab-el-Mandab. Djibouti has increasingly become a site for military influence for an increasing number of great powers [33]. Although French forces are still present, the United States overtook Camp Lemonnier from France in 2002[34], China too has strategically placed People's Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti in Djibouti, Japan has Japan Self-Defense Force Base Djibouti, Italy has Italian Military Support Base in Djibouti[35]. Meanwhile Saudi Arabia has established a logistics hub and is in discussions with Djibouti about a military base [36]. Russia meanwhile has established its military relations with Eritrea [37]

From sea, claims of control of the Bab-el-Mandeb have been made from the United States since the end of World War II through US-led naval operations in the area from the United States Naval Forces Central Command in Bahrain[38]. In 2002 the formal naval partnership Combined Maritime Forces was established. The force conducts maritime control missions in the area and is supported by contributions from 46 countries[39][40]. This includes latest the Combined Task Force 153 in April 2022 to ensure maritime security for the Bab-el-Mandab, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Measures also include efforts all to ensure safe transit passage through the strait[41].

See main article: Red Sea crisis

Following the 19th of October after the invasion of the Gaza Strip by the IDF the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen attacked Israel, American and British tankers in the Red Sea, and commercial ships[42][43]. A conflict which continued until a ceasefire was brokered in late 2025[44]. The asymmetric warfare of the Houthis using anti-access/area denial shows how the Houthis were able to effectively change the security situation in the Red Sea by using the chokepoint of the Bab-el-Mandeb and the national waters of Yemen as a strategic advantage. The Houthis have been backed by Iran in the broader Axis of Resistance[45] and the CRINK-alliance have allegedly, supported the Houthis with among other things weapons, dual-use weapons and geospatial intelligence[46]. Equally, there have been references to tracked navy ships in the area from Russia[47].

Following the Red Sea Crisis a number of new operations were initiated, including the EU-led Operation Aspides [48] and Operation Prosperity Guardian under the Combined Maritime Forces, all to ensure safe passage through the Bab-el-Mandeb[49]. Besides the above mentioned measures, previous measures have included the Djibouti Code of Conduct to ensure safe passage against pirates[50].

Geography

Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb with Perim Island in the distance

The distance across is about 26 kilometres (14 nmi) from Ras Menheli in Yemen to Ras Siyyan in Djibouti. The island of Perim divides the strait into two channels, of which the eastern, known as the Bab Iskender (Alexander's Strait), is 5.37 kilometres (2.90 nmi) wide and has a depth of 29 metres; 96 feet (16 fathoms) deep, while the western, or Dact-el-Mayun, has a width of 20.3 kilometres (11.0 nmi) and a depth of 310 metres; 1,020 feet (170 fathoms). Near the coast of Djibouti lies a group of smaller islands known as the "Seven Brothers". There is a surface current inwards in the eastern channel, but a strong undercurrent outwards in the western channel.[2]

Demographics

Country Area
(km2) 		Population
(2016 est.) 		Population density
(per km2) 		Capital GDP (PPP) $M USD GDP per capita (PPP) $ USD
Yemen Yemen 527,829 27,392,779 51.9 Sanaa $58,202 $2,249
Eritrea Eritrea 117,600 6,380,803 54.3 Asmara $9.121 $1,314
Djibouti Djibouti 23,200 846,687 36.5 Djibouti City $3.327 $3,351
Total 668,629 34,620,269 51.8 / km2 Various $70,650 $1,841
Source:[51]

Population centers

The most significant towns and cities along both the Djiboutian and Yemeni sides of the Bab-el-Mandeb:

Djibouti

Yemen

See also

Strait:

Region:

Rail (tunnel or bridge) transport:

References

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allikas: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bab_al-Mandeb