The Hwasong-10[a] (Korean: 《화성-10》형; Hancha: 火星 10型; lit. Mars Type 10) is a mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile developed by North Korea. Hwasong-10 was first revealed to the international community in a military parade on 10 October 2010 celebrating the Workers' Party of Korea's 65th anniversary, although experts believe these were mock-ups of the missile.[6][3] Hwasong-10 resembles the shape of the Soviet Union's R-27 Zyb submarine-launched missile, but is slightly longer.[3] It is based on the R-27, which uses a 4D10 engine propelled by unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (NTO). These propellants are much more advanced than the kerosene compounds used in North Korea's Scuds and Hwasong-7 (Nodong) missiles.[2]
Since April 2016, the Hwasong-10 has been tested a number of times, with two apparent partial successes and a number of failures. The Hwasong-10 was not shown in the February 2018 military parade, suggesting that the design had not been deployed.[7][8]
Assuming a range of 3,200 km (2,000 mi), the Musudan could hit any target in East Asia (including US military bases in Guam and Okinawa).[9] The North Korean inventory of the missile is less than 50 launchers.[5]
Development
In the mid-1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea invited the Makeyev Design Bureau's ballistic missile designers and engineers to develop this missile, based on the R-27 Zyb. In 1992, a large contract between Korea Yon’gwang Trading Company and Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau of Miass, Russia was signed. The agreement stated that Russian engineers would go to the DPRK and assist in the development of the Zyb Space Launch Vehicle (SLV).[9]
It was decided that, as the Korean People's Army's MAZ-547A/MAZ-7916 Transporter erector launcher could carry 20 tonnes, and the R-27 Zyb was only 14.2 tonnes, the R-27 Zyb's fuel/oxidizer tank could be extended by approximately 2 m (6.6 ft).[3]
The actual rocket design is a liquid fuel rocket, generally believed to use a hypergolic combination of unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) as fuel, and nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) as oxidizer.[3] Once the fuel/oxidizer combination are fed into the missile, it could maintain a 'ready to launch' condition for several days, or even weeks, like the R-27 SLBM, in moderate ambient temperatures. A fueled Hwasong-10 would not have the structural strength to be safely land transported, so would have to be fueled at the launch site.[3]
It was originally believed that the rocket motors of Hwasong-10 were the same as those within the second stage of the Taepodong-2, which North Korea unsuccessfully test fired in 2006.[10] However analysis of the Unha-3 launch, believed to be based on the Taepodong-2, showed that the second stage did not use the same fuel as the R-27, and is probably based on Hwasong-7 (Nodong) rocket technology.[3]
Before its test flight it was believed that there was a possibility that the Hwasong-10 would use the Nodong's kerosene and corrosion inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA) propellants, reducing the missile's range by about half.[3][11]
However it is unlikely that North Korea uses IRFNA propellants which would reduce its range by about half, after the experts acknowledged that the 22 June 2016 test could have had a range of 3,150 km (1,960 mi) if the missile was not launched in the lofted trajectory.[12]
List of Hwasong-10 tests
Attempt | Date | Location | Pre-launch announcement / detection | Outcome | Additional Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 15 April 2016 5:30 am Pyongyang Standard Time (PST) | Wonsan | Reports of the test is imminent surfaced on just a day before.[13] | Failure | Both United States and South Korea "detected and tracked" the missile followed by the confirmation of launch failure. South Korea further claims the missile in this test deviated from a "normal" trajectory.[14]
North Korea kept silent on the test despite the day is the 104th anniversary of the birthday of Kim Il Sung. |
2 | 28 April 2016 6:10 am PST | Northeastern coast | None | Failure | The missile crashed a few seconds after liftoff. North Korea kept silent on the test.[15][16] |
3 | 28 April 2016 6:56 pm PST | Wonsan | None | Failure | According to United States sources, the missiles went an estimated 200 m (660 ft) off the launchpad. North Korea kept silent on the test.[16] |
4 | 31 May 2016 5:20 am PST | Wonsan | None | Failure | Missile exploded on site. North Korea kept silent on the test.[17] |
5 | 22 June 2016 5:58 am PST | | Wonsan | None | Success (North Korea) Failure (South Korea & United States |
Missile crashed at 150 km (93 mi) away from the site. First successful Hwasong-10 missile test that safely launched from the launch site but still exploded in the midway.[18][19] North Korea did not respond until after the 6th launch which hails the twin missile test was a success.
Although initial reports suggested that this test was a failure due to a relative short distance and the missile did explode in mid air, at least one US missile expert suggested otherwise. David Wright, a missile expert and co-director of the Union of Concerned Scientists' Global Security Program suggested that the North could have intentionally terminated its flight early to keep it from flying over Japan after launching it at a normal angle because the distance of flight at 150 km, corresponds roughly to burnout of the Hwasong-10 engines.[20] |
6 | 22 June 2016 5:58 am PST | Wonsan | None | Success (North Korea) Partial success (South Korea and United States) |
South Korea, US and Japan eventually confirmed that the missile reached an apogee of about 1,000 km (620 mi) and landed in Sea of Japan (East Sea of Korea) at about 400 km (250 mi) away from the launch site. South Korea originally skeptical of the test as success because the missile did not reach a minimum of 500 km to be considered as an IRBM.
However, with the subsequent analysis, experts agreed that the about 1,000 km (620 mi) apogee is intended for the missile to fly at a steeper angle than would be ideal that could reach its maximum range of 3,500 km (2,200 mi) or more as a deliberate attempt to avoid Japanese airspace.[21] North Korea have hailed the twin test in 22 Jun 2016 as a 'complete success' in the state-owned media outlet KCNA with mentioning the missile accurately landed in the targeted waters 400 km (250 mi) away after flying to the maximum altitude of 1,413.6 km (878.4 mi) along the planned flight orbit. The missile was officially named as Hwasong-10.[1] Kim Jong Un reiterate that "We have the sure capability to attack in an overall and practical way the Americans in the Pacific operation theatre".[22] |
7 (Alleged) | 15 October 2016 12:03 pm PST | Kusong | None | Failure | Initially, the US military identified these test each as an "intermediate ballistic missile launch failure" from a Hwasong-10 missile, without specifying details.[23][24][25] North Korea kept silent on these reports. Five days later, a second launch took place just hours before the start of the final US Presidential Election 2016 debates.
On 26 October 2016, The Washington Post carried a report from an analysis by Jeffrey Lewis, a nonproliferation expert and director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Lewis suggested there was a 50% chance that North Korea might have actually tested their domestic ICBM (Western intelligence sources named this missile as KN-08), based on evidence taken from satellite imagery that the burn scars were bigger than any other Musudan (Hwasong-10) tests. He concluded that the test on 15 October damaged the launch vehicle without flight, but that the missile on 20 October test could have flown for a short distance before things went wrong. In the same report, Lewis also stated not to place full trust on the U.S. agency StratCom for identifying the missile. He cited that StratCom misidentified the three missiles launched the previous month—it identified them initially as short-range Hwasong-7 (Rodong) missiles, and subsequently as medium-range Hwasong-10 missile; yet they turned out to be extended-range Scud missiles.[26] American astronomer and astrophysicist Jonathan McDowell claimed that Hwasong-12 was used for these failed tests.[27] News of the tests was also reported by other media agencies, including Yonhap.[28][29] |
8 (Alleged) | 20 October 2016 7:00 am PST | Kusong | None | Failure |
Strategic implications
Currently, North Korea is also working on land based nuclear deterrents that are of Intercontinental range, such as Hwasong-13 (and its variant, named KN-14 under United States naming convention). It is also working a sea-based nuclear deterrent, such as Pukguksong-1 SLBM.
North Korea has confirmed to have successfully launched a Pukguksong-1 missile in a full test flight in a lofted trajectory and expecting Pukguksong-1 to be operationally deployed as early as before 2017 by South Korea military source on 25 August 2016.[30]
In May 2017, North Korea successfully tested a new missile, the Hwasong-12, with a similar range to the Hwasong-10. It had been displayed in the April 2017 military parade on the Hwasong-10 mobile launcher, and the Hwasong-12 may be intended to replace the Hwasong-10 which has been shown unreliable during its test programme.[31][7] The Hwasong-10 was not shown in the February 2018 military parade, suggesting again that the design had not been deployed.[8]
Operators
![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/90/BM25_operators.png/400px-BM25_operators.png)
Current operators
North Korea: According to one source, more than 200;[32] other source claims 12 deployed.[33] 16 were seen at once during the October 10, 2010 Military Parade, although experts contacted by the Washington Post believed these were mock-ups of the missile.[6]
Suspected operators
Iran: 19, according to a leaked, classified U.S. State Department cable.[34] The Khorramshahr, which was first publicly displayed on 22 September 2017, is likely derived from Hwasong-10.[35]
See also
Notes
References
- ^ a b "Kim Jong Un Guides Test-fire of SSM Hwasong-10". Korean Central News Agency. 29 September 2021. Retrieved 18 January 2025.
- ^ a b c "BM-25 Musudan (Hwasong-10)". Missile Threat. 8 August 2016. Retrieved 18 August 2017.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Markus Schiller (2012). Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat (Report). RAND Corporation. ISBN 978-0-8330-7621-2. TR-1268-TSF. Retrieved 19 January 2013.
- ^ "Facts about North Korea's Musudan missile". GlobalPost. 8 April 2013. Archived from the original on 24 May 2013. Retrieved 10 April 2013.
IHS Jane's puts the estimated range at anywhere between 2,500 and 4,000 kilometres ... potential payload size has been put at 1.0-1.25 tonnes.
- ^ a b Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee (June 2017). "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat". National Air and Space Intelligence Center. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
- ^ a b John Pomfret and Walter Pincus (1 December 2010). "Experts question North Korea-Iran missile link from WikiLeaks document release". The Washington Post. Retrieved 13 June 2012.
- ^ a b Panda, Ankit (15 May 2017). "North Korea's New Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile, the Hwasong-12: First Takeaways". The Diplomat. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
- ^ a b Elleman, Michael (8 February 2018). "North Korea's Army Day Military Parade: One New Missile System Unveiled". 38 North. U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Retrieved 9 February 2018.
- ^ a b Anthony H. Cordesman; Aaron Lin (25 March 2015). "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat" (PDF). Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
- ^ C. P. Vick (2000–2004). "2nd 3rd Right Side". Global Security. Retrieved 18 August 2017.
{{cite web}}
: CS1 maint: date format (link) - ^ Markus Schiller, Robert H. Schmucker (31 May 2012). Explaining the Musudan (PDF) (Report). Arms Control Wonk. Retrieved 16 April 2013.
- ^ Emmanuelle Maitre (10 March 2023). "Le Musudan : quels progrès techniques et stratégiques pour Pyongyang ?" [The Musudan: what technical and strategic progress for Pyongyang?]. Foundation for Strategic Research (in French). Retrieved 8 February 2025.
- ^ JH Ahn (14 April 2016). "North Korea deploys missile for possible launch: Yonhap". NK News. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
- ^ Anna Fifield (14 April 2016). "North Korea's missile launch has failed, South's military says". The Washington Post. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
- ^ Hyung-Jin Kim (29 April 2016). "North Korea's missile launch has failed, South's military says". Associated Press. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
- ^ a b Euan McKirdy; Paula Hancocks (29 April 2016). "North Korea launches two midrange missiles; both tests fail". CNN. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
- ^ Tamir Eshel (31 May 2016). "North Korean Musudan IRBM Failed - Again". Defense Update. Retrieved 23 June 2016.
- ^ "(3rd LD) N. Korea botches fifth Musudan missile test-launch". Yonhap News Agency. 22 June 2016. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
- ^ "North Korean missiles fall in Sea of Japan- Pentagon". Reuters. 22 June 2016. Retrieved 18 August 2017.
- ^ "N. Korea's fifth Musudan test might not have been failure: US expert". The Korea Times. 29 June 2016. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
- ^ Ankit Panda (23 June 2016). "North Korea's Musudan Missile Test Actually Succeeded. What Now?". The Diplomat. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
- ^ Vasudevan Sridharan (23 June 2016). "Kim Jong-un boasts of North Korea's Musudan missiles launch". International Business Times UK. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
- ^ "North Korea conducted failed ballistic missile test, US military says". The Guardian. 15 October 2016. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
- ^ "US military detects 'failed ballistic missile launch' in North Korea after state media vows revenge for 'hostile acts'". The Independent. 15 October 2016. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
- ^ "(LEAD) N. Korea's launch of Musudan missile ends in failure again: military". Yonhap News Agency. 20 October 2016. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
- ^ Anna Fifield (26 October 2016). "Did North Korea just test missiles capable of hitting the U.S.? Maybe". The Washington Post. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
- ^ Jonathan McDowell. "Tests of Hwasong-12 missile family". Planet4589.org. Retrieved 4 January 2025.
- ^ "(LEAD) N. Korea's failed missile tests could have involved KN-08: U.S. expert". Yonhap News Agency. 27 October 2016. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
- ^ "美专家:朝鲜本月试射的并非"舞水端"而是洲际弹道导弹" ["American expert: North Korea's missile test in this month isn't 'Musudan' but an ICBM"]. China Radio International (in Chinese). 27 October 2016. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
- ^ "(2nd LD) N.K. leader calls SLBM launch success, boasts of nuke attack capacity". Yonhap News Agency. 25 August 2016. Retrieved 6 February 2025.
- ^ John Schilling (14 May 2017). "North Korea's Latest Missile Test: Advancing towards an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) While Avoiding US Military Action". 38 North. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
- ^ Richard Finney (13 October 2010). "North's Missiles Raise Concerns". Radio Free Asia. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
- ^ "North Korea Rolls Out Ballistic Missiles". Global Security Newswire. 13 October 2010. Archived from the original on 17 October 2010. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
- ^ William J. Broad; James Glanz; David E. Sanger (28 November 2010). "Iran Fortifies Its Arsenal With the Aid of North Korea". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 27 May 2011. Retrieved 28 November 2010.
- ^ "Khorramshahr". Missile Threat. 29 September 2017. Retrieved 18 August 2017.
External links
- BM-25 Musudan (Hwasong-10) - Missile Threat
- R-27, astronautix.com
- R-27, Globalsecurity.org
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